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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research by explaining the background and motivation to the 
research. The background analysis sets out to examine the current scene in Taiwan and the 
several pressures, which are creating change and uncertainty within the education system in 
Taiwan in order to see if there is a knowledge gap where research could be usefully applied. 
The purpose and aims of the research are explained, together with the content of each of the 
chapters of the thesis. 
1.2 Research Background and Motivation 
Currently, the higher education sector in Taiwan is feeling under pressure and there is an 
increased need for the sector to adapt to change. There are several causative factors, some 
interrelated, for example: 
there are both public and private universities 
- the globalization of education means that foreign universities are attracting 
Taiwanese students 
- the changing economy and employment requirements 
the declining birth rate 
- too many student places 
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the changing higher education emphasis 
the Taiwan government is looking to use the higher education budget more 
efficiently. 
Education in Taiwan is not a free market because there are both public and private 
universities. The private universities have been encouraged to develop rapidly to meet the 
higher education expansion needs particularly of the last two decades. However, although 
the Taiwan government gives financial support to universities on the basis of a student 
number evaluation, the public universities always receive a larger state contribution than 
private universities, and the private universities have a proportionately greater dependence 
on academic fees from students. So, particularly the private universities tend to be more 
susceptible to changes in the economy or decline in the numbers of students, because this 
will mean even less government financial support. Also, each university cannot cut salaries 
because these are set nationally, so any university which is unable to attract enough 
students will become progressively even weaker financially. Taiwanese parents try to send 
their children to the most prestigious universities, so low ranking private universities tend 
to be the most vulnerable, and eventually some universities may be unable to continue. 
Globalization refers to the interdependence of world society (Giddens, 1989), and it is now 
suggested that there is a global war for talent in higher education which is influencing 
national education policies (Green, 1999; Bottery, 2000). Thus, developed countries try to 
attract students to their universities because these universities are often under pressure 
financially, and also if talented students stay on after their education is completed they 
contribute to the host country economy. Many universities from developed countries are 
offering degree courses both in their own countries and in Far East centres such as Hong 
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Kong and Singapore, many of which are attracting Taiwanese students. Consequently, 
developing states like Taiwan must be careful not to lose their talented people because, for 
example, Gomory and Shapiro (2003) report that more than 40 percent of scientific Ph. D. 
students trained in the United States are now foreign nationals, and only about half of these 
return to their countries of origin. Also, globalization is changing the nature of careers and 
employment (Sennett, 1998). In the past, people used to have linear career lives with "a 
lifelong channel for one's economic pursuits" (p. 9). However, the modern emphasis is on 
flexibility, and in the twenty-first century people can expect to do several jobs during their 
life. In the developed counties the number of jobs for people without any qualifications has 
decreased. Thus, globalization is increasing the importance of having a well-educated 
workforce and it is seen as the key to participating successfully in the globalized world 
(Pollard, 1997; Tipton, 1998). In Taiwan, degrees from overseas tend to be valued more 
highly, so again this puts pressure particularly on the low ranking Taiwan universities. 
Furthermore, there is political influence on the education system, as Green (1997) and 
Bottery and Wright (2000) argue, because, in many countries, e. g. Germany, France, USA, 
and Japan, the role and function of the education system has been influenced by the 
creation of the nation-state, because in many cases the education system was designed to 
spread the dominant cultures, develop political and cultural unity and consolidate the 
hegemony of the ruling classes. This has also occurred in Taiwan, like Japan, because it has 
used its education system for two purposes. Firstly, as a way to construct national identity 
and state power. Secondly, for the development of economic competitiveness, by 
intervention to guide economic activity to specific national requirements (Bottery and 
Wright, 2000: 8). 
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Murgatroyd and Morgan (1993) also emphasise this point of political pressures by 
highlighting the growing importance of 'return on investment' in education internationally, 
which focuses on organizational profitability. They highlight four important drivers (p-3): 
(1) Costs and demands for public education provision are outstripping revenue. 
(2) Some taxpayers are baulking at paying. 
(3) Parents and governments are re-defining what they expect from schools (to include 
personal, health and social education) 
(4) Government and influential groups expect education to contribute to national economic 
competitiveness. 
Indeed, this appears to be happening in Taiwan with globalization pressures, because 
education leaders and politicians in Taiwan now appear to be tending towards the market 
system as the solution to education provision which appears to be creating a market driven 
education system emphasising financial efficiency and profitability in Taiwan. 
The number of Taiwanese universities have increased in recent decades to educate the 
increasing number of students, however since about 1998/99 there has been increasing 
pressure on colleges who are finding it increasingly difficult to fill all their student places 
that have been created. This is partly a cultural factor because parents want their children to 
go to the top universities, and prefer universities rather than colleges because the degree is 
considered more valuable and employability potential better. However it is also a 
consequence of the declining birth rate in Taiwan, as illustrated in Figure 1.2 (Education 
Statistics, 2004: 22). 
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Figure 1.1 Number of Primary School children in Taiwan 1984 - 2004 (Education Statistics, 
R. O. C., 2004: 22). 
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All Taiwanese children attend elementary primary school, and Figure 2.1 shows that the 
number of primary school children peaked at around 2.4 millions in 1988, and has declined 
to about 1.9 millions in 2004. Primary school entry age is six, and university entry age is 
usually eighteen, so the number of entry age university students is expected to decline 
significantly until around 2008. On the basis of the number of births in Taiwan from 2000 
to 2004 (Figure 1.3) the decline in the student numbers is likely to continue to decline for a 
long time after 2008 (www. moi., gov. tw/stat). Of course, decline in higher education student 
numbers will mean a further decline in the education budget allocation from the Taiwan 
Government. 
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Figure 1.2 Number of Births in Taiwan 2000 - 2004 (w-"A-v. moi. gov. txN,, /stat). 
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For several decades, the emphasis of the Taiwan higher education policy was on quantity 
expansion, but now there are too many student places so, during the twenty-first century, 
the policy is changing towards more emphasis on quality. One potential solution for some 
universities is to merge with another institution, perhaps more prestigious or to create a 
better mix of course provision, and to try to reduce managerial overheads and improve their 
financial positions and therefore to keep running. However, of several possible mergers 
which have been tried in recent years in Taiwan, only one merger so far seems to have been 
successful - the formation of National Chiayi University. Other institutions which have 
tried to merge have subsequently ceased trying to merge and remain separate institutions. 
These then are unsuccessful merger cases. 
However, the questions arise - Why has one merger been successful and the other mergers 
been unsuccessful, and are there guidelines for successful higher education sector merging 
in Taiwan? 
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There has been no systematic attempt or published explanation, as far as I know, to try to 
reach an understanding of why one case has been successful and why several other mergers 
have been unsuccessful in Taiwan. Consequently, with all these pressures and lack of 
understanding about merging, there are fears and anxieties in the Taiwan higher education 
system. From my personal point of view, I am a lecturer at a private college in Taiwan and 
in the early stages of my career, so these pressures can have very real and important 
consequences for my career development. Therefore, this is my motivation to carry out this 
research about higher education mergers because there appears to be a knowledge gap 
which is important to the higher education sector in Taiwan and which this research project 
can explore. 
1.3 The meanings of Merger, Successful Merger and Unsuccessful Merger in this 
Research 
In this research the following working definitions are adopted for Merger, Successful 
Merger and Unsuccessful Merger: 
Merger: An higher educational institution which has been formed from the joining of two 
or more previously separate educational institutions. As a minimum, the merged institution 
has one name, one principal chief executive and one top policy administration. 
Successful merger: A merged higher education institution which continues to exist as a 
merged entity more than four years after the start of merging. (This is a working definition 
adopted merely for ease of reference concerning the mergers considered in the primary data 
collection during this research, and because this is also the criterion used by the Taiwan 
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Ministry interviewees. However, it is accepted that what is successful can depend on one's 
perspective, which suggests the need for qualitative primary data). 
Unsuccessful merger: A merger attempt by higher education institutions which has failed to 
produce a merged institution. 
1.4 The Purpose and Aims of the Research 
The purpose of this research is to explore the knowledge gap about university mergers in 
Taiwan to generate understanding about the criteria needed for successful merging. 
The six explicit research aims at the start of the research were: 
(1) To carry out a literature review about higher education mergers 
(2) To search for existing published data about higher education mergers in Taiwan 
(3) To generate new data about higher education mergers in Taiwan 
(4) To analyse the data to generate new understanding about higher education mergers, 
principally in Taiwan 
(5) To explain why one merger has been successful and another merger was unsuccessful. 
(6) To recommend guidelines for successful higher education sector merging in Taiwan 
At the start of the research, it was expected that attainment of these aims would generate 
five research outputs, as follows: 
qualitative opinions concerning a case of successful merging 
qualitative opinions concerning a case of a failed merger attempt 
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increased understanding of successful and unsuccessful mergers 
explanation of what leads to a successful merger and an unsuccessful merger 
recommendations of the required criteria for successful merging. 
1.5 Overview of the Thesis Chapters 
The research is reported in a total of eight chapters. 
Chapter One is the introduction chapter for the thesis. It aims to explain the motivation and 
background to the research by the identification of a knowledge gap which is creating fears 
and anxiety within the educational community in Taiwan. Also, the purpose, aims and 
hoped for research outputs are explained. 
Chapter Two contains the first literature review chapter. This chapter looks briefly at 
Chinese organizational culture in Taiwan, and then explains the set up of higher education 
in Taiwan. It moves on to review previous published research about education mergers 
across the world in order to discover the existing knowledge and understanding in this area, 
and to generate a list of most appropriate questions to ask interviewees. 
Chapter Three contains the second part of the literature review. This chapter describes the 
successful case, the unsuccessful case, and the role of the Education Ministry in Taiwan. 
Chapter Four contains the first chapter addressing the research methodology. This chapter 
reviews the methodological approaches, looks at their strengths and weaknesses, and 
selects the most appropriate approach for this study. 
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Chapter Five progresses the methodological approach focus by explaining implementation 
of the methodology choice concerning interview process for interviews, interview guide, 
gaining access for the interviews, and the people to be interviewed. 
Chapter Six reports the results of the research. This chapter contains a summary of the 
answers of the interviewees to the list of interview questions using quotations from the 
transcipts of the interviews, and preliminary analysis. 
In Chapter Seven the results are further analysed and discussed and compared and 
contrasted with research results from other studies. 
Chapter Eight sets out the conclusions which are drawn from the research and puts forward 
several recommendations to increase the chances of success when carrying out higher 
education mergers in Taiwan. 
1.6 Conclusion 
This introduction chapter has revealed that there are pressures from several different 
sources on the higher education sector in Taiwan. These pressures are leading to merging of 
educational institutions which are creating fears and anxiety within the education 
community in Taiwan. However, there appears to have been no systematic attempt or 
published explanation to try to reach an understanding of the reasons for merger success or 
failure in Taiwan. Thus, there appears to be a knowledge gap which is important to the 
higher education sector in Taiwan and which this research project will explore to generate 
understanding about the criteria needed for successful merging. One appropriate research 
22 
methodology for the project would appear to be to collect and examine the points of view 
of participants involved in specific cases of university mergers, involving both successful 
and unsuccessful mergers. The study should be able to generate five imPortant research 
outputs. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 1: 
Chinese Organizational Culture, Higher Education in Taiwan, 
and Previous Research about Education Mergers 
2.1 Introduction 
Firstly, this chapter looks at Chinese organizational culture to form a basis for 
understanding the research analyses of the primary data collection. Secondly, it examines 
the current set up concerning higher education in Taiwan, particularly regarding the number 
of students, and the number of public and private institutions. Thirdly, the chapter contains 
a review of previous literature about education mergers. The initial literature search used 
the key words - education and merger - and this surfaced about twenty publications, but 
none from Taiwan. The reference lists of these publications were used to find other relevant 
publications for review. 
2.2 Chinese Organizational Culture 
Hofstede (1991) sees culture as the collective programming of the mind which can 
distinguish one group from other groups. It is the personality of the society or organization. 
Culture involves shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices. Deal and Kennedy (1982) 
point out that the core of organizational culture is the values embodied in the beliefs, and 
rituals of the organization, and that "a strong culture is a system of informal rules that spells 
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out how people are to behave most of the time" (p. 15). It is important because it affects 
how societies and organizations operate, evolve and can operate better. Culture is 
recognized as stable and difficult to change, and a factor which can affect the internal 
coherence of the society or organization and how well it can adapt to change (Schein, 1992). 
The majority of Taiwan's population trace their ethnic and cultural origins from mainland 
China. In Chinese culture, the important factors are harmony, guanxi (connections), mianzi 
(face), seniority, and authority (Chen, 2001). Thus, 'top-down' decision making is 
traditional and accepted. Also, Chinese people avoid creating conflict because of the 
Confucian emphasis on harmony (Leung et al, 2002). 
Meade (1970) has compared the Chinese and American cultures and reported that 
traditional Chinese culture stresses respect for age and experience and there is an inherent 
feeling to obey the authority much more than the West. Consequently the traditional 
management style in Taiwanese organizations tends to be based on traditional Chinese 
culture leading to the top-down autocratic style relying on a power structure rather than 
democratic management style. Recent generations who attended university have been more 
influenced by Western culture and thinking, so the younger generation may tend to have 
slightly different values and be more individualistic (Cheng and Kleiner, 1993). Chow et al 
(1998) examined cultural influences by comparing Taiwanese and US staff and found 
differences. Taiwanese people made fewer misrepresentations than Americans about 
private information in non face-to-face interactions, but both nationalities showed an even 
lower misrepresentation rate in face-to-face interactions concerning private information. 
This is particularly relevant when reflecting on the validity of the research findings. Chow 
et al (1999) found that participation in budgeting was lower in Taiwanese companies than 
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in US owned firms in Taiwan, indicating more centralized control in Taiwanese 
organizations. 
Consequently, it appears that Taiwanese organizations generally involve the traditional 
centralized top-down hierarchical decision making and are likely to adopt the traditional 
Chinese culture of respect for traditional practices and authority. 
In the field of education, Green (1997) suggests that national education systems were 
designed to spread the dominant cultures, develop political and cultural unity and 
consolidate the hegemony of the ruling classes in nations. Taiwan has followed the same 
example, and used its education system for two purposes. Firstly, as a way to construct 
national identity and consolidate state power. Secondly, for the development of national 
economic competitiveness, by intervention to guide economic activity to specific national 
requirements (Bottery and Wright, 2000). 
Grace (1995) points out the importance of the recontextualization of education in the 
marketplace, as part of the increasing market culture in education which has meant that 
education has become another commodity in the wider political, cultural, economic and 
ideological movements of society. Greenfield and Ribbins (1986) have argued that sPecific 
national education leadership-culture and education leadership-values relationships are only 
understandable in the light of the historical and cultural contexts of the societies in which 
they are found. Internationally, Bottery and Wright (2000) propose that education has 
become more centrally managed by government, with loss of autonomy and 
deprofessionalization of teaching, because they have identified the same features in the 
USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. As a consequence, success or failure in 
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education has become judged by an outcomes-based approach using only carefully selected 
criteria. 
Taiwanese education is also centrally managed, as revealed by the Ministry of Education 
role in the review of higher education in Taiwan (Chapter 3), and there has been a shift 
towards a market driven approach (Chapter 1), all of which must be considered within the 
strong tradition for a top-down decision making culture. 
2.3 Higher Education in Taiwan 
2.3.1 The Current Education System in Taiwan 
In order to understand the position of higher education in Taiwan, it is useful to start by 
looking at the position of higher education within the current education system of Taiwan 
(Education Statistics, R. O. C., 2004). 
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Figure 2.1 Diagrammatic representation of the current school system in Taiwan(Ed u cation 
Statistics, R. O. C., 2004) 
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Figure 2.1 contains a diagrammatic representation of Taiwan's current schooling system, 
which shows that for the great majority of students higher education starts at age eighteen, 
although some students do enter Junior College at age fifteen. Higher education is provided 
in universities, colleges, technology colleges, and junior colleges. The junior colleges and 
technology colleges can offer courses which lead to bachelor degrees. The colleges can 
offer courses leading to bachelor and master level degrees, while the universities can 
provide the full range of higher education degrees at bachelor, masters and doctoral level 
degrees. 
Figure 2.2 contains a diagram of the Education Administrative System in Taiwan 
(Education Statistics, R. O. C., 2004). This contains both Administration and guidance lines 
of control and influence. This illustrates that education leadership in Taiwan starts at the 
Executive Yuan (the Government of Taiwan Cabinet) and the administration is carried out 
through the Ministry of Education of Taiwan which administers the National schools at all 
levels, the National Social Education Organizations, the private universities and colleges, 
and the private senior secondary schools. The Ministry of Education also has input into the 
Bureau of Education for both the County and City Governments, and of the Municipalities, 
which is referred to as the guidance line of influence in the Taiwan education system. 
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Figure 2.2 Diagram of the Education Administrative System in Taiwan(Education 
Statistics, R. O. C., 2004). 
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Figure 2.3 Diagram of the Organization of the Taiwan Ministry of Education in 
2004(Education Statistics, R. O. C., 2004) 
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Figure 2.3 contains a diagram of the organization of the Taiwan Ministry of Education in 
2004 (Education Statistics, R. O. C., 2004). Figure 2.3 illustrates that reporting to the 
Minister of Education there are two Vice Ministers: the Administrative Vice Minister and 
the Political Vice Minister. Both the Minister of Education and the Political Vice Minister 
are appointed by the party elected into government by the Taiwan people, while the 
Administrative Vice Minister is a career member of the civil service administration. The 
Administrative Vice Minister controls both the Internal Units and the Affiliated Schools. 
There are thirty-two Internal units, and one of these is the Department of Education. The 
Affiliated Schools are all National Schools, all of which come directly under the 
Administrative Vice Minister. 
2.3.2 Higher Education 
In the list of Affiliated Schools, there are fifty-two schools in the Higher Education sector - 
consisting of thirty universities, nineteen colleges, and three Junior colleges (Education 
Statistics, R. O. C., 2004). These fifty -two schools are the National higher education 
universities and colleges of. Taiwan. Also, there are two municipal higher education 
institutions, therefore in total there are fifty-four (54) public universities and colleges in 
Taiwan. The Ministry of Education also administers the private universities and colleges, as 
described above. There are one hundred and four (104) private universities and colleges in 
Taiwan. 
Therefore, in 2004 there were a total of one hundred and fifty eight (158) institutions of 
higher education in Taiwan, all of which come under the direct or indirect responsibility of 
the Ministry of Education. A summary of the institutions of higher education in Taiwan in 
2004 is given in Table 2.1, the breakdown showing the division into graduate schools, 
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departments, courses, and includes the number of full time and part time teachers, and the 
number of students and graduates. 
The breakdown indicates that most students (58 per cent) are at universities rather than 
colleges or Junior colleges. Also, most students (72 per cent) are receiving their higher 
education at private universities, private colleges and private Junior colleges rather than at 
the public institutions. It is also interesting to note that, just considering the universities, at 
the thirty National (Public) universities there are 14122 full time teachers for the 270210 
students, while at the thirty-seven private universities there are only slightly more full time 
teachers (14842) for the 460589 students. However, there are 6204 more part time teachers 
at the private universities than at the National universities. The average student: teacher 
ratio at the national (public) universities is about 12, while at the private universities the 
average student: teacher ratio is almost 16. This could be interpreted as suggesting that the 
private universities are driven by competition to be more efficient at the education process 
than the public universities, which may or may not be true. However, it is also necessary to 
take account of the type of students. When the type of students is examined, it is seen that 
the public universities educate about twice as many Masters level students, and more than 
five times as many Ph. D. level students, both of which tend to require a higher student: 
teacher ratio than the Bachelor level teaching. Also, the public universities are generally 
rated, by both ordinary people and academics, to be of higher quality than the private 
universities at Bachelor level, and the degrees are generally more highly regarded. 
Table 2.1 Summary Breakdown of Universities, Colleges and Junior Colleges in Taiwan 
(Education Statistics, R. O. C., 2003/4). 
National Munici Private 
Type Total Univ. Coll. Jr. Coll 
Univ. I Coll. I Jr Coll -pal Univ. Coll. I Jr. Coll 
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All 158 67 75 16 30 19 3 2 37 54 13 
Graduate 
2215 1918 297 - 1103 169 - 24 815 104 - 
schools 
Departme 
4059 2249 1810 - 852 320 - 20 1397 1470 - 
nts 
Courses 1105 104 829 172 42 108 11 - 62 721 161 
F/T 
47472 28964 16738 1770 14122 3380 112 350 14842 13008 1658 
Teachers 
P/T 
35506 22784 11730 992 8290 2535 113 160 14494 9035 879 
teachers 
All 
1270194 730799 490812 48583 270210 78025 2804 5344 460589 407443 45779 
Students 
PhD 
21658 21338 320 - 17986 271 - 35 3352 14 - 
students 
Masters 
121909 110486 11423 71683 7287 1258 38803 2878 
students 
Number 
of 
318867 168740 138130 11997 61339 19697 249 1459 107401 116974 11748 
graduates 
2003 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the great increase in the number of undergraduates at both public and 
private universities and colleges in Taiwan from 1950 to 2004. However, the graph shows 
that the number of undergraduates at private universities and colleges has grown at a much 
higher rate than at the National higher education universities and colleges, particularly 
since the mid-1990s. 
Figure 2.4 The number of undergraduates at private and public universities and colleges in 
Taiwan 1950- 2003 (Education Statistics, R. O. C., 2004: 20-23). 
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During the 1990s, Taiwanese universities were encouraged by the Taiwan Government to 
increase the number of places for postgraduates, because many students wanted to study for 
a Masters or Doctorate degree but most students could not afford the cost of studying 
overseas. Thus, the numbers of postgraduates at Taiwan's public and private universities 
and colleges have increased greatly particularly since around 1990, as shown in Figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.5 The number of postgraduates at private and public universities and colleges in 
Taiwan 1950-2003 (Education Statistics, R. O. C., 2004, P. 20-23). 
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Figure 2.5 illustrates that the growth in postgraduate places has been much greater at the 
public universities rather than at the private universities in Taiwan. 
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From Table 2.1, it can be seen that both the public and the private universities have 
graduates/ students ratios of about 0.23, which is surprising given the much higher growth 
in the numbers of students attending the private universities compared with the public 
universities over the recent past, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. This suggests a slightly higher 
failure rate at the public universities which may be interpreted as supporting the view that 
these universities maintain higher standards on average than the private universities. 
2.3.3 Higher Education Entrance Examinations 
Entry to higher education institutions in Taiwan is by examination. The public and private 
universities and colleges have a joint entrance examination, which is taken across the 
nation in a three day period each year. Similarly, the public and private Junior colleges 
have a joint entrance examination, which is taken across the nation on one day each year, 
but this examination is different from the public and private universities and colleges joint 
entrance examination. 
All students in Taiwan who wish to enter higher education must take and pass the entrance 
examination. Also, students in Junior college who wish to move to universities and colleges 
must take and pass the joint entrance examination of the public and private universities and 
colleges. 
Students use their examination grade to guide the choice of university. A higher grade 
means more choice, and the chance to gain entry to one of the higher ranking higher 
education institutions. 
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2.3.4 Higher Education Funding 
Funding for higher education institutions comes from two main sources: Taiwan 
Government and academic fees from students. 
To determine the state funding, the Ministry of Education carries out an evaluation each 
year of each higher education institution in terms of research result of teachers, equipment, 
the financial statement of the university, the numbers of undergraduate and postgraduate 
students... etc. The higher the ranking from the evaluation by the Ministry of Education, 
the more the funding to the higher education institution from the state. If higher education 
institution have high savings reserves, the government may even decide to reduce the state 
funding allocation to them. In the case of a public higher education institution, if they run 
out of funds, it appears that they can call on the government for more funding. Also, the 
government provides support to buy equipment and buildings for public higher education 
institutions. However, the private universities have to survive on the allocation from 
government and fees, so they need to budget very carefully. 
Table 2.2 shows the private expenditure and total state expenditure at University, College 
and Junior colleges 1980-2003 
(Education Statistics, R. O. C., 2004: 43 -45). The total state expenditure includes allocation 
to both private and public universities. The table indicates the large growth in expenditure 
since 1980, both in the public and in the private sectors. Many private Junior colleges were 
reclassified as colleges and universities, in 2000, but even so the growth in expenditure to 
private colleges and universities has been enormous. 
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Table 2.2 Private expenditure and Total State Expenditure at University, College and 
Junior colleges 1980-2003 
(NTD billions) 
Total State Expenditure Public Expenditure Private Expenditure 
Year Junior 
College 
Universities 
& Colleges 
Junior 
College 
Universities 
& Colleges 
Junior 
College 
Universities 
& Colleges 
1980/1 6.1 10.0 2.6 7.0 3.5 3.0 
1986/7 10.9 18.7 4.6 13.8 6.3 4.9 
1990/1 20.2 51.0 6.5 35.6 13.7 15.4 
1995/6 34.2 71.9 9.2 44.9 25.0 27.0 
1998/9 37.8 96.3 9.1 51.2 28.7 45.1 
00/01 - - - - 8.9 96.5 
02/03 0.7 79.7 6.5 115.7 
In Table 2.2, the expenditure on public Junior Colleges and Universities and Colleges is 
determined by subtracting the private expenditure (by the state) from the total state 
expenditure in order to indicate the differences in expenditure between public and private 
institutions over the years. The expenditures for 2002/3 concerning public and private 
universities, colleges and Junior colleges presented in Table 2.2 is as given in Education 
Statistics, R. O. C., 2004: 43 -45. 
From Table 2.1, in 2003/4 there were a total of 49 public universities and colleges and there 
were a total of 91 private universities and colleges. Hence, this suggests that the average 
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allocation for each public university or college was 1.6 NTD billions, while the average 
allocation for each private university or college was 1.3 NTD billions. 
Also, in 2003/4 there were a total of 348835 students at public universities and colleges, so 
this suggests that the average allocation for each student at a public university or college 
was 0.23 NTD millions, while there were a total of 868032 students at private universities 
and colleges, so this suggests the average allocation for each student at a private university 
or college was 0.13 NTD millions. 
This supports the generally held view that the public higher education institutions get a 
much larger state contribution than private higher education institutions, and the private 
higher education institutions have a proportionately greater dependence on the academic 
fees from students. 
2.4 Previous Research about Education Mergers 
2.4.1 Literature review 
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Merging of educational institutions is not a new phenomenon and not an infrequent 
occurrence. In the UK, merging of educational establishments dates at least to the 191 
century (Harman and Harman, 2003), and in the USA, the US Office of Higher Education 
reported up to 23 mergers each year from 1940 to 1978 (Boberg, 1979). Merging has 
probably been happening to a varying degree throughout the history of the existence of 
educational establishments in response to the changing needs and demands of the society 
which the education system aims to serve. 
However, Humpal (1971: 103) noted that the "paucity of any kind of literature which 
systematically addresses the organizational and behavioral aspects of merger" had created 
an information gap in this area. Humpal highlighted that mergers cause high personal and 
organizational stress involving uncertainty, anxiety, role conflict, ambiguity and distrust. A 
major cause of these problems appears to be that the merged entity is unlikely to absorb all 
members of the previous separate institutions, which emphasised the important factor of 
power differentials between participants. 
Merger proposals create threats for institutional loyalties and administrations and 
consequently are usually controversial, but they provide opportunities for solving problems, 
for re-adjustment, and for innovation leading to survival or growth (Harman, 1988). There 
is an extensive literature on this subject from a number of different countries, particularly 
since the second world war to the present day, indicating that mergers continue to occur in 
the modern era and that the subject is of continuing interest and importance. However as 
Rothschild and White (1993: 34) noted "the analysis of university behaviour in a market 
context has been an under-researched area". 
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Merging in higher education is influenced not only by educational ideals but also by 
political and financial necessity (Meek, 1988). Both the UK and Australia have had binary 
higher education systems involving academic universities and teacher training colleges, but 
wit the decline in the birth rates in the 1960s and the expected decline in demand for 
teachers, there were many cases of cross-sectoral mergers between universities and colleges. 
Universities are larger and more powerful, and inevitably attitudes of their staff to merging 
carried the most weight. People were in favour during initial phases when their 
expectations were focused on better conditions, better facilities, and raised academic 
prestige. However, staff at some colleges feared shrinkage or disappearance, but reluctantly 
accepted that this was inevitable because of the external pressures of declining birth rate 
and poor economy. The research of Meek (1988) indicates that cross-sectoral mergers 
involved particular problems of different funding sources, co-ordination and course 
accreditation. However, the merged entity was always a university. 
In the Netherlands, Goedegebuure and Vos (1988) report that changes in higher education 
had the objectives of improving efficiency and effectiveness by: size enlargement by 
merging; increase of autonomy; and greater efficiency of resources usage. They note that 
game theory is relevant in merging. In particular, "the larger the differences in power 
between actors... the larger the degree of harmony of interest between actors" (p. 209). 
However, I wonder whether perhaps this harmony is superficial because the weak do not 
complain. Their analysis suggests that merger negotiations between unequal organizitions 
have more chance of success than those between more equal organizations, unless oiie or 
both organizations are under 'shrinkage' pressure, which can increase willingness to merge 
between 'equal' organizations. Consequently, the relative status and viability of merging 
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institutions is likely to be an important influencing factor on whether mergers succeed or 
fail. 
Goedegebuure (1992) explains merger occurrences on the basis of the resource dependency 
theory, meaning that mergers occur because of diminishing resources, or the threat of them. 
However, Jansen (2002) argues that there are problems with this assumption because it 
suggests that institutions act rationally, when in practice it is observed that sometimes 
institutions resist merging even when it appears to be financially beneficial for the pnaies. 
Also, the assumed view that merger policy implementation is a rational process, and 
proceeds in practice as planned, is often not the case because "the merger plan is not the 
merger" (Eastman and Lang, 2001: 243). 
Sehoole (2005) carried out a comparative case study of several mergers in South Africa 
using a semi-structured interview methodology schedule involving individuals, focus 
groups of students, academics, administrative and technical staff to try to answer the three 
questions : (1) How do mergers happen? (2) What are the effects of mergers on curricLilum, 
organizational and physical integration? (3) Why are mergers difficult to implement as 
planned? Sehoole concluded that the origins, processes and effects of mergers depetid on 
the interaction of institutional and governmental politics. Thus, Sehoole stressed the 
importance of politics in merging and challenged the assumed view of rationality in the 
merging process because government policy was not rational, coherent or congruent, rather 
a contingency theory of merging was proposed because merging origins, forms and 
outcomes were conditioned by the turbulent environment of institutional micro-politics and 
government macro-politics. Sehoole proposed that merger form and outcome were 
contingent on whether there was strong institutional leadership, strategic leadershiji, and 
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strong proactive government intervention. The political interactions affected whether there 
was autonomy or incorporation, whether there was choice of incorporating partner, and 
who owned college plant and property, after merging which were important to participants. 
Bates and Santerre (2000) mathematically analysed closures and mergers in higher 
education in the U. S. A. from 1960 to 1994, and revealed a direct linkage between merger 
rate and tuition fee or salary changes. In this period, 1969 saw the largest number of 
mergers, 11. Their analysis showed that the rate of occurrence of mergers declined with 
increase of tuition fee rise because a one percent increase in tuition was associated with a 
7.7 percent decline in merger rate. In contrast, the rate of merger occurrence increased 
when there was a real salary increase because a one percent salary increase led to a 16 
percent increase in merger rate. This research seems to suggest that some higher education 
institutions are living on a financial knife-edge, and that consequently even small changes 
in the income stream could have rapid consequences on viability. 
Harman and Harman (2003) have reviewed recent international experience of mergers in 
higher education. They point out that mergers have been used by both national 
governments and institutions, and that there can be different degrees of collaboration 
between institutions: ranging from informal cooperation, to a certain amount of 
coordination, through to formal institutional mergers or amalgamations. They define a 
merger as "the combination of two or more separate organizations, with overall 
management control coming under a single governing body and single chief executive" 
(p. 30). The new institution usually assumes all assets, liabilities and responsibilities of the 
former separate institutions. However, the control structure may be of either a federal or 
43 
unitary type. Federal refers to some retention of autonomy by (prior) institutions after 
merging, while in the unitary case there is complete integration of the power structure. 
Harman and Harman (2003) point out a variety of merger purposes, for example: major re- 
structuring; efforts to address problems of institutional fragmentation; lack of financial 
and/or academic viability; low efficiency; low quality; in order to tackle financial problems; 
falling student demand; and competition. They identify several types of higher education 
merger: 
Voluntary and involuntary mergers 
Consolidations and take-overs 
Single sector and cross-sectoral mergers 
Two-partner and multi-partner mergers 
Similar and different academic profile mergers. 
Harman and Harman (2003) comment that mergers tend to be more successful in 
'horizontal' mergers where the potential for integration and articulation between 
institutional goals and visions is greater, than in cross-sectoral or 'vertical' mergers where 
visions are less likely to be similar. This comment appears to contradict the conclusion of 
Goedegebuure and Vos (1988) that the greater the differences of status and power of 
institutions the higher the chances of a successful merger. Clearly, there is some 
disagreement among researchers concerning the criteria influencing success and failure in 
merging. 
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Key stakeholders can have an important influence on the merging process, according to 
Harman (2000). For example in several cases, Harman identified that key stakeholders 
showed low transparency, a lack of communicating important information, and a low level 
of consultation. These factors could have contributed to merging difficulties. 
Harman and Harman (2003) emphasise that culture is an important consideration in 
mergers. Academic culture refers to the historically transmitted patterns of shared meaning 
and values (Harman, 1989). From a recognition that university cultures tend to be different 
from higher education college cultures, Harman (2002) has proposed five dimensions for 
distinguishing cultural differences: academic role (looser or prescribed); professional 
loyalty (to disciplines or to institution); teaching versus research (value emphasis); reward 
structure basis (from research or teaching); and governance styles (democratic or 
hierarchical). The degree of difficulty in merging appears to depend on several factors: the 
number of partners involved; their institutional characteristics; the degree of voluntary 
choice about merging; the academic profile and culture of merging institutions; whether it 
is consolidation or take-over. Harman and Harman (2003) conclude that effective 
leadership with sensitivity to human and cultural factors are critically important to 
achieving a successful merger. 
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The important role of culture is emphasised in several other studies. For example, Scott 
(1988) looked at the merging of James Cook University and Townsville College of 
Advanced Education (TCAE) in Australia, and noted that conflict was created in the 
merged institution because many staff remained loyal to the identity and culture of their 
previous separate institutions. The initial idea for merging came from Australian 
Government pressure who recognized the high unit costs of two small institutions. Meeting 
and negotiations continued from 1967 to 1982, because there was staff resistance 
particularly in TCAE but it was political pressure which forced the merger through 
eventually. In order to study the merger, Scott (1988) carried out interviews with 30 people 
involved in the amalgamation process but there were no interviews with people near the top 
of the decision process and few interviews with people who were satisfied with the 
amalgamation, so the study was imbalanced. Also, Rechter and Scott (1988) noted a highly 
competitive staff culture during the merging of La Trobe University and the Lincoln 
Institute of Health Sciences (LIHS) in 1988. 
Both La Trobe University and LIHS voluntarily proceeded with merging even though the 
initial stimulus came from Government pressure that single-purpose education colleges 
should merge, however there were other specific influencing pressures and constraints. La 
Trobe emphasised research excellence and general student education but before merging 
had an emphasis towards the Arts, and wished to enlarge the Sciences side. However, La 
Trobe was not allowed to open new science departments by the Australian Government. 
LIHS had accommodation problems which it wanted to solve to expand, however it did not 
want to lose its identity, reputation and status, and staff fought to retain this identity, which 
delayed the merger for about seven years. The proposed merger was expected to save 1.4 
million Australian dollars annually. 
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Subsequent case study research (Gamage, 1992) identified a number of particular merger 
issues at La Trobe University: 
(1) the acute shortage of suitable accommodation at the LIHS and the hidden agenda to 
preserve its identity; 
(2) the existence of schools of behavioural and biological sciences in both institutions and 
the problem of their integration; 
(3) the academic programmes and staff profiles of the LIHS; 
(4) the cost of amalgamation and concerns regarding the distribution of research funds; 
(5) the problem of associate professorship titles and status for the principal lecturers of the 
LIHS. 
Also, culture was the research focus of Wallace (1996) who charted the culture shift 
following the merger of three schools. Wallace pointed out that "reorganisation may entail 
a change in age range of pupils, removal of classrooms, closure, creation of a new 
institution, or merger" (p. 460), and that uncertainty follows the initial announcement, 
creating stress for teachers, and jobs are at risk. The study traced the transition of staff 
professional cultures and political perspectives during the merger and tried to identify who 
had the power to shape staff culture and identity. The head tried to build a unified culture. 
However after the merger there were persistent subcultures - from the pre-merged infant 
department staff and from the group responsible for promoting the unified culture - which 
created a perception of a remote head. The process of culture transformation was beyond 
the control of anyone or any group. The main lessons from the study were, firstly that 
merging can save money but the cost is teacher stress, disruption of management and 
education (unless additional resources are provided), and secondly that the new designated 
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head may have responsibility without authority during the transition, which can limit their 
influence on the culture shift. Clearly, culture, and how it is dealt with, are important 
factors for consideration in achieving merger success and avoiding failure. 
Hazelkorn (2004) has highlighted the pressures on educational institutions which are 
driving change across the OECD: "globalization and internationalization; changing 
demographics and enrolment patterns; technological revolution; stricter regulatory 
environment; new educational sites and formats; changing nature of the workplace and of 
academic work" (p. 2). In particular, it is important to recognize that students, government 
and society have differing needs and expectations: Students, as "citizens, consumers or 
clients" (p. 1), are increasingly concerned about the education quality of institutions and 
their career prospects; Governments believe that higher education can contribute to the 
economic prosperity and national prestige; Society wants higher education to serve the 
community "acting as catalysts and facilitators for knowledge and technology transfer and 
social, cultural and intellectual activities" (p. 1). The wider context of the merger decision is 
seen as the balancing of the differing needs and expectations of students, government and 
society, against the background of international change in the OECD. Consequently, 
whether the differing needs and expectations of students, government and society have 
been adequately considered during merging must be considerations for deciding 
influencing factors of success or failure. 
Frame analysis research was used to study the merging of two universities in Australia in 
1996 - Kalgoolie College and Western Australia School of Mines (Pick, 2003). Frame 
analysis has been used previously by Rein (1983) and Schon and Rein (1994) with the aim 
of making complex policy development more understandable, because "a frame integrates 
theory, facts, interests and action" (Rein, 1983: 96). The analysis examined how differing 
and competing interpretations and commitments affected how the merger proceeded. 
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Multiple sources of data were used to triangulate findings e. g. taped interviews with 
participants, participant observation, questionnaire, various organizational documents, 
plans, policies, press reports etc. The study identified three important influencing frames on 
the merger at different times - regional, social and economic development; education for 
industry; and economic rationalism. Some researchers (e. g. Fisher, 1997, and Welsh and 
Chesters, 2001, have criticised frame analysis because there is no agreement about how to 
identify and use a frame, and there can be over-emphasis on the importance of particular 
frames. This seems to suggest that researchers must be careful not to impose their own 
perspectives over-strongly about contexts at the expense of the views of the people in the 
c0ntext 
Higher education mergers are not restricted to private establishments nor to the developed 
countries of the West. For example, Sharpe (1999) presents a translation of a 1997 China 
National People's Congress strategy discussion on re-structuring needs in the higher 
education sector in China. In China, a realignment of colleges and departments took place 
in the 1950s when the emphasis was on 'separation' into different establishments, whereas 
in a new realignment in the 1990s the emphasis had changed to one of 'recombination'. 
The strategy change had followed a recognition by many Chinese education leaders that 
China needed a single comprehensive university system rather than many scattered colleges 
and that the hope was that this amalgamation of colleges and universities would lead to a 
quantum leap forward. 
In the 1950s, the higher educational structure in China was decided by the interests of the 
major regions and the professionals there. Most provinces established colleges and 
universities of their own to serve the local needs for development. The institutions were 
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small but complete, but in fact most of them simply replicated what was done in many 
other areas. Consequently, it was recognized that there was need for a combination 
programme involving combining and merging of institutions to minimize replication and 
strengthen the education and research within China. The educational set-up in China differs 
from most other countries in that its top universities are all specialized in the various 
disciplines, and none of them offers a comprehensive range of multiple disciplines covering 
the arts and humanities, the sciences, engineering and technology, agrarian sciences, 
medicine, finance and business, economics, law, foreign languages and international 
studies. The old structure of small colleges and universities led to major imbalances 
between the number of students graduating in some disciplines and the expected 
requirements of the country in the coming decade. For example, the People's Bank of China 
found that the number of students studying finance was already greater than the expected 
societal needs, and this could lead to disappointment for graduates as well as wasted 
educational resources. Also, more recently insufficient students were enrolling for 
mathematics courses. 
Overall, narrow education had focused too much on the indUstrial sciences and 
technologies, and tended to ignore law, economics, and political science. However, it was 
recognized that merger programmes needed to be conducive to development and stability. 
Hence, merging must only proceed in stages by taking careful and secure steps. Qingdao 
University had been formed by merger of four institutions--the former Qingdao University, 
Shandong College of Textile Industries, Qingdao Medical College, and Qingdao Teachers' 
Vocational School" (p. 2). Integration was carried out in stages over four years in the areas 
of administrative structuring, organizing the curriculum and discipline clListers, carrying out 
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an in-depth interdisciplinary exchange of scholarship, and setting up common integrative 
teaching programs. 
The purpose of merging is for better effectiveness, not just for greater size. Care was 
needed in the naming of the merged institution, and the appointing of the new president, 
and it was recognized that no mention should be made in terms of who was swallowing 
whom, it had to be 'mutual marriage'. People had to be agreed that merging was the right 
direction to take. It was thought that it would generally be easier to merge a weak 
institution with a stronger one, but less easy to merge institutions of equal strength and 
standing. Also, the history of institutions could be a factor for consideration. There are 
difficulties such as budgeting, human resources, and, in China, the problem of having three 
overseers - the departments of the central government, the provincial governments, and the 
municipal governments all involved in the promotion of education. - so it is essential for 
people to have a concept of the new whole at the start. 
In China, there is the problem of power imbalance because the departments of the central 
government and the provincial government are both much bigger than those of the 
municipal government, but they are both remote and difficult to consult. Therefore, roles, 
responsibilities and obligations must be defined and finances must be sufficient. It was 
recognized that a benefit incentive mechanism was necessary to make the mergers work, 
and the management system of the schools may need reforming. At the strategy discussion 
it was pointed out that merging institutions must seek two effects: effectiveness of scale, 
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and effectiveness of cross-disciplinary integration. If the separation distance between the 
institutions is too far and these two effects are absent, then merging would be futile. 
Zhiping (2000) argues that the initial inspiration for the merging of China's universities 
was external, it came from outside the China education system. Zhiping proposes it stems 
from 1980 when Nobel Prize winner Chen Ning Yang suggested to China's leadership to 
reform education and develop 10 world class universities. 
Sharpe (2003) presents another translation from China which details how to "to re-adjust 
the management system of the ninety-three regular higher education institutions, and 
seventy-two higher learning institutions for adults, secondary vocational schools and 
technical schools" (p. 1). The report illustrates the top-down nature of higher education 
merging in China because it details the organization and procedures of implementation, the 
roles and responsibilities for the management and the implementation of the re-structuring. 
Clearly, the China National People's Congress strategy discussion reported by Sharpe 
suggests many factors for consideration when looking at success and failure during higher 
educational mergers. 
From carrying out an historical and documentary analysis of policy change in China, Mok 
(2005) attributes the changes on the education structure in China to the pressures of 
globalization creating a drive towards a more competitive and efficient system. Before the 
late 1970s the influencing model was the Soviet Union. However the opening up of the 
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economy to the outside world made the old higher education model inappropriate. Reform 
emphasised local responsibility, diversity of opportunities, multiple sources of funds and 
decentralization of power. There was major re-structuring. In 1998,1999, and 2000, the 
leadership of 151,59 and 97 universities, respectively, were transferred from central state 
council and central ministries to local governments. In fact, university mergers occurred 
from 1994 onwards, and in year 2000,556 higher education institutions merged to become 
232 institutions. This is seen as the 'rolling back' of micro control by centralized state by 
Mok, from intervention to deregulation to a marketization led model. 
Previous research also contains several examples of failed mergers. Lamb (1988) described 
some of the lengthy merger discussions that took place between the University of New 
England and Armidale College of Advanced Technology in Australia from 1971 and 1983. 
Both institutions had suffered declining student enrolments. However, the institutions could 
not agree on how to amalgamate and focused on defensive strategies. There was resistance 
inside the university to a greatly enlarged education faculty. Also, Armidale did not want to 
lose its identity, and resisted the merger but was threatened with loss of federal funding. 
However, following a political change this threat was withdrawn, so the discussions ended 
and the two institutions remained separate. 
Martin (1996) looked at the case of merging higher education institutions in South 
Australia in 1991. The Dawkins (1987) proposal was for merging to produce one or two 
large universities. The outcome was three universities: Flinders University merged with the 
adjacent Sturt campus of SACAE (South Australia College of Advanced Education), the 
University of Adelaide with the city campus of SACAE and the Roseworthy Agricultural 
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College, while the Magil, Salisbury and Unidale campuses of SACAE amalgamated with 
SAIT to form the new University of South Australia. The single university plan failed 
because there were several losers and only one winner. The predicted economies and 
greater course design flexibility failed against the protective instincts of entrenched 
administrators. Several proposed mergers have indicated an overall difficulty in coping 
with political and organizational change and factors such as centralization, job survival, 
group dominance, coalitions of resistance, defensive strategies and federal/state rivalries. 
Hoff (2004) highlighted the complexity of merging from the case of a merger idea which 
failed. The idea was to merge a low achieving school with a nearby high achieving school. 
There was strong opposition from parents of pupils at the high achieving school that they 
did not want pupils travelling to a reportedly high crime area. However, many parents of 
pupils at the low achieving school also opposed the merger because they didn't want pupils 
attending a school outside their community. Clearly, there is a need for consensus among 
the affected people on both sides of the merger that merging will bring improvement for 
them, otherwise merging has little chance of a successful outcome. 
It can de deduced from the above literature that, although there is some disagreement 
among researchers concerning the effects of differing status and power and their influence 
on success and failure in merging, the chances of merger success appear to be enhanced if 
some factors are included, such as - maintenance of trust, and no job losses (Humphal, 
1971); large difference in size or status (Goedegebuure and Vos, 1988); strong strategic 
leadership (Sehoole, 2005); a merger negotiation process, good planning, agreement of all 
institutions (Harman and Harman, 2003); high transparency, and student consultation 
(Harman, 2000); meeting needs of students, government or society (Hazelkorn, 2004); care 
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taken with naming, someone in control, sufficient finance, good role definition (Sharpe, 
1999; 2003). Moreover, it can be deduced that for success other factors should be avoided, 
such as - personal stress, uncertainty, anxiety, role conflict, ambiguity, distrust, 
organizational stress (Humphal, 1971); highly competitive staff culture, political 
intervention perceived as unwelcome (Rechter and Scott, 1988); threats to jobs, coalitions 
of resistance, defensive strategies (Martin, 1996); loss of status (Zhiping, 2000); declining 
tuition fees (Bates and Santerre, 2000). 
Thus, there is extensive prior research in the area of mergers in education and higher 
education which seems to indicate that mergers often have both supporters and opponents, 
involve cultural, social, political and international issues, and can involve some difficulties 
resulting in success or failure. However, none of the reviewed literature has reported in- 
depth qualitative interviews with stakeholders involved in mergers to elucidate differences 
between successful and unsuccessful cases, and the literature search using key words 
revealed no publications concerning mergers in Taiwan. All these points suggest that more 
knowledge and understanding of mergers could be beneficial and indicates that the subject 
is worthy of further research. Furthermore, examination of the above previous literature 
raises a number of important questions to ask concerning mergers which are covered in the 
next section. 
2.4.2 Questions raised by the literature review 
The conclusions, comments and discussions in the previous literature, reviewed in Section 
2.4.1, point to many relevant and important factors for consideration of how and why a 
particular education merger has succeeded or failed. These factors are now presented in the 
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form of questions likely to be relevant to merger success or failure. The reference source of 
my main inspiration for discerning each question is indicated, however, several of the 
questions were inspired by more than one of the reference sources. 
From Humpal (197 1): 
Did the merger cause personal stress - uncertainty, anxiety, role conflict, ambiguity, 
distrust? 
Did the merger cause organizational stress? 
Did the merged institutional absorb all members of the previous separate institutions? 
How much did staff trust the decision makers? 
How important is maintaining trust, in your view? 
From Meek (1988): 
Were there political or financial pressures for merging? 
Was it a cross sectoral merger? 
From Goedegebuure and Vos (1988): 
Were there differences in size or status between the establishments? 
Were these differences large or small? 
Were power differentials influential in shaping the merged entity? 
From Sehoole (2005): 
Is it autonomy or incorporation? 
Was there choice of incorporating partner? 
Who has ownership of college plant and property? 
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Was there strong institutional leadership, strategic leadership, strong proactive government 
intervention? 
From Bates and Santerre (2000): 
Were there changes in tuition fees or salary just prior to merging? 
From Harman and Harman (2003): 
Is it a consolidation or a take-over? 
Is it a single sector or a cross-sectoral merger? 
Is it a two-partner or multi-partner merger? 
Were the previous academic profiles similar or different? 
Are there problems of - major re-structuring; institutional fragmentation; lack of financial 
viability; academic viability; low efficiency; low quality; financial problems; falling 
student demand; competition; technology changes; globalization; new regulations? 
Was merging from an internal initiative or from external pressures? 
Did the separate institutions have different cultures? 
Are there institutional history factors to take into account, and have they been? 
Was the merger well planned? 
Was there a merger negotiation process? 
Was there a merger strategy? 
Was it agreed by all institutions? 
Was there a shared vision? 
How did merger implementation take place? 
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Was degree of difficulty in merging connected with: the number of partners involved; their 
institutional characteristics; the degree of voluntary choice about merging; the academic 
profile and culture of merging institutions; whether it is consolidation or take-over? 
From Harman (2000): 
Concerning the role of key stakeholders: Was transparency high or low? Was important 
information communicated well or poorly? Was consultation wide or narrow? Were 
students asked for their opinions? 
From Harman (2002): 
Concerning your former institution: Was the academic role fairly loose or tightly 
prescribed?; Was your main professional loyalty to your discipline (subject) or to your 
institution?; Was teaching or research most valued?; Was the reward structure based on 
research output or teaching ability?; Was the governance styles mainly democratic or 
mainly hierarchical? Did this create problems during merging? 
Concerning the new institution: Is the academic role fairly loose or tightly prescribed?; Is 
your main professional loyalty to your discipline (subject) or to your institution?; Is 
teaching or research most valued?; Is the reward structure based on research output or 
teaching ability?; Is the governance styles mainly democratic or mainly hierarchical? Does 
the new institution have a coherent culture? Has the previously separate institution retained 
any autonomy? 
From Scott (1988) and Rechter and Scott (1988): 
Do staff remain loyal to the identity and culture of their previous separate institutions? 
Was there a highly competitive staff culture during the merging? 
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Was there political intervention which was perceived as unwelcome? 
Did economic advantages only appear minimal'? 
From Hazelkom (2004): 
Will the merged institution meet the needs of students? Government? Society? 
From Sharpe (1999,2003): 
What is the purpose of merging? 
Has care been taken in naming the new institution? 
Who will be the new President? 
Do the involved people all agree that merging is the right direction? 
Is it a mutually agreed and beneficial 'marriage"? 
Does someone have a concept of the new whole? 
Who will be in control? 
Will any one be in control? 
Are roles and responsibilities defined adequately? 
Does the new institution need a new management system? 
Are the finances sufficient? 
Are the human resources considerations sufficient? 
Is there effectiveness of scale, in terms of size and geographical closeness? 
Is there effectiveness of cross-disciplinary integration? 
Is there a benefit incentive scheme? 
is legislation necessary to achieve standardization and improvement? 
From Zhiping (2000): 
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What will be the merging rules? 
Which name has more value and who chooses it? 
Could loss of well-known name, mean loss of status? 
From Pick (2003): 
Has the merger process been evaluated? 
From Martin (1996): 
Were any of the following factors issues for stakeholders: centralization, job survival, 
group dominance, coalitions of resistance, defensive strategies and federal/state rivalries? 
Many of the above questions, which are discerned from the comments and conclusions of 
indicated previous researchers in this field, will be used as the basis for the design of an 
interview guide later in this thesis (Section 5.4). 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has firstly briefly looked at Chinese organizational culture. It secondly 
examined the current position concerning higher education in Taiwan, and thirdly carried 
out a review of previous literature about education mergers. 
Published literature about Chinese organizational culture indicates that Taiwanese 
organizations generally involve the traditional centralized top-down hierarchical decision 
making and are likely to adopt the traditional Chinese culture of respect for traditional 
practices and authority. The literature suggests that Taiwanese education is centrally 
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managed, and there has been a shift towards a market driven approach, all of which must be 
considered within the strong tradition for a top-down decision making culture. 
The overview of higher education in Taiwan revealed that there are 158 higher education 
institutions in Taiwan and that most undergraduates in Taiwan attend private higher 
education institutions. However, since the public higher education institutions seem to get a 
much larger state contribution than private higher education institutions, the private higher 
education institutions have a proportionately greater dependence on the academic fees from 
students, and are therefore likely to be more vulnerable to the economic and other 
environmental pressures outlined in Chapter 1. 
The review of previous literature about education mergers revealed that mergers occur in 
both capitalist and communist countries and that there is extensive prior research in the area 
of mergers in education and higher education. This indicates that mergers often have both 
supporters and opponents, involve cultural, social, political and international issues, and 
can involve some difficulties resulting in success or failure. However, no previous literature 
has attempted to elucidate differences between successful and unsuccessful cases, and the 
literature search using key words revealed no publications concerning mergers in Taiwan. 
The review indicated that the subject is worthy of further research. Furthermore, the 
previous literature raised a number of important questions to ask concerning mergers. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MERGERS IN TAIWAN: 
Description of the successful case, the unsuccessful case, and the role of the Ministry 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the successful and unsuccessful cases of higher education merging in 
Taiwan for which access was gained to carry out the primary data collection by qualitative 
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interviewing, as reported in detail in Chapter 5. The first part of the chapter contains details 
of the successful case, and the second part presents details of the unsuccessful case. The 
purpose of looking at the successful and unsuccessful case histories and structures before 
and after merging is to learn about both cases in order to see if there are obvious differences 
in history and structure which could have contributed to one merger attempt being 
successful and the other merger attempt being unsuccessful, and to support or deny data 
and comments provided in the qualitative interviews. The cases are labelled as successful 
and unsuccessful using the working definitions adopted in Section 1.3, in which a merger is 
considered successful if it remains a merged entity four years on, and the histories 
presented confirm this qualification. The third part of the chapter provides information 
about the official role of the Taiwan Ministry of Education as derived from published 
sources to see how it links in with higher education merging. 
3.2 The Successful Merger Case: National Chiayi University. 
3.2.1 Structure before merging 
In 20005 two previously separate higher education institutions in Taiwan -a teacher 
training college, and a technology college (both public colleges) - merged into one 
university called National Chiayi University. This university still exists in 2006 and 
therefore qualifies as a successful merger case for the purpose of this research according to 
the working definition in Section 1.3. 
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The teacher training college was called National Chiayi Teacher College (also often 
referred to as Chiayi Teacher College). The National Chiayi Teacher College was first 
established in 1957 with the name "Taiwan Provincial Chiayi Teacher School" 
(http: //www. ncvu. edu. tw/eniz/about/history. php). It was located on the Linsen Campus as 
today, which was the former location of Linsen Elementary School. Chiayi Teacher 
College was established with the aim of nurturing excellent teachers for elementary schools 
to satisfy the teaching load to be filled in the elementary schools from both Chiayi and 
Yunlin. In 1966, the school underwent a reformation and was renamed "Taiwan 
Provincial Chiayi Normal College, " a five-year junior college that accepted junior high 
school graduates. Furthermore, to meet the need for the development of pre-school 
education in Taiwan, a two-year program for the education of kindergarten teachers was 
started in 1983. With regard to on-the-job training education, a summer program was 
established in 1970, while the evening program was established the next year (1971). The 
Minsiun Campus was built in 1987, and in July of the same year, the school was upgraded 
and reformed as the "Taiwan Provincial Chiayi Teacher College" and started taking 
undergraduates. An evening program was also established for the continuing education of 
the administrative staff from elementary schools and kindergartens. In 1991, the college 
was subordinated to the central government control, and it was renamed the "National 
Chiayi Normal College. " The administration, along with most of the departments, was 
relocated to the Minsuin Campus in 1992. On the solid foundation of the undergraduate 
programs, the graduate programs were started in 1994 and the Ph. D. program was launched 
a few years later. During its history of 43 years, the Chiayi Teacher College educated 
numerous excellent teachers for elementary schools, kindergartens and nurseries, along 
with talented people in the fields of school administration, educational administration, and 
researchers in the field of national education. At the same timeý National Chiayi Teacher 
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College was responsible for providing teaching assistance to the elementary schools and 
kindergartens in Chiayi and Yunlin campus, and contributed a lot to the improvement and 
development of primary education and pre-school education in the area. The cultivation of 
excellent teachers, the rich and abundant ambiance of humanities and arts have been the 
special features of National Chiayi Teacher College. 
The technology college was called National Chiayi Technology College (or Chiayi 
Technology College). The teaching establishment that eventually became the National 
Chiayi Technology College was established in 1919 with the name "Taiwan Public Chiayi 
School of Agriculture and Forestry" (http: //www. ncyu. edu. tw/eng/about/hi story. php). Its 
aim was to nurture talent in the fields of agriculture and forestry in Taiwan. In 192 1, it was 
renamed the "Taiwan Provincial Chiayi School of Agriculture and Forestry" and was 
further reformed in 1945 as "Taiwan Provincial Chiayi Vocational School of Agriculture. " 
In 1965, the school was upgraded to a five-year junior college, and it became the Taiwan 
Provincial Chiayi Agricultural Junior College. In the year 1971, a two-year evening 
division program was established at the college. In 1975, a two-year day program was 
launched and in 1981, the college became subordinated to central government control and it 
was renamed to become the "National Chiayi Agricultural Junior College. " In July, 1997, 
the college was again upgraded to be "National Chiayi Institute of Technology. " During 
this long period of development, the location of the school changed quite a few times. The 
first location of the school was at Shan-Tzai-Ding (The Hilltop), or the present location of 
the National Chiayi Senior Commercial Vocational School. In 1938, it was relocated to 
today's Minsheng Campus. In 1985, the school administration was relocated to the present 
location of Lantan Campus. Throughout its long history of 81 years (before upgrade to 
university), the school combined the fields of nature, science and industry, and there was 
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academic and technical collaboration with countries like the United States, Japan, Korea 
and the Philippines. It made itself into the national cradle for the cultivation of Taiwan's 
agricultural elite, and consequently regards itself as having a special education role in 
Taiwan. The baseball team from Chiayi Agricultural School won tremendous victories in 
Koshien and became famous in Japan and Taiwan. It pioneered the craze for baseball sport 
in Taiwan and it is still famous for this today. 
3.2.2 Structure of National Chiayi University after the merger 
After the merger, National Chiayi University is now structured into six main colleges or 
institutes, with a total of 51 departments (http: //www. ncyu. edu. tw/eng/about/). 
The six colleges and institutes are: 
(1) College of Teaching 
(2) College of Agriculture 
(3) Academy of Life Sciences 
(4) College of People's literature and Art Skills 
(5) Institute of Technology 
(6) College of Management 
3.2.3 Staff numbers before and after merging. 
There are both full time and part time teaching and support staff in National Chiayi 
University. Some details are presented to give a useful picture of the university. Table 3.1 
shows the numbers of full time staff - teaching and support workers - from 1995 to 2004, 
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in order to illustrate the progression both before and after merging completion in year 2000 
(National Chiayi University Merger Report, 2004). 
Table 3.1 Full time Staff Numbers Before and After Merging 
(A = Chiayi Technology College; B= Chiayi Teacher College; C= National Chiayi 
University). 
Year Institution Teacher 
Staff 
member 
Fellow 
workers 
Security 
staff 
Subtotal Total 
1995 
A 291 74 63 428 
634 
B 128 51 27 206 
1996 
A 294 74 60 428 
639 
B 130 54 27 211 
1997 
A 322 74 59 455 
668 
B 128 58 27 213 
1998 
A 319 71 56 446 
665 
B 132 60 27 219 
1999 
A 298 70 61 429 
659 
B 140 63 27 230 
2000 C 465 129 88 12 - 694 
2001 C 470 131 84 12 - 697 
2002 C 486 132 75 11 - 704 
2003 C 489 129 74 11 - 703 
2004 C 493 132 73 11 - 709 
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3.2.4 Categories of student in 2004. 
At National Chiayi University there are both full time day students and evening/weekend 
students. The day student population in 2004 is 8405, and there are also 3020 training 
students who received evening and weekend teaching. The total student population consists 
of doctoral, masters, bachelor, college, training and credit class students as shown in Table 
3.2 (National Chiayi University Merger Report, 2004). 
Table 3.2 Categories of all Students in 2004 in National Chiayi University 
2 or 3 
Doctor's Master's Bachelor Bachelor year- Credit 
Subtotal 
class class 4 year 2 year college class 
student 
Departme 
46 1221 6218 855 65 - 8405 
nt(day) 
Training 
(evening/ - 894 905 898 1 322 3020 
weekend) 
Total 
46 2115 7123 1753 66 322 11425 
3.2.5 Day student numbers before and after merging. 
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Table 3.3 shows the total day student numbers from 1994 to 2004, to illustrate the 
progressive change in the day student population over this time period and both before and 
after merging (National Chiayi University Merger Report, 2004). The day student 
population has gown year on year except when it shows a small fall in number of students 
in year 2000, and again in year 2004. 
Table 3.3 Day student number totals before and after merging 1995 to 2004. 
Year 
Chiayi 
Technology 
College 
Chiayi Teacher 
College Subtotal 
National Chiayi 
University 
1995 4300 1303 5603 - 
1996 4404 1395 5799 - 
1997 4554 1516 6070 - 
1998 4779 1717 6496 - 
1999 4850 1915 6765 - 
2000 - - - 6674 
2001 - - - 7132 
2002 - - - 7724 
2003 - - - 8524 
2004 - - - 8405 
3.2.6 Teacher to student ratios in National Chiayi University from 2000 to 2004. 
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Since the merger to create National Chiayi University in 2000, up to year 2004 the rise in 
the day students has been much greater than the rise in the number of full time teachers 
(National Chiayi University Merger Report, 2004). Therefore, the number of day students 
for each full time teacher has increased on average from around 14 in year 2000, up to 17 in 
year 2004 (Table 3.4). The ratio of full time teachers to day student number is presented as 
this is the ratio used by the Ministry of Education in Taiwan. 
Table 3.4 Full time Teacher: Day student ratio from 2000 to 2004 in National Chiayi 
University 
Number of teachers Number of students Ratio 
2000 465 6674 1: 14.4 
2001 470 7132 1: 15.2 
2002 486 7724 1: 15.9 
2003 489 8524 1: 17.4 
2004 493 8405 1: 17.0 
However, although on average there are fewer full time teachers for the students, the 
quality of the teaching staff in terms of the number of doctoral standard teachers has risen, 
as shown in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 shows that there were 300 doctoral teachers in 2004 
compared with only 160 in 2000. The number of teachers with only a Masters degree has 
fallen from 194 to 134, from 2000 to 2004, with the rise in doctoral qualifications. The 
number of teachers with only Bachelors degree has risen from 20 to 58. 
70 
Figure 3.1 Teacher's quality growth statistical chart, year 2000-2004 
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In fact, as shown in Table 3.5, there are also part-time teachers together with the full time 
teachers with degree level qualifications. 
Table 3.5 Full and part time teacher with degree level qualifications. 
Doctor Master Bachelor Other Total 
Full-time 300 131 20 4 455 
Part-time 92 138 19 2 251 
In addition, the trend toward a more highly qualified teaching staff is also reflected in the 
breakdown of professors and lecturers, as shown in Table 3.6 and Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 
shows that, from 2000 to 2004, although there has only been a slight rise in the number of 
Professors and Associate Professors, there has been a huge leap in the number of Assistant 
Professors, compared with the reduced number of lecturers. 
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Doctor Master Bachelor Other 
Table 3.6 Breakdown of all teaching staff in 2004 
2004 Profes Associa Assista Lecturer Assistant Army Raw Total 
sor te nt partial scienfifid 
profess Profess personn technical 
or or el personnel 
Full-time 92 150 109 104 10 23 5 493 
Part-time 33 44 37 137 0 0 0 251 
Figure 3.2 Breakdown of Professors and Lecturers in 2000 and 2004. 
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Also, the increasing quality of the academic staff can be illustrated by looking at the 
academic research results from 2000 to 2003 (Table 3.7). The table indicates a year on year 
rise in the total amount of published works which suggests the increasing quality of the 
university. 
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Professor Assodate Assitant Lecturer 
professor Professor 
Table 3.7 National Chiayi University academic research results, 2000 to 2003. 
Year Journals 
Conference Books Copyright Other Total 
SCI SSCI El Othe 
2000 51 3 3 185 154 45 6 11 458 
2001 67 1 1 162 198 44 1 8 482 
2002 60 3 5 171 247 53 10 13 562 
2003 81 5 2 199 270 27 13 25 622 
Table 3.8 shows the budgets of the colleges and merged university prior to, and following, 
merging (National Chiayi University Merger Report, 2004). Table 3.8 illustrates that the 
budgets were generally rising year on year for each separate institution and the total 
continued to rise for two further years for the merged institution. However, during 2003 
and 2004 the budget has declined each year although it is still greater than the total of the 
two institutions just prior to merging. In contrast, day student numbers rose by about 24 per 
cent from 1999 to 2004 (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.8 The budgets of the successful case (NTD million) 
Year National 
National Chiayi National Chiayi 
Chiayi Total 
Teacher College Technology College 
University 
1996 373 601 975 
i-9 9 -7 385 621 1005 
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1998 438 702 1139 
1999 439 696 1135 
2000 600 1007 1607 
2001 1797 1797 
2002 2084 2084 
2003 1962 1962 
2004 1717 1717 
3.2.7 National Chiayi University Philosophy and Strategy to progress present situation 
The university has an ultimate goal which is to "attain truth, goodness, and beauty through 
excellence in research, professional training, cultural and social services". The university 
stated that its main values are "honesty, simplicity, action, innovation and service", in order 
to become renowned both nationally and internationally 
(http: //www. ncyu. edu. tw/ený-ý/about/developments. phP). 
The overall strategy statement to the Ministry of Education in the National Chiayi 
University annual report of 2004 set out the aim to improve the university and study 
environment, improve teaching quality, promote the academic research level, and make the 
budget develop steadily (National Chiayi University, 2004). More specific progress steps 
were made as follows: 
Progress construction of the administration building; 
Progress the building of the management college; 
74 
Develop the focus of the administrative affairs of schools; 
Work to improve teaching skills quality, and specifically set up a teaching incentive system 
to praise teacher's professional dedication , encourage teaching morale and reward 
excellence; 
Extend the network tutoring system website; 
Implement the school motto "honesty , strength, competence, innovation , service". 
National Chiayi university seeks to attain increased administration efficiency and to 
develop better services provisions by developing into a learning community. It will try to 
achieve this through "regular in-service training programs, improved teaching by increased 
competitiveness, from regular teacher evaluations, new teaching methods and techniques to 
promote creativity and critical thinking in students, and from raised research standards". 
This can help to bring more research grants, awards, exchanges and cooperation programs 
with both national and international universities. 
(http: //www. ncyu. edu. tw/ený/about/developments. phP). 
3.3 The Unsuccessful Merger Case: 
In 2001/2, two educational institutions - the Taipei Municipal University of Education and 
the Taipei Physical Education College - tried to merge into one university. The merger 
process proceeded for about one year but then ceased in 2003. In 2006, the two institutions 
remain separate educational establishments, therefore this case represents an unsuccessful 
merger case as defined in Section 1.3. 
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3.3.1 Taipei Municipal University of Education (TMUE) 
By 2000, the Taipei Municipal University of Education had existed for one hundred and 
five years. Because of its long history and several name changes it is still variously referred 
to by one of four names: the Taipei Municipal Teachers College, the Multiple Teacher 
College of Taipei, the Taipei Teacher Training College, and by its present official name the 
Taipei Municipal University of Education. 
The college was originally established in 1895 as the Academy of Language in Chih Shan 
Yen, Taipei when Taiwan was under the rule of the 21" year of Emperor Kuang Hsu's 
government, in Ching Dynasty, Japan 
(http: //reiz. aca. ntu. edu. tw/colleize/search/colshow. asp? selid=3 10 1). The aim was to cultivate 
competent Japanese translators and to promote Japanese culture in Taiwan. The hundred- 
plus years of development and improvement of this university can be viewed in terms of 
four periods: 
(1) Japan's Occupation Period (1895-1945). The government of Japan set up the 
Academy of Language in Chih Shan Yen, Taipei, in July, 1895, however, in 1896, the 
school was transferred to Tsu Shih Temple in Wan Hua and constructed on the 
present site, with a new name "the Language Grammar School. " Again, in March, 
1919, the former Government of Taiwan renamed the school "the Taipei Normal 
School. " In 1927, the Japan Government divided the school into two branches: the 
south area, which only admitted Japanese students, was named "the Taipei First 
Normal School, " while the newly constructed area, which mainly accepted Taiwanese 
students, was called " the Taipei Second Normal School. " Nevertheless, in 1943, the 
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two schools merged into one, entitled "the Provincial Taipei Normal School, " 
offering pre-course programs, a major program, and a lecture training program to 
develop Taiwan's future teachers' education. 
(2) Female Teachers Period (1945-1964). After Taiwan's restoration, in 1945, our 
Government replaced the school's name with a new one, "the Provincial Taipei 
Normal School for Girls. " The school set up many teacher training programs, which 
included the Normal Teachers Training Program and the Two-year Simple Teachers 
Training Program, the One-year Teachers Training Course and the Three-year Normal 
Teachers Program, the Four-year Normal Teachers Program and the Three-year 
Kindergarten Teachers Program, the Spring Teachers Training Course and the Special 
Teachers Program. 
(3) Vocational School Period (1964-1987). In August, 1964, the school was promoted 
and renamed "the Taipei Municipal Normal School for Women. " However, when 
Taipei became a Special Municipality in July, 1967, the school was re-entitled "the 
Taipei Municipal Normal School for Women. " It retained its education systems and 
customs, and provided the Primary School Teachers Training Course and the Primary 
School Teaching Guidance in Taipei. In 1979, the school became co-educational and 
was renamed "the Taipei Municipal Teachers Junior College. " 
(4) University of Education Period (1987 up to now). The school was upgraded to 
become a prominent, city-supported institute of higher education and assumed the 
name "the Taipei Municipal Teachers College, " on July 1", 1987, setting up the four- 
year university system. Despite experiencing a long-term development and numerous 
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changes of school name, the Taipei Municipal Teachers College, with its excellent 
teachers and abundant facilities, remarkable teaching research, high academic status, 
and its alumni's prominent achievements, showed that the school's main purpose, to 
provide professional education positively and to cultivate outstanding teachers in 
junior-high, primary school, and kindergarten, has not changed. To match the 
Government policies and school development, the school advancement project 
includes to strengthen education, enrich school facilities, and to merge the Taipei 
Physical Education College into the University. It is hoped that, with teachers' and 
students' efforts, society's and government officials' supports, and alumni's help, the 
Taipei Municipal University of Education will become one of Taiwan's best higher- 
education institutes. 
To meet Government policy, accommodate the city's demands, push up vocational 
education, and collaborate with other business incorporation, the Taipei Municipal 
University of Education planed to cultivate some capable business staff and to keep close 
contact with other business sectors, to create mutual development and a big triumph. The 
departmental adjustment and increase of the Taipei Municipal University of Education 
hinged not only on the needs of the cosmopolitan area development, but also on the 
manpower demands of the Government policies in the 21" century, and, thus, the school 
has set up more departments which combine vocational education in the Nei-hu Science 
Park and the Nan-kang Software Industrial Park. Also, in combination with Taipei city's 
medical system, the university has organized older people's education, and also health and 
recreational education for all citizens, opened many practical programs, and is promoting 
local business growth (http: //reg. aca. ntu. edu -tw/col lege/search/col show. asp? sel id=3 10 1). 
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The most important part of the Taipei Municipal University of Education's transition 
was, under the Ministry of Education's (but only since becoming a university) and Taipei's 
Department of Education's help and guidance, that, by the change of school name, teachers 
and students could cohesively improve the school's systems. Through its transition and the 
change of school name, the university aimed to eliminate conservative thinking and school 
systems, simplify and rebuild the administration organizations to enhance its efficiency. 
Also, they aimed to re-focus their numbers in the teacher-training classes to alter their 
direction into developing a Special Education Department, a Culture Department and a 
Social Science Department, and, additionally, to accommodate the importance of 
knowledge service and to match the future possibility of creative business. The aim was to 
change from a simple teacher-training program into cultivating both teacher-training and 
other business-training projects. This included designing foresighted plans and helping 
students to develop a second specialty in order to help the school to develop both diversity 
and flexibility, and to encourage student specialisms and professional certificates, all of 
which can boost the school's academic research and pragmatic application development to 
make a more competitive edge. Taipei Municipal University of Education believes it has 
undergone a "positive transition" and that it has not only responded to the "impact and the 
challenge of the College of Education system", but further it has helped accomplish the 
preliminary plan of the Taipei Physical Education College's integration, creating a 
CC successful cornerstone of school-integration development" 
(http: //reg. aca. ntu. edu. tw/college/search/colshow. asp? selid=3 10 1). 
According to the "Organization Regulation of Taipei Municipal Teachers College, 
2003", admitted by the Ministry of Education in June, 2003, the job positions of this 
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college prior to 2003 were as follows: one principal, 232 teachers, 25 teacher assistants, II 
military instructors and I medical teacher. Therefore, the total for teaching staff was 270. 
By 2003, the reported teaching numbers had changed, there were: 197 teachers, 22 
teacher assistants, II military instructors, I medical teacher, and 87 other teaching 
employees, giving a total of 320. 
3.3.2 Taipei Physical Education College (TPEC) 
By 2000, the Taipei Physical Education College had been in existence for 32 years. It was 
officially established in August, 1968. The purpose of the establishment of the school was 
to fulfil governmental policies concerned with developing physical education for all people 
in Taiwan. The Taipei Physical Education College was given the task of the cultivation of 
elite standards in sports, physical education teachers of all levels, sports coaches, 
researchers in physical science, leaders in sports and excellent workers in the field of 
physical education in society. The goal was to satisfy the requirement of the long-term 
national policy in developing physical exercise and sports (http: //www. tpec. edu. two. 
The first president Mr. Lin, Hong-tan started the grand plan of establishing the school and 
continued until February, 1977. Then, President Liu, Shaw-ben took over. President Liu 
carried out President Lin's plans of "pursuing excellence and continuous development" 
http: //www. tpec. edu. tw/). In October 1985, President Tsai, Te-lung continued with the 
plan with "great enthusiasm and a reforming mind" (http: //www. tpec. edu. tw/). In March 
1994, President Tsai transferred to The National Academy of Physical Education, and Dr. 
Cheng, Hu took over the office. President Cheng set the primary goal of upgrading the 
school to be a college. The status and standing of the school steadily developed and 
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became a college in 1996. President Cheng, Hu retired in August 2002, and President 
Yang, Jongher, Ph. D., the current president, took the office on July 7thof2OO3. 
President Yang focused on improving the administration work with the ideological concept 
of running the school with "macroscopic, open-minded, harmonious, revolutionary, caring 
and encouraging qualities", to carry out his responsibilities and enhance the chances of the 
school (http: //www. tpec. edu. tw . He also hoped to bring a balance to "sports and 
competition, humanity, art, and science". He set the goals of enhancing "the academic 
quality, pursuing efficacy for the sake of enhancing the efficiency, seeking fairness in 
handling matters so as to consolidate the spirit of humanitarianism and build a campus of 
warmth and harmony" (http: //www. tpec. edu. tw/). 
From 1998, there have been seven departments: Department of Recreational Sports 
Management, Department of Dancing, Department of Aquatic Sports, Department of Land 
Sports, Department of Martial Arts, Department of Ball Games, and a two-year Department 
of Physical Education. The Graduate Institute of Exercise and Sports Science was 
established in 1999. In the academic year of 2003, the Department of Physical Education 
and Health was set up, and then in 2004, the Graduate Institute of Sports Technology, the 
Graduate Institute of Sports Pedagogy, The Graduate Institute of Sports Equipment 
Technology and Science, the master's program of the Department of Recreation and Sport 
Management and the master's program of the Department of Dancing were subsequently 
added to the list (http: //www. tpec. edu. tw/new/eng/index. html). 
For the purposes of enhancing the teaching environment and quality, the college is working 
hard on the construction of a new campus in Tien-mu. With great expectations from the 
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faculty and student body, Taipei Physical Education College started on the construction of 
the new teaching building in 2002, the construction of the building of TPEC and the Shih- 
Hsin Building was commenced in 2004. Taipei Physical Education College took over the 
management of Tien-mu Baseball Stadium in January 2006 and the school relocated to the 
new ien-mu Campus in July 2006. All the modem equipment and software can give the 
college a brand new look, and by then, TPEC can be a specialized school and represent the 
cradle of professional talents in physical education and the main force for promoting the 
development of physical education in Taiwan. 
3.3.3 Teachers, Students and Budgets of Taipei Municipal University of Education and 
Taipei Physical Education College 
It was in 2001/2 that Taipei Municipal University of Education (TMUE) and Taipei 
Physical Education College (TPEC) tried to merge into one university. 
There were differences in the numbers of teaching staff, students and graduates of the two 
colleges as illustrated fo r years 2000/1,2003/4,2005/6 in Table 3.9 
(http: //www. edunet. taipei. gov. tw/public/publicx. asp? SEL=52; Education Statistics, 2004 ). 
TMUE is bigger in terms of staff, classes, students and graduates from 2000 to 2005. Both 
show growth in numbers of staff and classes. TMUE shows growth in students and 
graduates, while the figures for TPEC do not show much change. 
Table 3.9 Numbers of teaching staff, students and graduates of the two colleges for year 
2000/1,2003/4, and 2005/6 
Year/ College I Full time I Number of I Total number of I Total number of 
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teachers classes students graduates 
2000/ TMUE 189 98 3420 804 
2000/ TPEC 93 36 1965 417 
2003/ TMUE 226 112 3591 950 
2003/TPEC 124 40 1753 509 
2005/ TMUE 228 133 3939 908 
2005/TPEC 136 51 1954 405 
However, the budgets of the two colleges from 2001 to 2005, which are presented in Table 
3.10, reveal a different story 
(http: //www. edunet. taipei. gov. tw/pubIic/pubIicx. asp? SEL=52).. 
Table 3.10 The budgets of the unsuccessful merger colleges (NTD million) 
Year 
Taipei Municipal University of 
Education 
Taipei Physical Education College 
2001 630 296 
2002 1068 375 
2003 766 404 
2004 728 732 
2005 705 841 
Table 3.10 illustrates that at the time of the merger negotiations in 2000/1, Taipei 
Municipal University of Education had more than twice the budget allocation of the Taipei 
Physical Education College. However, since 2002, the budget of TMUE has fallen by about 
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thirty per cent to around 705 million NTD, while the budget of TPEC has more than 
doubled to 841 million NTD. Therefore, although Taipei Municipal University of 
Education was much bigger financially than Taipei Physical Education College at the time 
of merger negotiations in 2000/1, TPEC is now financially more substantial than TMUE. 
TPEC receives income from external sponsoring companies, and is benefiting from interest 
in the coming 2008 Olympics. 
Thus, since the failed merger attempt, TMUE has grown in all aspects except budget, while 
TPEC has grown in staff, classes and budget, but not students and graduates. 
3.4 Official Role and Strategy of the Taiwan Ministry of Education 
For 2500 years, China has had a government office overseeing education with the overall 
aim of developing culture and maintaining social order through education 
(http: //rs. edu. tw/english/home ministry. htm). The Ministry of Education, R. O. C., was 
founded in 1912, to make and implement national educational policies to give a "solid 
foundation for societal transition, democratic development, cultural attainment, and 
economic achievements". 
According to the Taiwan Ministry of Education "the goal of education is to allow every 
student to show their full potential and become individuals who can make contributions to 
society, the nation and mankind" (Education in R. O. C., 2005: 4). Furthermore, innovation 
is the source of a nation's power, so education plans should possess foresight to meet the 
challenges caused by globalization and international competitiveness. This requires 
analytical thinking, innovative, awareness of societal duties and global perspectives. The 
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role of the Ministry of Education is regarded as crucial because it can influence the overall 
development and advancement of the nation's education policies and power. 
Before the 1980s and the emergence of democracy in Taiwan, the avenues for political 
participation for the common members of society were limited, so education policy was 
mainly planned by the Ministry of Education, following the policies of the central 
government. During the 80s, Taiwan moved towards a plural, democratic and open model 
of society. In 1994, the Alliance for the Education Reform Movement was set up, and 
pushed forward concepts of education modernization (Tu, Cheng-Sheng, Minister of 
Education, Education in R. O. C., 2005). 
In order to ensure the full development of education in Taiwan, the 13th Chapter of the 
Constitution, section 5 clearly states that "all citizens should have equal access to education, 
and that the poor should be given greater financial assistance" (Education in R. O. C., 2005). 
Furthermore, it stipulated that citizens have the right of education and that the goal of 
education was the cultivation of people with "good character, democratic thinking, 
concepts of law and order, cultural achievement, healthy and with the abilities of judgment 
and creation". 
On May 14,1998, the Ministry of Education's Educational Reform Action Program was 
approved by the Executive Yuan, with the allocation of a special budget equivalent to $5 
billion US dollars for five years, for this unprecedented project, in order to propel Taiwan 
forward into an c6era of educational reform" (Lu Mu-Iin, 2005; 
ýme nýiniAsta. htrn). Several key points regarding Taiwan's http: //rLs-edgu. tw/eýlisLh/ho 
current higher education transformation and reform were identified: Special emphasis was 
to be put on "the quality and quantity of opportunities available to Taiwanese students; 
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Development of Programs For Increased Student Enrollment and Academic Excellence; 
and Establishment of an International Component in order to achieve excellence in 
education". 
Furthermore, within this period the Ministry of Education continued with seven important 
policies: 
I. The Establishment of a Legal Foundation for Universities 
2. Active Promotion of a Multiple-channel Entrance System 
3. Continuation of University "Academic Excellence" Development Projects 
4. Establishment of an Internationalized Environment for Higher Education 
5. Establishment of Lifelong Learning Society 
6. Developing a Knowledge-based Economy Educational Foundation 
7. Promoting Cooperation between the University and Business Sectors. 
The academic excellence program included plans for more on-the-job training in graduate 
schools, pre-education programs in Universities, and implementation of policies for 
increasing and adjusting departments and enrollment at Universities. The educational 
reforms started in 1998 resulted in the creation and development of higher education 
institutions with more autonomy because of relaxed higher education legal restrictions (Lu 
Mu-Iin, 2005). The educational reforms are still continuing in 2006. This reform program 
resulted in a rapid expansion of higher educational institutions and the availability of 
education for all sectors of the population. However, this has led to an increase in quantity 
and a decrease in quality in higher education. There appeared to be a lack of diversification 
or development of specialty areas within the university environment and, because of the 
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globalization trend in higher education, a need to work at upgrading Taiwan's universities 
to meet international standards was recognized. 
In order to further improve the quality of university standards in Taiwan a five-year 
USD400 million dollar "Academic Excellent Development Project" was launched in 2000 
(Lu Mu-lin, Nov . 6,2003; http: //140.111.1.22/english/home_press. htm) . The first phase of 
16 projects were awarded a total of USD130 million in grants. In July 2001, a sub-project 
entitled "Improving University Fundamental Education" was implemented with the purpose 
to explore how to best utilize and develop the teaching and research resources within 
university settings in order to push Taiwanese universities to conduct research and refine 
their teaching methods. It was considered that Taiwan had too many small higher education 
establishments and fewer larger universities were needed to raise standards and compete 
internationally. Thus the Ministry of Education encouraged some merging between higher 
education establishments. The encouragement to merge was in the form of a promise to 
increase the funding for the merged institution above what it would have been if the 
institutions had remained separate establishments. 
The Ministry of Education has two goals concerning the development and promotion of 
higher education - Developing and Promoting Higher University Education, and Supporting 
and Encouraging Cooperation for a More Inclusive Internationalized Environment (Lu Mu- 
lin, Nov . 6,2003). 
The Ministry would like at least one of its universities to be ranked 
among the top 100 leading international institutions of higher education, within the next ten 
years and to have at least one university ranked as number one, within Asia by the next five 
years. In order to encourage and motivate the universities, a Taiwan scholarship was 
established. Four areas of classification were established for universities. These 
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classification areas are research, teaching, profession and community and new development. 
Seven universities have been selected for present excellence (National Taiwan University, 
Tsinghua University, Chao-Tung University, Central University, Yang-Ming University, 
Cheng Kung University, and Sun Yat-Sen University) and for the past several years, the 
Ministry of Education has provided extra budget to help these universities to pursue 
excellence. Over the period 2003 to 2008, the Ministry will distribute $50 billion NT 
dollars to increase standards. A similar monetary plan, with slight variations, is being 
implemented for university departments that would like to be ranked as number one within 
Asia by the year of 2008. 
It should be noted that the Ministry of Education role only directly applies to public 
universities (such as National Chiayi University, TMUE and TPEC), however its control of 
finance coupled with the top-down hierarchical culture in Taiwan, suggests its influence 
can be crucial in mergers. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the background to the successful and unsuccessful cases of 
higher education merging which represent the focus of this research, and the philosophy 
within the Taiwan Ministry of Education which is encouraging merging of institutions in 
higher education in Taiwan. 
National Chiayi Teacher College was first established in 1957 for the cultivation of 
excellent teachers with emphasis on creating a rich ambiance of humanities and arts. 
National Chiayi Technology College was first established in 1919 particularly to nurture 
talent in the fields of agriculture and forestry, and more recently in the fields of nature, 
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science and industry. It made itself into the national cradle for Taiwan's agricultural elite, 
and consequently regards itself as having a special education role in Taiwan. Thus, both 
institutions have a long history, and have contributed to higher education in Taiwan though 
in mainly different specialisms. These two colleges merged in 2001/2 to form National 
Chiayi University, which still exists as a merged university in 2006 and therefore qualifies 
as a successful case as defined in Section 1.3. 
Taipei Municipal University of Education (TMUE) was originally established in 1895 as 
the Academy of Language to cultivate competent Japanese translators and to promote 
Japanese culture in Taiwan. Subsequently, it educated a wider range of teachers. Currently, 
the university aims to eliminate conservative thinking and to simplify and rebuild the 
organizations to enhance efficiency. 
Taipei Physical Education College (TPEC) was officially established in August, 1968, to 
develop physical education for all people in Taiwan by the cultivation of elite standards in 
sports, physical education teachers, sports coaches, researchers in physical science, leaders 
in sports and excellence in physical education in society. 
Thus, both Taipei Municipal University of Education and Taipei Physical Education 
College have long histories, and have both contributed to higher education in Taiwan 
though in mainly different specialisms. They were completely separate establishments prior 
to 2001 and tried to merge into one university. in 2001/2. However, they remain separate 
institutions in 2006. This example therefore qualifies as an unsuccessful merger case as 
defined in Section 1.3. 
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The role of the Taiwan Ministry of Education was identified to be concerned with 
beneficially influencing the overall development and advancement of the nation's 
education to meet the challenges caused by globalization and international competitiveness 
with the goal of every student showing their full potential to make contributions to society, 
the nation and mankind. 
Over the past two decades, the Ministry of Education oversaw educational reform which 
resulted in a rapid expansion of higher educational institutions and the availability of 
education to all sectors of society. However, this increased quantity and was perceived to 
decrease quality in higher education. There arose a perceived lack of diversification and 
specialty areas within universities and, because of globalization trends, a perceived need to 
upgrade Taiwan's universities to better meet international standards. A USD400 million 
dollar "Academic Excellent Development Project" was launched in 2000. The Ministry of 
Education felt that Taiwan had too many small higher education establishments, and 
needed fewer larger universities to raise standards and compete internationally. Thus the 
Ministry of Education encouraged merging between higher education establishments. The 
encouragement to merge was a promise to increase funding for the merged institution 
above what it would have been if the institutions had remained separate establishments. 
90 
CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY1 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the subject of research and how knowledge can be acquired, in order 
to choose an appropriate research approach for the study. The methodological approaches 
which have been used by previous researchers for carrying out research, and their strengths 
and weaknesses, are considered, and explanation is made about the choice of methodology 
for this study. 
4.2 Research Methods 
The ways by which mankind can inquire into, make sense of, and ultimately understand, 
the world fall into three categories - experience, reasoning, and research (Mouly, 1970). 
These three categories are all valuable means for mankind to search for truth, acquire 
knowledge and gain understanding of the world. However, they must not be regarded as 
independent of each other because they are complementary and overlapping (Cohen et al, 
2000). 
Kerlinger (1973) has defined research, the third of these categories, as the systematic, 
controlled, empirical and critical investigation of hypothetical propositions about the 
presumed relations among natural phenomena, which sounds like the 'scientific method', 
and research is often associated in the minds of people with the scientific method. Zikmund 
(2000: 40) defines the scientific method as 
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"the use of a set of prescribed procedures for establishing and connecting theoretical 
statements about events, for analysing empirical evidence, and for predicting events 
yet unknown. There is no consensus concerning exact procedures for the scientific 
method, but most discussions of the scientific method include references to 
6empirical testability'. Empirical means that something is verifiable by observation, 
experimentation, or experience. " 
Punch (2000) sees the scientific method in two parts, firstly real-world data, and secondly, 
theory which explains what is observed. Social science refers to the study of human 
behaviour using the scientific method. 
Borg (1963) views research as a combination of both experience and reasoning, and 
observes that research has been particularly successful in the search for knowledge in the 
natural sciences. However, research is also very important to social science and education, 
and contributes knowledge in terms of description, prediction, improvement and 
exPlanation (Gall et al, 2003). 
Thus, research can involve exploration of real world data or theory, and requires data 
collection by observation, experiment or experience, and/or the making and testing of 
theory, and the concept of verifiability is an important characteristic in science. Research in 
the social sciences can be regarded in terms of three components - construction of theory, 
collection of data, and design of methods (Gilbert, 1993), and research is often categorised 
into quantitative and qualitative approaches (Punch, 2000). 
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The following sections look at quantitative and qualitative approaches, what they offer, 
strengths and weaknesses, the theories underpinning them, and examines the implications 
for the choice of the research methods to be employed in the proposed research project. 
4.3 Quantitative Approaches 
Bryman (2004) notes that the quantitative research tradition exhibits many of the features 
of the natural sciences approach. Bryman distinguishes five different quantitative 
approaches which are valuable for inquiry and data collection in the social sciences. These 
are: 
(1) Surveys 
(2) Experiments 
(3) Analysis of previously collected data 
(4) Structured observation 
(5) Content analysis. 
Sarantakos (1997) indicates that surveys are the most widely used form of data collection in 
the social sciences. In the survey method, data is collected by either oral or written 
questioning from the population under study. The oral questioning is termed 'interviewing' 
while the written questioning is achieved using 'questionnaires'. The questions can be 
administered face-to-face, by telephone, by mail, by email, or by intemet. Compared with 
interviewing, questionnaires have several advantages if care is taken in their design. They 
are less expensive than interviewing, they can produce fast results, they can be anonymous 
and completed at the convenience of the respondent, the results are not biased by the 
interviewer presence or attitudes, there can be wide coverage using a consistent uniform 
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measure, and they can receive a considered response as files can be consulted. Also, the 
quantitative findings can be statistically analysed and represented by simple summary 
measures representing whole populations. The limitations of questionnaires are that there is 
no opportunity for motivating participation, or probing, prompting and clarification of 
answers, the respondent identity and consideration of the questions is unknown, the order 
of answering is unknown, partial responses may occur which cannot be followed up, and 
relevant additional information may be missed. Questionnaires, remotely administered, can 
suffer a number of problems such as low response rates, non-response bias, the different 
understandings of respondents to questions, and the fact that information is a 'cross- 
section' at a particular time. However, surveys are widely used and rated a valuable data 
collection route provided care is taken in the questionnaire design and interpretation. 
Interviewing in the quantitative method uses a structured approach involving a strict pre- 
planned procedure with an interview guide (the questionnaire) which is administered face- 
to-face to individuals or groups. The interviewer is required to ask questions like a 'robot' 
to maintain presentation consistency and try to minimise bias. 
Experiments are the major quantitative data collection method in social psychology 
(Bryman, 2004). Experiments involve at least two groups - the experiment and the control - 
consisting of randomly selected people. The two groups are treated in as an identical a way 
as possible except that only the experimental group is subjected to the experimental 
stimulus (the independent variable). Observed differences between the two groups are 
attributed to the independent variable. This experimental approach can produce valuable 
knowledge even with small groups, but large groups, or care with sampling design, may be 
needed to achieve the statistical significance of findings beyond random variation 
(Sarantakos, 1997). 
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The analysis of previously collected data is another quantitative approach. This can involve 
the examination and exploration of figures, records and statistics published by governments 
and local governments, non-governmental organizations, world or regional organizations, 
companies, groups, or individuals. This is a valuable approach to produce data for 
interpretation or re-interpretation. 
Structured observation is the name given to research in which observations are made using 
a particular programme plan and the data which is generated is presented in a quantified 
form. 
Content analysis is the name given to the analysis of the communication output of media in 
quantitative terms which can be used for classification, and other, purposes particularly 
concerning newspapers and broadcast TV content, and often involves summary statistics. 
4.4 Qualitative Approaches 
Van Maanen (1979) proposes that the term 'qualitative methods' has no precise meaning 
but is umbrella terminology for methods to describe, decode, or translate the meaning, but 
not frequency, of social phenomena. Patton (1990) identifies ten themes of qualitative 
inquiry in qualitative approaches: naturalistic inquiry; inductive analysis; holistic 
perspective; qualitative data; personal contact and insight; dynamic systems; unique case 
orientation; context sensitivity; empathic neutrality; design flexibility. Different authors 
identify and emphasise different qualitative approaches. Gall et al (2003) identify in 
particular: Case study research, Investigation of lived experience, Investigation of life and 
culture, Ethnography, Investigation of Language and Communication, and Historical 
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research. Bryman (2004) focuses on participant observation, which is part of ethnography. 
Cassell and Symon (1994) identify a variety of qualitative approaches particularly: the 
Qualitative Research Interview, Discourse Analysis, Participant Observation, Analysis of 
Company Documentation, and Case Studies. 
Let us briefly look at five of these: 
(1) Qualitative Research Interview 
(2) Ethnography 
(3) Case Study 
(4) Historical Research 
(5) Discourse Analysis 
Interviewing is the most widely used qualitative approach in organizational research 
according to King (1994). In general, qualitative research interviews are characterised by 
low structure, mostly open questions, and focus on specific situations and sequences. The 
aim of the qualitative interview is "to see the research topic from the perspective of the 
interviewee, and to understand how and why he or she comes to have this particular 
perspective" (King, 1994: 14). Sarantakos (1997) notes that qualitative approaches are 
characterised by unstructured or semi-structured interviews in contrast to the strictly 
controlled standardised structure in quantitative interviewing. In the qualitative interview, 
the interviewer and interviewee have a different relationship than in the quantitative 
interview. In the quantitative interview the interviewee is seen as a passive research subject 
and the interviewer must minimise interpersonal impacts. In contrast, in the qualitative 
interview, the relationship is part of the research process because the interviewee is seen as 
an active participant in the research, who can change the interview course. 'Rambling' 
answers by interviewees can be unxN, -anted distractions in quantitative interviews, but in 
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qualitative interviews the 'rambling' is an important part requiring investigation because it 
is important to the interviewee (Measor, 1985). Because of the different strengths and 
weaknesses of the different interview approaches, the type of interview appropriate to a 
study depends on the nature of the research. The qualitative interview is particularly 
appropriate when the meaning of particular phenomena is important to the participants; 
individual perceptions or historical accounts are needed; exploratory information is needed; 
existing quantitative data needs validation or explication (King, 1994). 
Ethnography is essentially an anthropological study in which the researcher finds out about, 
and uses, the shared knowledge of participants to gain understanding about behaviour (Gill 
and Johnson, 1991). Burgess (1984) identifies four depths of immersion in context for 
researchers 
(a) Complete-participant, where the researcher has a role as a participant and covertly 
observes the context. 
(b) Participant-as-observer, where the researcher participates in the context, makes 
relationships with participants but overtly observes. 
(c) Observer-as-participant, where the researcher has limited involvement with the context. 
(d) Complete-observer, where the researcher only observes and does not participate. 
The complete-participant role has the major advantage that the researcher can make very 
detailed observations and gain in-depth understanding of the group dynamics without the 
research observation affecting the situation. Also, it can overcome the gaining-access 
problem of overt research. However, note taking is difficult and the covert nature of the 
status and role of the researcher creates an ethical and moral problem because the people 
under study, who treat the researcher as a colleague, are unaware that research is being 
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carried out on them. There is high risk of discovery of the research, immersion in context 
and observations can take a long time, which makes this approach expensive, and writing 
up may take six times longer than the time in context, but the main value is the high 
reliability of the naturalistic observations (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). 
The participant-as-observer role does not have the moral dilemma of compl ete-parti ci pant 
because the researcher role is known by the participants and so immersion in role is less 
time-consuming and less-expensive, however it is possible that the behaviour of the people 
being studied will not be completely natural which could affect the reliability and value of 
the research findings. 
The observer-as-participant role means there is only occasional participation by the 
researcher in context activities. This role requires less time- involvement and cost than the 
previous two roles, but there is less-data collection and the risk that the group behaviour 
may be different when the researcher is not present, so information which could be relevant 
and important may be lost from the research. 
In the comp I ete-ob server role the researcher remains an outsider from group participation. 
Therefore, researchers may 
gain an accurate knowledge of events but may not be able to reliably explain the underlying 
reasons for the behaviour in the context, which may limit the value of the research findings. 
Research purpose, cost, the access which is possible, the time available, and how 
comfortable the researcher is with the role can all influence the choice of role (Easterby- 
Smith et al, 199 1). 
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Case study is an in-depth focus on a particular phenomenon, and over a period of time, and 
is widely used in education research (Gall et al, 2003). The purpose can be description, 
explanation or evaluation. Data collection and analysis are focused on the phenomenon or 
on particular aspects of it and may involve a number of methods both quantitative and 
qualitative. The key feature of case study is its emphasis on understanding processes 
occurring in the context from detailed knowledge usually over time which can make it 
particularly valuable research (Hartley, 1994). 
Historical research is a "process of systematically searching for data to answer questions 
about a past phenomenon for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of present 
institutions, practices, trends, and issues in education" (Gall et al, 2003: 514). The value of 
historical research rests in the fact that it can contribute to understanding the present 
educational situation by examining the past from which it originated. It can involve study 
of social issues, specific individuals, institutions, and social movements, exploration of 
relationships between events, synthesis of data, and reinterpretation of past events. It can 
use quantitative records, and qualitative materials including diaries, archives, documents, 
oral history, and relics. The researcher may act as interpreter of history, look for causal 
inferences, and try to form generalizations, in a search for understanding of occurrences. It 
can be a valuable way to gain understanding of the present. 
Discourse Analysis focuses on the use of language, both spoken and written, in contexts 
(Marshall, 1994). It is concerned with identification and description of language usage, and 
with examining the consequences of particular language usage, in particular contexts. Data 
is gathered from texts and from interviewing. In interviews, it is recognized that 
participants may provide only limited accounts, therefore the active involvement of the 
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interviewer is important, and it is not the 'genuine' views of interviewees which are sought 
but their ways of making sense of the practices of the participants in the context. Discourse 
analysis has been valuable in examining the ways that language can be important 
concerning the scope of understanding of occupational role and practice, which is neglected 
in other more traditional approaches. 
4.5 Evaluating Strengths and Weaknesses of Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches 
The strengths and weaknesses of the quantitative and qualitative approaches derive from 
the differences between them. Some differences are technical, as revealed in the previous 
sections, but deeper differences between them are revealed below. 
For Best (1981) quantitative studies use a numerical description of observations, while in 
qualitative studies description is not in quantitative terms. Punch (2000: 4) points out that 
the main distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is that "Quantitative 
research is empirical research where data are in the form of numbers. Qualitative research 
is empirical research where the data are not in the form of numbers", which could suggest 
that there is only a technical differentiation between the two research approaches. Proctor 
(2000) observes that quantitative data involves numbers and figures, while qualitative data 
refers to people's motivations, impressions, awareness, intentions, and behaviour. 
Concerning social research, Bryman (2004: 1) states that "Quantitative research is typically 
taken to be exemplified by the social survey and by experimental investigations. Qualitative 
research tends to be associated with participant observation and unstructured, in-depth 
interviewing". 
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However, Bryman points out that although technical issues are involved in the 
classification of whether an approach is quantitative or qualitative, there are contrasting 
philosophical issues underpinning each of the two approaches which it is necessary to 
consider in order to understand the differences between the two approaches and to evaluate 
their relative merits. Guba and Lincoln (1982) identify quantitative and qualitative 
approaches with different paradigms because they can be seen to rest on different 
epistemological assumptions about what constitutes knowledge and how it can be generated. 
Von Wright (1993) points out that the philosophy of science involves two principal 
traditions of empirical inquiry. one is termed positivism, and the other he refers to as 
antipositivism, which many other authors refer to as interpretivism (O'Brien, 1993) or 
phenomenology (Cassell and Symon, 1994). 
4.5.1 Positivism, and its strengths and weaknesses 
Positivism derives from the work of Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. The underlying 
tradition of positivism is that there is "a unity of scientific method among a diversity of 
subject matter", that natural sciences can set a methodological standard against which to 
measure development and perfection of other sciences, and that scientific explanation is 
causal in character (von Wright, 1993: 10). Thus, according to the positivist philosophy, 
the assumption is that there is an objective reality about the social world, which can be 
uncovered using the approach of the natural and physical sciences. Cohen et al (2000: 8) 
point out that the positivism of Comte suggests that "all genuine knowledge is based on 
sense experience and can only be advanced by means of observation and experience". 
Kolakowski (1993) maintains that positivism involves a particular philosophical attitude to 
human knowledge, because: 
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a) It does not prejudge questions about how men arrive at knowledge, but it helps us 
distinguish between that which may and may not be reasonably asked. 
b) The data recording and collecting is according to the actual manifestation in experience. 
c) Positivists do not object to getting invisible causes of any observed phenomenon, but 
they reject accounting for them in occult terms or something beyond human reasoning. 
d) Positivist philosophy is unity of scientific method, which expresses the belief in the unity 
of methods for acquiring valid knowledge in all types of experience. 
There are several practical methods involving a positivist philosophy, for example the 
inductive and deductive hypothesis methods, the experimental method, and the survey 
research method. 
This positivist philosophical view assumes that individual cases will accord with general 
laws which exist in the universe, and so rejects as unscientific the explanation of 
phenomena in terms of factors such as intentions, goals, and purposes. The positivist view 
in sociology is that it is progressive, cumulative, and can be explanatory. Therefore in the 
positivist philosophy, the inference is that society, and behaviour within society, is 
explainable in terms of scientific laws and logic (O'Brien, 1993). 
Sarantakos (1997) points out that quantitative research is based on the positivist philosophy, 
which leads to identification of several theoretical principles of quantitative research, as 
follows: there is only one reality (from sense impressions) which is objective, simple and 
positive; human beings in the social world are subject to fixed observable patterns 
(scientific laws); facts are to be separated from values; social science should use physical 
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science methods; metaphysics is rejected; explanation comes from experience which can be 
validated; the logical form of theory is deductive. 
The strengths of quantitative approaches come from the close adherence to natural science 
principles, so that the findings are logical, can be replicated, and generalisations are 
possible which are applicable to other cases. The findings can often be statistically analysed 
and results can represent populations. 
The weaknesses of quantitative methodology also derive from the adherence to natural 
science principles, in particular it is regarded as inappropriate to treat human subjects as 
objects, leading to a number of criticisms (e. g. Sarantakos, 1997; Bryman, 2004) most of 
which are surnmarised in the following observations. Social phenomena are not objective 
but are in people's minds and their interpretations; quantification can hide the real meaning 
of social behaviour; it can assume appearance is reality; it supports the status quo; study of 
reality is adjusted to fit available methods; measurement can give a biased perspective; 
reductionism, causality, generalisation and replication of natural science are often 
inappropriate for social study; researchers cannot achieve complete objectivity, and 
observations are not uncontaminated by scientists; prior design of research can mean 
omitting what is relevant and meaningful; the researchers are taken as objective experts. 
Furthermore, Cohen et al (2000) emphasise that the quantitative approach can give a 
misleading representation of social life because it ignores important factors such as 
intentions, individualism and freedom. 
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4.5.2 Antipositivism, and its strengths and weaknesses 
The tradition of antipositivism is related to such thinkers as Droysen, Dilthey and Max 
Weber (von Wright, 1993). These thinkers reject the notion that the positivist approach is 
the only route to a rational understanding of reality. The natural sciences look to reveal 
generalisations about reproducible and predictable phenomena and therefore a positivist 
approach is appropriate in this case. However this contrasts with some other disciplines of 
inquiry, such as social science or the study of historical occurrences, in which the unique 
factors are often the goal of the study. The antipositivist or interpretive tradition "seeks not 
so much explanations and predictions of social events as understanding what meaning and 
what significance the social world has for the people who live in it" (O'Brien, 1993: 7). 
Antipositivism takes the view that the behaviour of human beings can only really be 
understood if the researcher is able to share their frame of reference of the world, and so the 
understanding comes from the inside, not the outside (Cohen et al, 2000). Thus, this 
tradition views social science as a subjective rather than an objective inquiry, and is 
associated with the qualitative approach. 
Bryman (2004) points out that the main basis of the distinctive epistemology of qualitative 
research are: phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, verstehen, naturalism, and 
ethnogenics. Phenomenology derives from the ideas of Husserl (Sarantakos, 1997) that 
people actively create their world and experience it through consciousness. Although 
people create their world they are not aware of this and accept it as natural and so do not 
question it. So human behaviour is a result of how humans interpret their world. Symbolic 
interactionism "views social life as an unfolding process in which the individual interprets 
his or her environment and acts on the basis of that interpretation" (Bryman, 2004: 54). 
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Verstehen, from Weber, views sociology as concerned with understanding - from 
observation of the subjective meaning or from explanatory or motivational understanding. 
Naturalism means that researchers should not adulterate the context of study. Ethnogenics 
is concerned with revealing and explaining the underlying structures of sequences of 
interlocking human actions (Bryman, 2004). 
Thus, it can be inferred that qualitative research has several strengths. It looks at people in 
natural contexts, and there is emphasis on interpretations and meanings to achieve a deeper 
understanding of the world of those people. The method has great flexibility and it treats 
people as human subjects or participants rather than objects. 
However, some weaknesses can be recognised in qualitative research from its methodology 
and underpinnings. The degree of subjectivity of studies can generate questions about the 
reliability of findings, and problems of representativeness and general isabi lity. The process 
can take a long time and can generate a lot of meaningless information. There are often also 
problems of objectivity, detachment and the ethics of probing into people's lives 
(Sarantakos, 1997). 
4.5.3 Is one approach better than the other? 
From considering the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
it is clear that the theory underpinning research is a very important consideration because 
this is determines the interpretation of the research. The fact is that "pure *empirical' 
research is impossible" (O'Brien, 1993: 11). The theory behind research may not be 
acknowledged but even simple investigations will involve some prior assumptions about 
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the world. Therefore research is theory-dependent. This supports the view that the design of 
methods to investigate the social world is important in the interpretations that may 
subsequently be drawn out. For example, one view may be that there is only one right way 
of investigating social contexts, and if one method produces a biased result then this is not 
the 'right' way and the 'right' way must be found. This represents the view that empirical 
reality is the privileged source of theoretical understanding of a social context (termed 
empiricism). Thus researchers must be careful in their inquiries and interpretations because 
the social reality we see is determined by the theories we use to examine it (Gilbert, 1993). 
4.6. Implications for Choice of Approach for this Study 
This research is being carried out to tackle the fears and reality problem of university 
mergers in Taiwan. This requires exploration of the knowledge gap about university 
mergers in I aiwan to generate understanding. 
There has only been one successful merger - National Chiayi University - and a few 
unsuccessful merger attempts in Taiwan. Therefore attempts to gain understanding on the 
basis of numerical descriptions or comparisons and the assumption that there is only one 
objective reality, that experiences can be validated, and that facts can be separated from 
values concerning mergers would seem to rule out adoption of a quantitative approach for 
this research. 
However, the qualitative research approach which views research as a subjective rather 
than an objective inquiry in which values are important, and seeks to gain understanding 
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from the experiences, meaning and significance of the participants in the context would 
seem to be a highly appropriate approach for this study. 
Interviewing is the most widely used qualitative approach, and interviews are characterised 
by low structure, mostly open questions, and focus on specific situations and sequences in 
order to discover the perspective of each interviewee and to understand how and why he or 
she comes to have this particular perspective. Other qualitative approaches such as 
ethnography, case study, historical research and discourse analysis would appear to be less 
appropriate for the present study because observation of participants before and after 
merging would only be suitable for studying one merger which has yet to happen and may 
or may not turn out to be successful four years later, similarly case study requires in-depth 
study over a period of time of one merger case yet to occur which may or may not be 
successful, historical research requires the existence of records which may or may not exist 
or be very difficult to access, and discourse analysis would only be justified if interviewing 
reveals differences in language use and understanding by participants. 
Therefore, in-depth interviewing seems to be the most appropriate collection method for the 
primary data, because this can reveal the perspectives of participants and from these it 
could be ascertained if use of other research approaches would be justified for follow-up 
research. The interviews will probably use a semi-structured interviewing approach with a 
series of prepared questions but with adequate space for open discussion. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the available methods of research inquiry. These can be 
classified in terms of quantitative and qualitative approaches which rest on different 
paradigmatic assumptions. Quantitative methods are numerically based and assume an 
objective reality in which facts are separated from values. Qualitative methods emphasise 
the importance of human beings as participants rather than as objects, look at people in 
natural contexts, and focus on interpretations and meanings to achieve a deeper 
understanding of the world of those people. 
The qualitative research approach using in-depth interviewing is chosen as the most 
appropriate approach for this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGY2 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues the explanation of methodology in the study by explaining how I 
implemented the methodology choice made in Chapter 4, in terms of interview process to 
carry out the interviews, interview guide, gaining access for the interviews, and the people 
interviewed. 
5.2 Methodology Implementation 
There were several steps in methodology implementation. First to consider was the theory 
and practice of interview process from previous researchers. Second to decide was the 
interview guide for the qualitative interviews. The third step was to gain access for the 
interviews and fourthly there was the issue of identifying the participants for the interviews 
who were appropriate to answer the questions. Each of these issues will be considered in 
turn. 
5.3 The Interview Process 
Brown and Gilmartin (1969) have noted how the use of verbal data has become 
increasingly widespread in empirical social research. For example, in 1940-41,25 per cent 
of the empirical studies used interviews and questionnaires, while in 1965-66,48 per cent 
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of studies collected primary data in these ways, although the percentage rises to 64 if verbal 
secondary data is included. Foddy (1996) believes that more recent sociological studies 
probably rely even more on data from interviews and questionnaire. Consequently, the 
collection and use of verbal data has a long and significant history in social research. 
However, Belson (1986) concluded that there are five main sources of error using this route: 
(1) Respondents not understanding the intended meaning of questions 
(2) Lack of interest by respondents 
(3) Respondents' reluctance to admit particular attitudes and behaviour 
(4) Respondents' memory failures from interview stress 
(5) Interviewer failures - from word changing, poor presentation or poor recording. 
Foddy (1996) outlines several cases of proven inaccuracies in verbally collected data in 
previous studies. This leads Foddy to identify ten sources of inaccuracy: - even factual 
answers can be invalid; there can be differences between what respondents say they do and 
what they actually do; attitudes, beliefs, opinions can be unstable; small changes in wording 
can bring changed responses; questions can be misinterpreted; earlier questions can affect 
answers to later questions; question order can affect responses; question format can affect 
answers e. g. closed versus open questions; some respondents will give answers to questions 
they know little about; cultural context can affect answers. However, several of these 
problems can be minimised by not using a rigid self completed questionnaire approach, but 
by instead using face-to-face interviewing so that the meanings of questions can be 
explained, if necessary. 
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King (1994) divides the interview process into four parts: 
(1) Defining the research question 
(2) Creating the interview guide 
(3) Finding participants 
(4) Carrying out interviewing. 
The research question should be defined by reference to the question: how do participants 
describe and understand the element in focus? The question, or questions, should not 
contain assumptions of the interviewer that could introduce bias to the answer. The 
interview guide is not 'word-for-word in set order' but a list of topics to be covered. The 
guide can draw on three sources: research literature, interviewer personal knowledge, and 
from preliminary conversations in the research area. The degree of structure in qualitative 
research interviews can vary from unstructured discussion to quite detailed but flexible 
interview guides. Usually qualitative research interviews have a low amount of imposed 
structure, contain mainly open questions, and focus on specific situations of the interviewee 
world. However, questions should be simply phrased and only one question should be 
asked at a time to avoid partial answering or confusion. 
The number of participants will depend on the time and resources available. Generally, 
transcibing a one hour interview can take at least a day and up to three days (King, 1994). 
Potential participants must be promised confidentiality, informed of the reasons for the 
research, its aims, and if and when there will be feedback of results. Tape recording of 
interviews can avoid the danger of interviewer bias about what it is relevant to record, but 
permission must be obtained from respondents prior to using tape recording (Proctor, 2000). 
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During the interview, which usually is started with a common easily-answered opening 
question, the order of topics and questions on the interview guide can be varied if 
discussion and probing takes different routes, and participants must be allowed to raise and 
talk about any other issues they think relevant, because questioning should be "as open- 
ended as pos sib le..... encourage respondents to communicate their underlying attitudes, 
beliefs and values rather than a glib or easy answer" (Fielding, 1993: 138). Frankness is the 
aim, so the interviewer should be relaxed, unselfconscious, and show interest without 
rudeness or over-intrusiveness. Questions can be repeated for clarification, but care should 
be taken not to suggest any answer is 'wrong' because it does not seem to fit in with the 
interviewer's mindset. 
Interviewees giving very short answers should be allowed time to elaborate, but the other 
extreme of repeated digressions with over-verbose answering should be steered gently back 
to the relevant area. With high status interviewees, it is important to be respectful but to be 
confident with one's own expertise to ask and probe with the questions. The interview can 
be ended by asking the interviewee for any relevant comments not already covered in the 
interview. Pilot testing of questions can help surface difficulties, but again tape recording is 
recommended (Foddy, 1996). 
Reliability in qualitative interviewing does not come from 'objectivity' and 'distance' from 
participants as in quantitative research (which expects repeatability of results), rather it is 
about describing and understanding how people make sense of their world context. Fielding 
(1993) recommends that: interviewer guidance and direction should be minimal; 
interviweees should be allowed full and specific expression to include the value-laden 
implications of the responses. Validity, which refers to measuring what you aim to measure, 
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in qualitative research is reached by drawing on multiple viewpoints concerning 
interviewees, expert researchers, research colleagues and supervisor opinions on the 
research approach, because as Reason and Rowan (1981: 243) write "rightness of an 
interpretation is inter-subjective... it is right for a group of people who share a similar 
world". 
Therefore, although total accuracy cannot be relied on in any verbally collected data (Foddy, 
1996), inaccuracies were minimised in this study by using the above guidelines from 
previous researchers which included using a relaxed face-to-face in-depth interviewing 
approach with a list of topics and open questions drawn from existing knowledge and 
research, choosing interviewees who had been involved in merging, and from the same 
cultural background, open-ended questions with time for frank value-laden responses, 
deciding on the word order and the order of questions only if thought appropriate by 
supervisor or colleagues, and asking interviewees to make clear if their answers to any 
questions came from direct personal experience or from indirect sources. Participants were 
informed of research aims and about feedback, and were forewarned that the interviews 
were to be recorded for later transcription and translation but confidentiality would be 
maintained by use of code letters or some description of roles and responsibilities, to which 
they agreed. 
5.4 Interview Guide 
The following interview guide for the qualitative interviews was compiled mainly from 
questions raised by the conclusions, comments and discussions in previous research on 
mergers in education, presented in Section 2.4. In the limited duration of each interview 
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with the busy interviewees (probably a maximum of ninety minutes at any one time), it was 
thought that an interview guide containing all of the questions in Section 2.4.2 would be too 
long to receive full answers, therefore a shorter list of forty questions, interview guide draft 
2 (Appendix 1) was prepared as an interview guide. A personal trial of interview guide 
draft 2 indicated that this too would probably be too long, therefore a shorter version with 
twenty questions, interview guide draft 3 (Appendix 2) was prepared focusing in particular 
on aspects suggested as most important in previous research. This interview guide was pilot 
tested on a person in the higher education system in Taiwan to minimise difficulties and to 
ensure the questions were appropriate for the likely duration of interviews. The final 
interview guide, draft 4 below, was finalised following the comments from the pilot trial. 
The subjects of the questions were chosen from both previous research and my own ideas 
in order to try to surface the important factors leading to merger success or failure, which 
previous researchers attribute to a variety of factors, including in particular purpose, size, 
status, position, education profile, external intervention, internal politics, organizational 
culture, negotiation process, finance, leadership vision, planning, implementation, trust, and 
clear definition of roles and responsibilities. However, participants were allowed to raise 
and talk about any other issues that they thought were relevant and the order of topics and 
questions was varied if discussion and probing took different routes. Furthermore, 
interviewees were asked to make comments and answer questions from their own 
experience or in their own opinion, and to make clear if that was not the case. 
The final interview guide then consisted of the following questions: 
What was your role in the merger, or merger attempt? Explain. 
Q2. Why did the institutions merge or try to merge? Explain. 
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Q3. Were there differences in size, status, history, geographic position, tuition fee, salary, 
education profile or education sector prior to merging? 
Q4. Were prior power differentials influential in shaping the merger? Explain. 
Q5. Did the institutions have the choice of incorporating partner, or of looking for other 
partners? 
Q6. Was there proactive government or Education Ministry intervention? 
Q7. Was anyone in control of the merger, and who was it? 
Q8. Was there a merger negotiation process? Who was involved? Did involved people all 
agree that merging was the right direction? Explain. 
Q9. Were the finances sufficient to complete the merger? Explain. 
10. Concerning your institution prior to merger: What was the organizational culture like? 
e. g. Was the academic role fairly loose or tightly prescribed?; Was your main 
professional loyalty to your discipline (subject) or to your institution?; Was teaching 
or research most valued?; Was the reward structure based on research output or 
teaching ability?; Was the governance styles mainly democratic or mainly 
hierarchical?; Did any of these create problems during merging? 
1. Concerning the institution after merger, or attempted merger: What is the 
organizational culture like? 
e. g. Is the academic role fairly loose or tightly prescribed?; Is your main professional 
loyalty to your discipline (subject) or to your institution?; Is teaching or research 
most valued?; Is the reward structure based on research output or teaching ability?; is 
the governance style mainly democratic or mainly hierarchical?; Does the new 
institution have a coherent culture? 
Q12. Was organizational culture influential in merger success or failure? 
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Q13. Did the merger create uncertainty, anxiety, job losses, rivalries, defensive strategies, 
role conflict, ambiguity, distrust? Explain. 
Q14. Was the merger well planned, and well implemented? Explain. 
15. Are, or were, new roles and responsibilities defined adequately? Explain. 
16. Does, or could, the merged institution better meet the needs of students? Government? 
Society? Explain. 
Q17 How much did staff trust the decision makers? How important is maintaining trust, in 
your view? 
18. Was the merger process evaluated? Should it have been? Explain. 
19. Did the merger, or merger attempt, solve any problems, or create problems? Explain. 
Q20. In your view, did the merger, or merger attempt, succeed or fail? Explain why. 
5.5 Gaining Access 
In order to collect empirical primary data in social research, access must be gained to the 
sources of data (Hornsby-Smith, 1993). Thus, gaining access is an essential part of social 
research involving gathering new contextual data but because it is essential it is always a 
potentially problematic aspect of the research. The first decision for the researcher is 
whether to choose overt or covert methods of inquiry. In this study, the methodology to be 
used was the qualitative research interview. It was thought that the overt approach would be 
able to generate the required data, so this had to be the first choice because it is most 
acceptable ethically (Punch, 1986). Consequently, the research used the overt approach and 
the subjects were informed of the aims of the research. 
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However, even with this choice of inquiry approach, it was necessary to negotiate access 
because the access was of the closed type, that is the people with the knowledge and 
experience of the mergers being investigated were insiders in the universities and colleges 
of successful and failed mergers, and Government Ministry officials. Therefore, sensitive 
approaches needed to be made to institutions and individuals, because the 'wrong' 
approach could result in the raising of barriers to discourage inquiry by an outsider. For 
example, Lee and Renzetti (1992) indicate that some closed groups can strongly oppose 
research, and create effective barriers to inquiry. 
My method of approach was to approach people and colleagues within the Taiwanese 
education system, both in the Ministry and others who were teacher members of successful 
and unsuccessful university and college mergers cases, and to explain my research aims and 
the potential research outputs, and to ask them to participate as interviewees. I explained 
that confidentiality would be guaranteed, but emphasised that the research outputs would 
create knowledge and guidelines for merging which should benefit the Taiwan education 
system henceforth, and everyone involved in it. This proved to be a persuasive argument 
particularly for the Ministry officials, and also for failed merger case participants because 
the participants agreed with the argument that guidelines could have saved them much time 
and resources, possibly in making better choices concerning matching the fit of institutions 
or procedures. The successfully merged institution was persuaded to participate not 
particularly for themselves but to hopefully provide information which could help other 
institutions and the education system, indicating a concern for the Taiwan education system 
beyond self interest. However, the interviewees demanded forewarning of the kind of 
questions which I would be asking in the interviews as a precondition of giving the 
interview. Therefore, I sent each of them a copy of my interview guide prior to the 
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interview date. Thus, the interview guide actually became an essential part of gaining 
access. 
5.6 The Interviewees for this Study 
Interviews were arranged with a total of fifteen people who had either direct or indirect 
involvement with the Ministry of Education in Taiwan, the successful merger case or the 
unsuccessful merger case. The interviewees signed the IFL Ethics Committee Consent 
Form of Education Studies, University of Hull, as participants in the study. They were 
promised confidentiality for their participation in this research, therefore each interviewee 
is referred to by a code letter. The code letters, titles, roles and brief job description of the 
fourteen people are presented below. 
5.6.1 Ministry of Education 
The five interviewees from the Ministry of Education are given code letters MI to M5, as 
follows. 
MI: Political Vice Minister of Education. This person is assistant to the Minister of 
Education and will be the next Minister of Education. The political vice Minister of 
Education receives education policy from the Minister of Education. The Minister of 
Education receives policy for the Ministry of Education from the Executive Yuan, 
the elected ruling council of Taiwan (see Figure 2.3). 
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M2: Chairman of the Department of Higher Education. Supervisor of Higher Education 
Affairs in Taiwan. This person is Chairman of the department which supervises all 
universities in Taiwan including both the successful and unsuccessful university 
merger cases considered in this research. This person reports to the Political Vice 
Minister of Education (MI). 
M3: Chairman of the Deptartment of Technological and Vocational Education in Taiwan. 
This person supervises all colleges in Taiwan including Taipei Physical Education 
College, the unsuccessful college case. This person reports to the Political Vice 
Minister of Education (M I). 
M4: President of National Tainan University of Arts. Former Chairman of Department of 
Higher Education. This person supervised all universities in Taiwan at the time of the 
unsuccessful merger case. This person reports to the Political Vice Minister of 
Education (M I). 
M5: President of National University of Tainan. Former Director of Technological and 
Vocational Education who gave the initial permission for the merger, supplied the 
finance needed for the merger, and was involved in all of the meetings for the 
successful merger case. This person reports to the Political Vice Minister of 
Education (M I). 
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5.6.2 Successful Merger Case - National Chiayi University 
The four interviewees from the successful merger case are given code letters SI to S4, as 
follows. 
SI: Professor of Graduate Institute of Elementary and Secondary Education, National 
Chiayi University; Former President, National Chiayi University. Director of Special 
Office; Deputy Minister of Education. Prior to start of the merger process, SI was not 
affiliated with either of the merging colleges, but he was directly involved in the 
merger as Director of the Special Office. 
S2: President, National Chiayi University; Former Vice president, National Chiayi 
University; Former Dean of Academic Affairs, National Chiayi Technology College; 
Former Dean of Academic Affairs, National Chiayi Institute of Agriculture. This 
person was vice-president of the larger part of the successful merger. 
S3: President of Hwa Hsia Institute of Technology; Former president of National Chiayi 
Technology College, the larger part of the successful merger. 
S4: Professor of Southern Taiwan University of Technology; Former Dean of Teachers 
College of National Chiayi University ; Former Dean of Education College of National 
Chiayi Teachers College. The smaller part of the merger. 
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5.6.3 Unsuccessful Merger Case - TMUE and TPEC 
The interviewees relevant to the unsuccessful merger case are referred to using the code 
letters UI to U6, as follows. 
U I: Professor of Graduate Institute of Social Studies; Former president of Taipei Municipal 
University of Education (TMUE). This college was the larger part of the attempted 
merger. 
U2: Professor of Department of Languages and Literature Education; Former vice president 
of Taipei Municipal University of Education. This college was the larger part of the 
attempted merger. 
U3: Professor and The President of Taipei Physical Education College (TPEC), which was 
the smaller part of the attempted merger. 
U4: Commissioner of Department of Education of Taipei City Government. Supervisor of 
all educational establishments in Taipei City and reports to Taipei City Mayor. This 
person gave permission for the merger, and was a former political vice Minister of 
Education. 
U5: Assistant Commissioner of Department of Education of Taipei City Government. 
Assists the supervision of all educational establishments in Taipei City. This person 
reports to U4. 
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U6: Director of Higher Education, Department of Education, Taipei City Government. 
Supervisor of all higher education establishments in Taipei City. This person reports to 
U5. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has completed the explanation of methodology in the study by explaining the 
background to implementation of the methodology choice made in Chapter 4. The 
important aspects of the interview process for carrying out the interviews was described 
and decided upon, the list of questions drawn from previous research on merging was 
compiled into an interview guide involving a pilot test, the theory underlying the gaining of 
access for research interviews was reviewed and the method used in this study described, 
and the people who were decided as appropriate targets for qualitative interview were 
described in terms of code letters, roles and responsibilities. The thesis moves next to the 
outputs from the interviews. 
122 
CHAPTER SIX 
RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the output from the interviews with the fifteen interviewees. In the first 
part of the chapter, details are given of the date, timing and duration of each interview. In 
the second part of the chapter, the answers of the interviewees to the interview guide 
questions concerning the successful merger case are summarized with preliminary analysis, 
using actual quotations from interviewees. In the third part of the chapter, the answers of 
the interviewees to the interview guide questions concerning the unsuccessful merger case 
are summarized with preliminary analysis, using actual quotations from interviewees. 
6.2 Interview details 
The dates, times and duration of each interview with the people from the Ministry, the 
successful case and the unsuccessful case are given in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Dates, Times and Duration of interviews. 
Person code Interview date Interview start time 
Duration of 
interview, Hours. 
Mi 14/03/06 1600 1 
M2 16/02/06 1430 1 
M3 7/03/06 1000 1.5 
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M4 3/03/06 1400 1.5 
M5 22/02/06 1500 1 
si 1/03/06 1330 1.5 
S2 15/02/06 1400 1.5 
S3 1/03/06 1000 1 
S4 14/9/06 0900 1 
Ul 15/03/06 1100 1.5 
U2 2/03/06 0900 1 
U3 3/03/06 1100 1.5 
U4 9/03/06 0930 1.5 
U5 22/03/06 1800 1.5 
U6 23/03/06 1600 1 
The interview process was as follows. All of the interviews were conducted in Mandarin 
Chinese. A copy of the interview guide in Mandarin Chinese had been sent to each 
interviewee prior to each interview, as this had been requested by most of them as a 
condition of consenting to be interviewed. At the interview, I outlined the aims of my 
research and then proceeded to ask them the questions in my interview guide. Each 
interview was recorded. I let the interviewees answer the questions, and any follow up 
questions, in their own way, even though sometimes they did not answer a question or said 
C4 no comment", or gave what seemed to me to be an incomplete or sometimes partly 
irrelevant answer. If this occurred, I generally asked the question, or any follow up question, 
again with different phrasing but I could not press anyone too vigorously because all the 
interviewees were senior people involved in higher education matters in Taiwan, and they 
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could have terminated the interview and left me with nothing, so I had to be respectful and 
diplomatic with the questioning and probing. A short time after each interview, I 
transcribed and translated the answers into English ready for later analysis. 
6.3 Summaries of the Interviewees' Answers Concerning the Successful Merger Case. 
In order to facilitate understanding for the reader, each question of the interview guide is 
considered in turn concerning the answers from the interviewees. 
6.3.1 Q 1. What was your role in the merger, or merger attempt? Explain. 
The interviewees gave some different responses to this question, indicating that they were 
involved in the merger in different ways and from different sides. However, from their job 
titles and from what they said it is clear that they were senior people closely involved in 
either the colleges or in aspects of the merger. 
For example, SI answered "As the Political Vice Minister of Education and the Director of 
the Preparatory Office at that time, I took charge of the whole merger's plans and co- 
ordination with the Ministry of Education". S2 said "I was the Dean of Academic Affairs in 
National Chiayi Technology College, acting in a consultation role". S3 replied "as 
principal of National Chiayi Technology College, I took charge of the external negotiation 
and the internal communication". S4 commented that as "Dean of the Teacher 
college ... 
I ... communicated 
between planning leaders.. of National Chiayi Teacher College 
and teachers". 
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The Ministry of Education officials who were interviewed also had some involvement in 
the merger. For example, M2 (Supervisor of Higher Education Affairs in Taiwan) answered 
I was responsible for this program. Later... I was instated as National Chiayi University's 
Chief of the Administration Department, Preparatory Office, thus, taking part in almost 
every group's plans and works, including personnel affairs ... new information, school 
organization after integration, and some Ministry regulations". Also, M3 observed I 
supervise all colleges in Taiwan..... I offered most support to Chiayi Technology college, 
especially concerning policy and regulations". Furthermore, M5 pointed out that "as the 
chairman of Dept. of Technological & Vocational Education. I supervised and 
communicated with National Chiayi Technology College and National Chiayi Teacher 
College" 
However, M4 (Former Chairman of Department of Higher Education) said "During the 
process of integration, the Department of Higher Education didn't make any big move .... all 
plans and works were fully conducted by the Department of Secondary Education, and by 
the Technological and Vocational Education .... The 
first time we knew the plan was the 
National Chiayi University of Education's establishment ... From that moment the 
Department of Higher Education started to get involved". Also, MI (Political Vice Minister 
of Education) commented "I cannot easily explain all that I did in this case". 
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6.3.2 Q2. Why did the institutions merge or try to merge? Explain. 
The interviewees were all agreed about the reason for the merger. 
For example, SI pointed out that "The factors that drive the National Chiayi University 
merging together come mostly from the Government's advocacy. The promise made by the 
Premier of the Executive Yuan, during the local election". 
S2 supported this, saying "There was an important reason - the political promise... The 
Premier of the Executive Yuan made a promise in the election that there must be a 
university in Chiayi city. Then the Ministry of Education picked National Chiayi 
Technology College and National Chiayi Teacher College ... two equal colleges that seek to 
upgrade to university". 
S3 commented "The merger... resulted mainly from Government's policy. Since, the 
Premier of the Executive Yuan and a few local inhabitants advocated the program. There 
was a political policy". 
Also, S4 replied "Because of the political promise from the Excusive Yuan, the Ministry of 
Education suggested that the National Chiayi Teachers College merge with the National 
Chiayi Technology College. The Teachers College got a lot of pressures from the Ministry. 
The Ministry controls the budget and policy of the Teachers College ... That's why we went 
for merger" 
Also, the Ministry officials all agreed it was a top down policy. 
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MI observed that "The process of the merger was from high to low, not low to high. The 
former Minister of Education, Lin Ching Chiang, broached the idea ... to the former Premier 
of Executive Yuan, Hsiao, who, bom in Chiayi, always hoped to establish a university in 
his hometown". M2 noted the "integration is unusual ... The Government first made the 
policy, through which they started to negotiate with the two schools, setting up the 
Preparatory Office to operate the program". 
M31 M4 and M5 all said the merger "was a political promise". 
6.3.3 Q3. Were there differences in size, status, history, geographic position, tuition fee, 
salary, education profile or education sector prior to merging? 
Mlý M2, M3, and M4 said they did not know these details. However, the other 
interviewees all pointed out that the Technology college was larger than the Teacher 
college, in staff, students, and area, and they had a different focus. 
For example, M5 said "There were approximately 15 miles between them. The history of 
the National Chiayi Technology College is over 80 years, the National Chiayi Teacher 
College is over 45 years. The number of teachers in the National Chiayi Technology 
College (298) was two times that of the National Chiayi Teacher College (140). 1 think the 
National Chiayi Technology College was focused on research, the National Chiayi Teacher 
College was focused on teaching". 
These observations concurred with those of the other interviewees. In addition. SI 
commented that "National Chiayi Technology college was under the Department of 
Technological and Vocational Education's supervision. National Chiayi Teachers College 
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was under the Department of Secondary Education's supervision. The two colleges' tuition 
fee was quite similar, and so were their teachers' salaries". 
S2 noted that "National Chiayi Technology College... occupied 2/3 of National Chiayi 
University 
... [and] had more budget than the Teachers College. Because of this, some 
people in the Technology College opposed the merger. They thought National Chiayi 
Technology College [could] upgrade to a ... scientific and technology university. But the 
Ministry of Education wouldn't increase the budget each year.... The Technology 
College's culture was open, but the Teacher College is conservative. About salary, the 
Teacher College could get extra pay, because of the interactive teaching. The Technology 
College is in Chiayi city, but the Teacher College is in Chiayi county". S3 noted "[after 
merging] the academic status has become better; after all, a university's academic status 
and the education resources are better than a college. The rest of the parts did not change 
too much, either". 
S4 commented "The Teachers College focused on teaching ... But two years before the 
merger, [we] applied to establish more institutes and tried to put more focus on research 
[but were unsuccessfalf. 
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6.3.4 Q4. Were prior power differentials influential in shaping the merger? Explain. 
MI and M4 refused to comment. M2 and M5 did not know. M3 pointed out "I didn't see 
power operating between the two parties... This was a policy straight from the government. 
They will follow the policy as near possible as they can, even if they don't like it". 
Also, the other interviewees expressed the view that power differentials were not important. 
For example, S3 observed "[not] too much difference in their power or resources. Although 
the campus size of the two colleges was different, but I think it did not make any influence 
over the project". Also, S4 noted "In the merger... I didn't think the prior power 
differentials influenced the merger. As I mentioned, this merger was a political promise. 
The government led the merger". 
However, power differentials did exist. For example, S2 said " The Technology College 
was superior to the Teacher College [in budget and students]... At the beginning of idea of 
merger, the Technology College did not want the merger. The Teacher college did npt want 
it either. The Teacher College was afraid of elimination from merger. The Teacher College 
had treasured values. Without the political promise, the merger may not have been 
completed". Also, SI commented "To the superior college - National Chiayi Technology 
college, merging with another was unnecessary. But to the inferior college - National 
Chiayi Teachers college, merging [could] engender worries that some of their facilities 
might be eliminated after the merger. Therefore, the inferior college might feel difficulties 
during the communication with National Chiayi Technology college, but this did not 
happen". 
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Thus, the answers of several interviewees actually suggest that power differentials were 
important influences because there were feelings of superiority and inferiority. 
6.3.5 Q5. Did the institutions have the choice of incorporating partner, or of looking for 
other partners? 
All interviewees answered either 'No, or Don't know', except for S4 from the Teacher 
college. 
For example, S2 said "No, these two colleges were matched by the Ministry of Education" 
Also, S3 replied "No.. [but].. Before the Government gave the merger attempt, we did not 
have any [other] merger attempt". Furthermore, SI commented "There was a pressure that 
we have to accomplish the political promise. That's why the Ministry of Education gave a 
lot of guarantees to avoid worries and objections from staffs of the two colleges". 
MI replied I do not know", and M2 said "For National Chiayi University, they had no 
choice about partner". This was supported by comments from M3, M4 and M5. 
However, S4 replied "Yes. The National Chiayi Teachers College tried to merge with the 
National Chung Cheng University before (one year before the National Chiayi Technology 
College). But the National Chung Cheng University was too superior. Therefore, the 
merger attempt stopped. After that, the Ministry suggested the National Chiayi Teachers 
College merger with the National Chiayi Technology College" 
131 
6.3.6 Q6. Was there proactive government or Education Ministry intervention? 
All interviewees agreed that there was proactive government or Education Ministry 
intervention, and this was critical because both were public institutions. 
For example, SI commented "the Government's help promoted these two colleges' 
negotiation and execution of the merger. Because the Ministry of Education guaranteed 
most requests in the negotiation". S2 noted "The government had tremendous influence 
Probably more than 70%. Because both colleges are public. All were supervised by the 
Ministry of Education. If we don't follow the suggestion, the Ministry of Education may 
decrease the budget, or reject the application project for new departments". Also, S3 
observed "Yes, both were involved in the project, but I think it is a positive movement. 
They offered the merger attempt, funds (240,247 NTD for campus repair; 
370,000,00ONTID for Auditorium; 430,727,000 NTD for library), and new buildings 
(Auditorium, 2002-2003; Library, 2002-2005). Especially in the new buildings, without 
their support, it would take years to apply [and receive]". Furthermore, S4 answered "Yes, 
it was the Ministry of Education. At that time, the National Chiayi Teacher College tried to 
establish a few new institutes. And the Ministry will approve them [but] only if the 
National Chiayi Teacher College merged with the National Chiayi Technology College" 
Also, the ministry officials' answers supported the above comments. For example, MI said 
"The premier said this city needed a university, so the Education Ministry suggested a 
merger of these two colleges to achieve this". M4 agreed with this comment. Also, M2 
replied "Certainly ... The successful and unsuccessful merger cases are all public. Public 
schools' integration is different because both successful and unsuccessful merger cases 
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were top down suggestions. This was the case for the successful case from the Ministr\,. It 
was the same for the unsuccessful merger case, from the Taipei City council". However, 
M3 noted "The Ministry gave the merger suggestion, but then it was up to the two parties 
except that the Ministry of Education controlled the budget to make them carry on as it was 
a political promise", and M5 observed "if they ... want to upgrade to university, it is their 
best chance". 
6.3.7 Q7. Was anyone in control of the merger, and who was it? 
The interviewees gave some different answers to this question, although most thought SI to 
be in charge but recognized the Minister as a key person. 
For example, SI said "I was in control of the merger. The Minister of Education appointed 
me.... But I think the Minister of Education is a key player. If he didn't approve the merger, 
then nothing would happen". S2 thought "The Minister of Education is a key man. Because 
he encouraged this merger and gave lots of support in finance. The other one is the director 
of special office in the merger preparation. He adjusted the structure of the university". 
Also, S3 answered "the Minister of Education was the one. If there was ... no positive 
promotion of the merger, this case may not be completed. The Minister of Education could 
offer policies to appease worries of staffs and teachers. That is a very important support". 
And, S4 commented "The director of the special office controlled the merger. Because he 
was the first president after the merger. He decided the framework of the new university. 
He also reassigned some staffs to different departments". 
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These comments were supported by M3 and M5. For example, M3 replied "the president 
of the university is a key factor.... assigned by Ministry of Education.... The director of the 
merging office, he spent a lot of energy to link it up, co-ordinate too, and to support the 
policy, and communicating constantly. I think all these let it exactly combine, and [was] 
key to the good effect". Also, M5 thought it was "The director of special office ... [who 
became] president of the new university after the merger. So he planned lots of things for 
the new university. For example, new buildings, campus restructure, job adjustment. 
Therefore, I think he controlled the merger". 
However, MI stated that "there is no such designation .... Once the school convention 
agreed, we can find representatives, chosen by their own schools not by the Ministry of 
Education, to carry out the project". Also, M2 expressed no comment, and M4 said I 
don't really know who was in control of the merger. Because a lot of people worked for 
this case". 
6.3.8 Q8. Was there a merger negotiation process? Who was involved? Did involved 
people all agree that merging was the right direction? Explain. 
The interviewees agreed that meetings did take place prior to merging. 
For example, SI said "Yes, some representative directors of the two colleges, and some 
officials from the Ministry of Education attended the meeting together... all the members 
who attend the meeting approved that the merger is a correct decision". S2 replied "These 
two colleges held several conferences with their staff, in order to get agreement. After that, 
two representative directors of each college, the officers of the Ministry of Education, the 
principals of two colleges all were committee members. And all of us agreed the merger is 
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correct". S3 concurred, saying "Yes, we had meetings. We had representative directors 
from both colleges, 5-6 persons. Officers from the Ministry of Education, 5-6 persons. 
Experts from other universities and other countries, 4 persons. We all agree the merger is 
right". 
However, although S4 agreed with the above comments about a merger negotiation process 
and numbers of people involved, he added "they all agreed the merger was the right 
direction. Because those people already left the merger process who did not agree to 
merger55. 
The ministry officials generally agreed with the above, although both MI and M2 were 
unable to answer this question. 
M3 pointed out "Yes, we had a lot of meetings. There were nearly 20 people in the meeting. 
You could check the records. In each meeting, we all believed the merger is the only goal 
to achieve". Also, M4 observed that "Both colleges negotiated for the working right, new 
buildings, new departments, etc. We have lots people in the meeting, including experts, 
directors of both of colleges, and directors of Ministry of Education. Of course we all 
agreed the merger is the right thing". 
M5 gave more details about the meetings, stating that "Before the negotiation, each of them 
(The National Chiayi Teacher College and The National Chiayi Technology College) had 
an internal meeting and had an agreement to merge. Therefore, everyone in the negotiation 
meeting agreed that the merger was the correct decision. There were 5 senior administrators 
(president, director of academics, director of student affairs, director of general affairs) 
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from the National Chiayi Teacher College, 5 senior administrators (president, director of 
academics, director of student affairs, director of general affairs) from the National Chiayi 
Technology College, 6 officers from the Ministry of Education (The Minister of Ministry, 2 
Deputy Ministers, Chairman of Dept. of higher education, chairman of Dept. of 
Technological & Vocational Education, Chairman of Dept. of Secondary Education). So, 
there were 16 people in the negotiation meeting". 
6.3.9 Q9. Were the finances sufficient to complete the merger? Explain. 
The interviewees said that there was no extra budget allocation for merging, which did not 
cost a lot. However the new budget after merging could help with planned changes. 
For example, SI stated that "we did not execute the merger with any extra budgets. 
Because in the preparatory stage, it didn't cost us too much. As to some considerable 
expenditure on both hardware and software, we would use the new budgets ... after the 
merger completed". S2 replied that "the original budget of the two colleges was enough. 
We could operate the merger plan very well by means of the original budget even without 
the funding for a special office". S3 noted that "the real support from the Government was 
after the merger completed. Because it became a new university, it got a new budget". S4 
said "There was no budget for merger". 
The ministry comments did not disagree with the above comments. For example, M4 
answered "In National Chiayi University's case, the Ministry of Education didn't give any 
budget for the merger process, because there were just a few meetings during the merger 
process. But xve did give lots money after the successful merger, because it was a part of 
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the negotiation between the Ministry of Education and National Chiayi University". Also, 
M5 pointed out "[only] after the merger, there were a lot of institutes to be established, and 
offices to be adjusted etc. ... These all need funds from the Ministry of Education". MI, N42 
and M3 either agreed that finances were sufficient, or did not know. 
6.3.10 QIO. Concerning your institution prior to merger: What was the organizational 
culture like? 
The interviewees from the Technology college thought their college was more democratic 
than the hierarchical teachers college. 
For example, SI observed "National Chiayi Technology College had a democratic 
representative culture, but they did not want to merge. The National Chiayi Teacher 
College had a conservative one - they did not want to change and the power structure was 
hierarchical. Moreover, National Chiayi Technology College was characterized by their 
technology and science, always focused on developing research. However National Chiayi 
Teacher College, marked by their teacher-training program, always concentrated on 
developing their teaching and education". Also, S2 commented "The Technology College 
is democratic, the Teacher College is conservative. The National Chiayi Technology 
College is focused on research. The reward structure... is based on research. It took a lot of 
time to convince the staff of the National Chiayi Technology College [to merge]". S3 
agreed with these comments. 
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S4 replied that "the president of the National Chiayi Teacher College decided most things. 
It was hierarchical ... [and] focused on teaching. Because of it, the reward structure was 
based on teaching ability". 
M I, M2, M3, M4, and M5 all said I do not know" 
6.3.11 Q 11. Concerning the institution after merger, or attempted merger: What is the 
organizational culture like? 
The interviewees who were able to comment on this question all thought that National 
Chiayi University had a friendly democratic culture. 
For example, SI commented "After merging, the whole culture became more liberal and 
the prospect tended towards research. For the evaluation of teachers, school research and 
teaching became the criteria.... After the merger, National Chiayi University has a coherent 
culture". S2 answered "quite friendly, also democratic [like the Technology college]... Now 
the reward structure became semi-structured, based on research output and teaching 
ability... [but] The teachers of the education institute have little research". S4 observed that 
"After the merger, National Chiayi University is focused on research. The governance style 
is democratic". 
M 1, M2, M3, M4, M5 did not know, nor did S3 who had left the university to take up 
another position. 
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6.3.12 Q12. Was organizational culture influential in merger success or failure? 
The interviewees did not think this was the case, even though the institutions both had a 
long history and some conservative thinking probably because of that, in the end the 
Government policy and inducements had won over the staff. 
For example, SI noted "In National Chiayi University, some departments from the 
education institute argued that they got less funding than before. They can't understand that 
the budget now is for the university, not for their college. These arguments happen all the 
time. It's the difference of culture. If we don't deal with it carefully, the university may 
separate". S2 said I think the culture is a long-term accumulation. The problem for 
National Chiayi University is the organizational culture after merger. We have to 
compromise the culture gap, to deal with each other. It will take a long time, five or ten 
year maybe. If two colleges try to merge, and they have a similar organizational culture. 
That might be easier". S3 remarked "In this case, the merger may not complete without the 
Government's intervention. The National Chiayi Technology College had a very good 
connection with many enterprises. We didn't have a major problem to force us to consider 
merging". 
M3 commented "[culture] can be very serious influence on whether the whole really can 
exactly combine.... The most important factor should be the feelings of their personnel, 
you have not to give people too great pressure, especially if they are professors, because of 
academic freedom". M4 said "Chiayi Teacher College had a conservative culture 
established in the Japanese Occupation Period... The long historical background made them 
conservative... proud of what they were. That may make them hard to accept changes. In 
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the National Chiayi University [merger], the culture influenced the merger attempt, but not 
much". M5 remarked "In the Chiayi university case, I wasn't aware that the organizational 
culture was influential. They were very cooperative with the policy, and very peaceful in 
the merger. The Ministry offered many things they requested in the negotiation (e. g. extra 
budgets for new building after merger, guaranteed staffs'job)". 
S4, MI and M2 did not know. 
6.3.13 Q13. Did the merger create uncertainty, anxiety, job losses, rivalries, defensive 
strategies, role conflict, ambiguity, distrust? Explain. 
The interviewees generally considered that these negative factors were seemingly dispelled 
by government promises to protect salaries, employment and workers' rights. 
For example, SI noted "During the negotiation process, the Ministry of Education 
promised to protect the current staffs' job. Then, the two colleges negotiated and 
coordinated with their own members, reducing their misgivings towards the successful 
merger". S2 pointed out that "People feared about job losses. But at the beginning of the 
merger, the Ministry of Education guaranteed their jobs. Defensive behavior happened, but 
with only a few teachers. These teachers objected to the merger, even when the merger was 
completed". Also, S3 observed "Certainly, many were worried about their internal policies. 
But, specifically, the Government promised that every staff would keep the same position 
CICI- Iý 
with no layotis - 
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MI pointed out , it was decided that... the merger would never affect wages [but could 
include] work transference but exclude job demotion". Also, M3 commented "We 
promised their working rights. In fact, nobody lost their job because of the successful case 
merger. If the policy can keep jobs, everything gets easy". Furthermore, M4 said "In the 
National Chiayi University case, the "job losses" was the thing they worried about ... [so] 
the Ministry of Education guaranteed that nobody would get fired". 
However, for M2 "The main mutual disagreement in National Chiayi University lay in 
their dissatisfaction at the change of school name. During the integration, some faculties of 
these universities were worried that some departments might be eliminated, or two schools' 
academic status and school customs would be strongly influenced, but this did not happen. 
What teachers care most about is whether the integration would change their promotion 
system or not". Also, M5 noted "Some people... argued which school should give up the 
name. But the Ministry wanted a new name, then we solved the argument. Some people 
worried about job losses. The Ministry guaranteed their job, even if not the same job title, 
but still the same salary. So, we solved their worries. That's all I know". 
But merging problems may not have ended yet from the remarks of S4 who said "The 
rivalries happened after the merger. For example, the National Chiayi Teacher College had 
1.3 billion NTD budget each year.... But now, the National Chiayi University doesn't offer 
the same budget for the education institute (previously the National Chiayi Teacher 
College). Therefore, the staff from the National Chiayi Teacher College are not happy with 
it". This suggests that some merger problems are now arising. 
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6.3.14 Q14. Was the merger well planned, and well implemented? Explain. 
All interviewees except one of those able to comment seemed to think planning and 
implementation were satisfactory. 
For example, SI commented "Maybe we cannot fulfill each tiny plan, especially in the 
administration. We got three campuses, and it is very hard to make administration more 
efficient. But rest of the plans were executed well and engendered very good effects". S2 
answered "Some are not completed on time. For example, we had planned to use an 
electronic administration system, and tried to improve the efficiency in administration. We 
purchased the system, but it did not work as well as we expected. We have too many 
sites ... [but] The education establishments were built as expected. ". S3 replied "Yes, I think 
well-executed. For example, there were II departments in the Teacher College, 14 
departments in the Technology College. After the merger, it became 51 departments. We 
planned to build 4 new buildings (auditorium, library, business school, seminar building) 
that all started in 2002 and were completed before 2005". 
M3 said "I think it was well planned. For example, there was no business school in these 
two college before merging. But they do have one now, a management area in National 
University of Chiayi for future development, a very good foundation it establishes ... [for] 
teaching and research and the improvement of the teachers college of Chiayi". 
However, S4 thought differently about the execution "From my opinion, the merger was 
well planned. But not well implemented, especially in the education institute. In the merger 
plan, the National Chiayi Teacher College planned to establish new institutes. But none of 
them were approved. The teachers in the education institute are very angry about that". 
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M I, M2, M4 and M5 were either unsure or made no comment to this question. 
6.3.15 Q 15. Are, or were, new roles and responsibilities defined adequately? Explain. 
None of the interviewees made any complaint about new role or responsibility definitions. 
For example, SI said "Yes, so far the operation is no problem". Also, S2 answered "Yes, 
some of the staffs have been promoted to other department of government. For example, 
the former vice president of the Technology College, was promoted to The Council of 
Agriculture, as a vice Minister. Some have been reassigned to different campus. Over all, 
they were all defined adequately after merger". M3 remarked "Yes, I think so. Some of the 
staffs were reassigned to new positions. They are doing well". Furthermore, M5 noted "The 
former Deputy Minister, he was the director of the special office in the merger. His job was 
to plan the structure of the new university after the merger. And he also was the first 
president of National Chiayi University. That was a very clear definition of his role". 
S3, S4, MI, and M4 did not know, and M2 made no comment. 
6.3.16 Q 16. Does, or could, the merged institution better meet the needs of students? 
Government? Society? Explain. 
According to most interviewees there seemed to be advantages from merging for students, 
government and society. 
For example, SI commented "[now] the students' curriculum is richer and more 
multifarious... [so] good for students. For the Ministry of Education, I think they supervise 
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easier than before ... [was] two institutions before the merger, but now it is one. For the 
society, the political promise was accomplished". 
S2 answered "After the merger, students have more choices on courses. For example, they 
may choose a second specialty, contact more schoolmates, participate in each kind of 
different student society. For the government, the National Chiayi University is the only 
case that has completed merger". 
S3 pointed out "To society, they witnessed the first university, which succeeded in merger. 
To the Government, they accomplish their political promise. To students ... they have a new 
university, and receive a different certification inscribed the "National Chiayi 
University. "... So, I think it attained to everyone's anticipation" 
MI answered "a university needs a large scale, various educations, and multifarious 
faculties in order to achieve students' mutual learning and mutual competition.... I think 
[enlargement] is very good for students. .. [because] All those changes might drive them to 
absorb more knowledge and receive better education, from many academic domains. No 
matter whether to students or to schools' economy, the merger program is really beneficial". 
M3 remarked "students... get more courses to choose .... [this merger] could be a model to 
other colleges that try to merge... If [more] colleges could merge, that will be benefit to the 
government. ... If they 
didn't merge, they both may not be strong enough". 
M4 pointed out "students get more courses ... [also] the Government now only needs to 
cope with one big university, simply and smoothly. If an integrated school become more 
prominent than it was before, the integration is worthwhile". 
144 
M5 said "The numbers of departments increased to 51 departments. Therefore, the students 
got more choices. The funds were raised, the students got a better environment in which to 
study. The merger also met the needs of government. The Ministry of Education used the 
budget more efficiently .... the big university is more competitive". 
However, S4 appeared altogether less enthusiastic "I think the merger meets the needs of 
government. In the merger of National Chiayi University, it was a political promise. 
Therefore, the merger proved the political promise". 
M2 did not know. 
6.3.17 Q17 How much did staff trust the decision makers? How important is maintaining 
trust, in your view? 
Most interviewees thought trust was maintained during the merger and this was very 
important. 
For example, SI commented "During the merger, most members believed their decision 
makers. A leader must have staff s trust and recognition. Otherwise, the leader's credibility 
would strongly influence the plan's execution and also the guidance after the merger. 
Therefore, I think that mutual trust is extremely important". 
S2 answered: 
"There was no problem about trust. The National Chiayi University is 
democratic .... the 
Ministry of Education did not get any complaint letter related to me 
[president]. This is very important! You must extinguish disparagement ... The staff of 
145 
the National Chiayi University could express their opinion anywhere, anytime. I do 
not control them, but I communicate with them. That' s the way I keep the trust from 
my staff. Trust is very important. You can' t lead the university to improvement, or 
execute intemal policy without the trust from staff'. 
S3 said "mutual trust is vital. The leader needs the trust of employees, otherwise it would 
be difficult to communicate with them, execute the actions, and complete the merger. As 
for the Technology College, there were about 80% workers who trust their decision maker. 
Now, I have no idea". 
S4 expressed the view that "Most staff in the Teacher college trusted the first president of 
National Chiayi University. He was the Deputy Minister of Education, and some staff were 
his students. He also respected the tradition of the Teacher College. Therefore, he tried to 
make change on Teacher college slowly (in teacher evaluation structure). After he retired, 
the new president made changes too fast. Therefore, a few staff were not happy and left 
their position". 
MII M2ý M4, and M5 all said I don't know". M3 said "No comment". 
6.3.18 Q 18. Was the merger process evaluated? Should it have been? Explain. 
SIý S2, S3, S4, M2, M3, M4, and M5 all said "No evaluation was carried out during the 
merger process". 
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However, S2 and M5 noted that it had been evaluated as part of the normal three yearly 
evaluation of universities. For example, S2 said " we have the university evaluation... we 
got a very good comment". M5 noted that "the evaluation includes: Academic quality, 
administration system, and equipment". 
6.3.19 Q19. Did the merger, or merger attempt, solve any problems, or create problems? 
Explain. 
Overall, the merger solved problems according to most of the interviewees. 
For example, SI commented "the merger really solved [both colleges] problems. At first, 
the two colleges were facing the setback in their development, they can't get upgraded, 
more campus, or more courses at that time. But the completion of the merger solved all 
those thorny problems. The success of the merger not only satisfied citizens' anticipation, 
but also offered students multifarious education options ... No academic 
departments 
merged because there was no overlap, however there was merging of the administrations". 
S2 pointed out that "we all upgraded to a university. We got more students, more funds, 
better ranking. That's why I say the merger solved the problem". S3 replied "we did solve 
the problem. If the merger had not been completed, these two schools might probably have 
difficulties in recruiting new students now". 
M5 remarked "[Both colleges] were trying to reform and upgrade to universities. But were 
limited by their campus size [the Teacher College], the qualification of teachers [the reason 
for both]. Because of the political promise, they got the chance to upgrade to university by 
merger. For now, I think the merger solved their problem, also it avoided the student 
recruitment problem". 
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However, both S4 and MI thought it solved a problem for government. S4 thought "the 
merger solved the problem for the govemment. Because it was a political promise. As time 
goes by, it created some other problems. For example, the Teacher college didn't get the 
same budgets as before. Therefore, there are [still] a few complexities". MI said "National 
Chiayi University has been [the only] successful case of the merger program". Furthermore, 
MI pointed out that "when we tried to consolidate other teacher colleges with other 
universities, upgrade to them was not effective anymore, especially universities. Even 
though the other teacher college reached the agreement in the school convention, the 
university, which was a higher-education institute originally, has no intention to merge with 
them. The National Hualian University of Education was a good example. Upgrade is a 
very good incentive, but it is hard to find schools wanting to upgrade so much just like how 
the National Chiayi University did". 
M2, M3 and M4 were unsure whether the merger had solved or created problems. 
6.3.20 Q20. In your view, did the merger, or merger attempt, succeed or fail? Explain why. 
All interviewees thought it was a successful merger. 
For example, SI said "I think it is really successful. At first, the merger... was to 
accommodate the Government's policies, but nowadays the two schools not only 
successfully merged together, but also managed and developed very well after their 
integration. Since there has been no layoffs or unemployment in the merger, the objection 
to the merger was controllable. After the merger, the evaluation from the academics and the 
inhabitants towards this project was highly regarded". S2 answered "Very successful. 
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Because regardless of finance or academic, all better than before. Staff 's working rights 
were all safeguarded, the organization culture is fusing". S3 commented "the merger was 
successful ... the merged university, no matter in student recruitment, academic status, or the 
school administration, operates perfectly well". S4 thought "it was a successful merger. 
Because completed, and still together so far. It also satisfied the political promise". 
MI remarked "the National Chiayi University merger is successful ... the system 
has 
changed for the better, but it still takes them more efforts for them to become really 
integrated". M2 said "It succeeded because the two institutions are still merged together" 
M3 commented. " Certainly ... so 
far as performance, I think it is more efficient than before, 
reach originally anticipated goals, the merger raised the quality". M4 pointed out "the 
National Chiayi University is successful ... it is running better than separate. It was 
hard 
[before] to achieve a higher education standard and to make progress in academic research 
the integration will strengthen National Chiayi University's development". 
M5 replied "successful merger... from statistics. The number of students increased 1,635, 
from 6,765 (1999) to 8,405 (2004), they merged in year 2000. The budget increased 
581ý447,000 NTD, from 1,135,497,000 NTD (1999) to 1,716,944,000 NTD (2004). The 
research publications increased 164, from 458 (2000) to 622 (2003). .. the performance was 
very good". 
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6.4 Summaries of the Interviewees' Answers Concerning the Unsuccessful Merger 
Case. 
6.4.1 Q1. What was your role in the merger, or merger attempt? Explain. 
The different responses of the interviewees to this question indicated their close, but 
different, roles in the merger which could generate different perspectives on the merger. 
For example, Ul (President of Taipei Municipal University of Education) said he 
"negotiated with my school members, ... negotiated with Taipei Physical Education 
College and reported details to the Taipei City Hall". U2 assisted Ul. 
U3 (President of Taipei Physical Education College) said "I represented my college when 
negotiating with Taipei Municipal University of Education" 
U4 (Commissioner of Department of Education of Taipei City Government and Vice- 
Political Minister of Education when National Chiayi University merged) had the role "to 
provide help and ass i stance.... use my previous experience". 
U5 (Assistant Commissioner of Department of Education of Taipei city Government) 
ý4 communicated with the two college Presidents" concerning the merger attempt. U6 
(Director of Higher Education, Taipei City Government) said "I handled some procedures 
and communicated with [both colleges] and Taipei City Hall" 
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6.4.2 Q2. Why did the institutions merge or try to merge? Explain. 
Some interviewees Pointed out that the economic reality of too many teacher graduates for 
the available jobs was the driver for the merger. For example, UI said "overstock of teacher 
(amount needed in Taiwan: 9000, amount supplied in Taiwan: 27,000 ), ... many 
students ... still unemployed", and U2 said "in the past had 100% employment... [but now] 
just a few student gets employed.. [because] they don't have other expertise if they aren't a 
teacher". 
U4 supported this suggestion that wider education was the key factor saying "Universities 
provide students with multifarious education ... [which] can improve teacher's quality, 
emphasize various courses, and enhance the university's competitiveness.. [and] 
match .. [the] cosmopolitan area's 
development". And U6 said "Nowadays ... difficult 
for 
colleges ... to avoid 
difficulty in student [employment].. Therefore... the university merger.. 
[would be] a new way to make progress". 
However, U3 suggested a different emphasis "both [colleges] are Taipei City Hall's 
property... [and] not enough budget for these two colleges ... these two colleges 
have to use 
their budget more efficiently". 
Furthermore, U5 thought Ministry policy was an important influence, saying "Due to the 
Ministry of Education's higher-education policies ... aimed at enhancing 
high-school 
students' opportunity for further study, and... island-wide university establishment ... the 
Ministry of Education manifested their intent to establish universities in every city or 
county, at least one university for one place [but] Taipei City's resources are limited. . [and].. 
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the schools receive financial budgets from Taipei City, so the procedure must be accredited 
by City Council.... [but] the 
communication and negotiation" 
Ministry of Education ... would help the colleges' 
6.4.3 Q3. Were there differences in size, status, history, geographic position, tuition fee, 
salary, education profile or education sector prior to merging? 
According to the interviewees (and supported by Chapter 3), at the time of the merger 
attempt, 2000, Taipei Municipal University of Education had a much longer history and 
about twice as many teachers and students as Taipei Physical Education college, but the 
education fee was similar and both focused on teaching. 
For example, UI said "TMUE excelled their merging counterparts - TPEC... in student 
number... employee number... in annual budget. The tuition fee was similar. Both colleges 
emphasised their teaching". And, U2 said "[Since] the budget of these two colleges is all 
from Taipei City Hall... both are on the low-budget status ... [geographically] these two 
colleges are in Taipei City ... TMUE 
is training teachers for elementary school, The TPEC 
is training physical teachers for all schools.. these two colleges were complementary". 
However, concerning perceived status they were similar, and although TMUE had a larger 
site than TPEC, it was less good location and less valuable. For example, U4 commented 
that "The size of both schools .. not 
big .... 
in campus or status", while U5 noted "[In] status 
TMUE and TPEC are the same... both in Taipei city... 15kms between their 
campus ... 
TPEC has better location, more valuable". And, U6 commented "TMUE size 
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almost double TPEC. The location of TPEC is next to the Taipei City Stadium. Therefore, 
[they] got a better location". 
6.4.4 Q4. Were prior power differentials influential in shaping the merger? Explain. 
Five of the six interviewees identified that power differentials did influence the merger 
attempt. 
For example, Ul commented that "We [TMUE] had already upgraded to University 
but 
... our merging partner is a [smaller] college ... It affected TPEC's intention to merge. 
We have pressure from Ministry of Education to merge [because it was] condition [to] be 
upgraded to ... University ... [so] TPEC 
felt under pressure... [and was] unhappy with us". 
U3 observed that in a free vote TPEC would not merge because of "asymmetrical [power] 
distribution ... if we ... vote, the merger would 
definitely be turned down. However ... because 
[Taipei] Government provides the budgets ... Unless I quit my 
job ... I must 
follow the 
Taipei City Hall's guidance. The TPEC [lacked] a sense of security, but TMUE held an 
arrogant attitude". However, U3 told the Commissioner (U4) how to solve the problem 
"First, when integration completed, TPEC and TMUE [must be] equivalent, with equal 
faculties and equal-sized areas. This is a key point ... to maintain equivalence. 
Second, keep 
the original campus.... [so after merging each have] own faculties and territories... no 
occupation or intervention problems ... to provide us with a sense of solidity". 
U4 did not regard TPEC as inferior because both colleges had strengths however "Certainly, 
the dissimilar college histories might engender some discrepancies to the two colleges' 
power ... 
TPEC has successfully delivered ... Olympic gold-medal athletes and accomplished 
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Industry-University Cooperative Research, and sports business ... TMUE has attained high 
social evaluation ... the two colleges are essentially complementary.... The future potential 
of the college is the key that [should] influence the merger". 
U5 highlighted that people's perceptions are important concerning whether university or 
college and therefore "TPEC [wished] to upgrade to University [before merging to be] 
same level as TMUE. In my opinion, it is only a problem which implicates people's 
conception and thinking patterns. As the regulation says, independent colleges also stand at 
the same level as universities ... [so] if TPEC was willing to merge, the program would be 
very successful and accommodate the Ministry of Education's policies and target". 
Furthermore, U6 observed that "The discrepancies of power strongly influenced the 
program. The different power comes mainly from different school status, or different 
historical background". However, U6 thought TPEC thought itself to be more powerful and 
therefore should not merge on inferior terms because "The TPEC believed they are stronger 
[because] they got more and more budget in these 3 years. They had co-operation with 
sports apparatus companies and gyms ... also the students could get a job easily. Therefore, 
the Taipei Municipal Physical Education College didn't want to merge". 
6.4.5 Q5. Did the institutions have the choice of incorporating partner, or of looking for 
other partners? 
Some interviewees thought that the municipal circumstance meant that there was really no 
other obvious merging partner available for either establishment. For example, UI noted 
that "In Taipei City, there are two [municipal] higher education establishments [TPEC and 
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TMUE]... [so] legally the property could be transferred easier. ". Also, U2 said 
"Because 
... municipal establishment, difficult [to merge with non-municipal] and hard to 
sell to government ... Taipei only has [these] two higher education 
establishments ... Therefore we were going to merge". 
However, U3 held the view that it was policy therefore "we did not have any choice". In 
fact, U3 thought that TPEC did not want merger with TMUE [because] the status of the 
Taipei Municipal University of Education is going down". 
Furthermore, U4 revealed that TPEC had a possible alternative partner "due to the Olympic 
2008, the Ministry of Education attempt to consolidate National College of Physical 
Education and Sports with TPEC into National Physical Education University. And this is 
why TPEC is still vacillating". This was supported by U5 who pointed out that "during the 
two colleges' merger, the Taipei City Hall had set up a Preparatory Office to handle the 
affairs, but it was abolished since the program must require two colleges' agreement and 
City Council's approval. ... [also] the Ministry of 
Education demands that TMUE must 
integrate with TPEC.. However, TPEC preferred to merge with Nation Physical Education 
Colleges". 
However, U6 thought that merging with non-Taipei colleges was not feasible because of 
the property issue, he commented that "No [choice because] belong to Taipei City 
Government ... [who] 
designate ... the merger. 
Although, TPEC had intention to consolidate 
with other schools into Physical Education University, they found it difficult to merge with 
Non-Taipei-City colleges due to the problem of their school property". 
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6.4.6 Q6. Was there proactive government or Education Ministry intervention? 
All six interviewees revealed that merger inducements were offered to the colleges by the 
Taipei City government or the Ministry of Education. However, the inducements did not all 
appear to be pulling in the direction of this merger. 
For example, UI commented that "Taipei City Hall guaranteed new establishments (neNv 
stadium, new campus) to TPEC". Also, U2 noted that "the City Hall increased the budget 
to TPEC to encourage the merger, and threatened the budget of TMUC if it didn't merge 
with TPEC soon". U3 revealed that in addition to new campus and stadium, TPEC was 
promised "help to set up the Primary Diploma of Teaching Course and Secondary Diploma 
of Teaching Course .... [to] expel the staffs' misgivings and the sense of insecurity". 
However, U5 indicated that there were alternative inducements for TPEC which may have 
pulled against the TPEC/TMUE merger because "there was an intervention from... the 
Department of Physical Education, Ministry of Education and the National Council on 
Physical Fitness and Sports ... [concerning] the merger of three 
Physical Education Colleges, 
TPEC, National Taiwan College of Physical Education, and National Kaohsiung Physical 
Education College.... [so] TPEC not willing to merge with TMUE". 
Also, U6 revealed an important political factor which could have adversely affected the 
merger attempt "because the Taipei City Mayor turned down the merger.. [which] might 
also have led to the failure of the ongoing project". 
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6.4.7 Q7. Was anyone in control of the merger, and who was it? 
Five of the interviewees had opinions about this. 
U2 thought that "The City Mayor was the key man. This merger case was stopped by him 
because of City mayor election and he wanted more votes from citizens [so he promised] 
more of the education budget would go to elementary school [therefore less for higher 
education merging]". Also, U3 commented that most influential was the "Taipei City 
Council and The Taipei City Mayor. We can not presume the merger if without any 
permission from them". This view was supported by U4 who said "the two college 
properties belong to City Government, the City Council can also supervise the operation" 
Also U5 noted that "the process must be accredited by City Government and by the City 
Council. Furthermore if... the schools become one university... higher-education institutes 
are under the Ministry of Education's control, so ... the difficulties of the procedure are even 
higher than setting up a national university". 
U6 considered that control progressed from the colleges to City Hall to council because 
"both TMUE and TPEC ... are the 
first to control the merger.. [then].. The Taipei City Hall 
and the Taipei City council were the second and the third one who controlled the merger" 
6.4.8 Q8. Was there a merger negotiation process? Who was involved? Did involved 
people all agree that merging was the right direction? Explain. 
All the interviewees reported that there were meetings and discussions concerning the 
proposed merger involving representatives from both colleges, however there is some 
difference of opinion concerning whether this was effective and whether the right 
procedure was adopted. 
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For example, UI put it succinctly "The attendees were about 10 to 20.5 senior directors of 
each college, 3 officers from Taipei City Hall, 5 or 6 experts. We signed the agreement of 
the merger". Furthermore, this view was generally supported by the comments of U2, U4. 
U5, and U6. For example, U2 said "We had two colleges discussions, visits to each other, 
two group workings ... [but] ... When we communicated, we spoke only to people at the 
same status level ... we completed several matters ... use of libraries ... and joint 
establishment day celebration". 
However, U3 thought that the negotiation procedure was inadequate, saying "the 
Department of Education of Taipei City Government does not really understand the 
operation of higher-education institutes.... [merging] is a very significant policy and a huge 
change ... the school convention must make the decision by vote, counting the ballots one 
by one --.. [and] There were many 
factions in the college [TPEC]". 
6.4.9 Q9. Were the finances sufficient to complete the merger? Explain. 
All the interviewees commented that there was no extra funding to finance the merger 
process but extra funding was promised for the merged entity after the completion of the 
merger by Taipei City Hall. 
For example, Ul said only "if we complete the merger, they will provide the university 
more budgets to purchase software and hardware facilities.. [but] Ministry of 
Education ... 
didn't offer any financial support". 
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U3 observed that "The Taipei City Hall promised ... TPEC a new campus after the merger 
accomplished".. 
Also, U5 noted that "We didn't give any funds during the merger attempt. But we offered a 
promise that the budget will be increased for establishments after the merger". However, 
U5 explained that changes had already occurred prior to the merger attempt because TMUE 
had already received extra land from Taipei City when it upgraded to a university and "The 
ministry of Education ... last year ... offered 20 to 30 millions to TMUE 
for their education 
improvement and development". Also, TPEC had already been provided with a larger new 
site in Tian Mu by Taipei City. 
6.4.10 QIO. Concerning your institution prior to merger: What was the organizational 
culture like? 
UIý U2 and U3 gave their view of their own institutions, but U4, U5 and U6 who were not 
in either institution all said that they did not know. 
UI pointed out that "The governance style of the TMUE is hierarchical, but willing to 
change. Training teachers is the teaching goal". U2 answered that. " TMUE focused on 
teaching... [and] evaluated teachers by their teaching ability .... TNIUE 
is hierarchical, but 
wants to change... [and since] both the TMUE and TPEC are focused on 
teaching ... 
[therefore] no problem on teacher evaluation during merging". 
U3 observed that "The TPEC [has] various types of departments, including the researching 
type, teaching type and professional -technique type, [it is] multifarious and well-rounded. 
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All the departments have their own goals. Research in g-type departments, for example, 
always aim at developing their research. TPEC comprises researching, teaching, and 
training. But the TMUE aim at teachers training. And that is why I said the TMUE does not 
benefit us. Frankly speaking, I think the TPEC is the most friendly college in Taiwan. We 
are a democratic college. But unwilling to merge with the TMUE". 
6.4.11 Q 11. Concerning the institution after merger, or attempted merger: What is the 
organizational culture like? 
All the interviewees pointed out that the merger was not completed. 
6.4.12 Q12. Was organizational culture influential in merger success or failure? 
All the interviewees recognized that organization culture could be an important factor in 
merger success or failure, but several did not think it had been the decisive factor. 
For example, UI said "Organizational culture influences the operation of the whole system, 
which includes policy conveyance and workers' opinions. Therefore, organizational culture 
should be dealt with carefully". U2 recognized the importance of culture as a reason for the 
merger, saying "this is a very important reason for trying to merge: The urgency to reform, 
and the market competition increase". 
U3 had the view that organizational culture had been decisive for TPEC because "it is what 
worried about. Dissimilar to our trend, opinions, and teachers' diligent teaching attitude, 
which is the same as foreign teachers', the TMUE can never keep up with us". U5 
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supported this opinion, saying "the two schools have different conceptions. TMUE features 
training teachers and a well-rounded education system, while TPEC features training 
remarkable athletes or ball game players.... their thoughts and conception are also 
dissimilar 
... TMUE, in my opinion.... is more positive than TPEC towards [merger] ... there 
is a huge gap between the two schools' thinking patterns, ... [but]... Since they are 
essentially non-complementary, the merger might be easier to succeed. If the quality of the 
schools is too similar, it will be hard to achieve what we expect since their similar quality 
might conflict together.... but the different historical background, and dissimilar thinking 
would also affect the project". 
However, U4 thought that "In my opinion, the key ... [was].. how many funds or benefits 
the Taipei City Government offered the colleges. Organizational culture was not the main 
factor". Also, U6 thought that "whether the organizational culture... [influenced] success or 
failure, I think it was not the only factor". 
6.4.13 Q13. Did the merger create uncertainty, anxiety, job losses, rivalries, defensive 
strategies, role conflict, ambiguity, distrust? Explain. 
All the interviewees commented that staff in both colleges had worries about their jobs, 
positions and salary levels, even though the City Hall had guaranteed no job losses as a 
result of the merger. 
For example, UI said "Many staff of TMUE were worried about layoffs.. [but].. Taipei City 
Hall guaranteed their jobs. Some staff of TWE worried their college will be eliminated". 
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Also, U2 commented that "[TMUE staffl were worried [about] transfer to other 
department... job loss... [and].. salary level". 
U3 answered that "TPEC staff worried [about] loss of respect and benefits. 
Because 
... TPEC was the smaller part of the merger.. [and]... If merged, the TPEC staff 
worried they have to share funds [from external companies] with TMUE". 
U4 said that "TPEC was worried that merging... would devour their resources and 
discriminate against them". 
U6 observed that "some teachers were concerned about their jobs. Especially... overlaps. 
For example, both colleges had a Department of sports". 
6.4.14 Q 14. Was the merger well planned, and well implemented? Explain. 
Interviewees U4, U5 and U6 refused to comment on this question. U2 did not know. 
However, both UI and U3 had an opinion. UI said that "we specifically make the plan, 
hold the meetings regularly, and often report the progress to the Mayor and the 
Commissioner of the Department of Education. We planned to exchange 20% of teachers 
to each other's campus, exchange 50% of staffs in the administration system". 
U3 indicated that he thought it could have been done better because "I suggested to the 
Commissioner to establish a higher-education committee... The committee, with the same 
rank as the Government institutes, controlled directly by the higher-education 
commissioner, such as Deputy Minister... However, establishing a higher-education 
cornmittee will waste too much manpower and too many resources". 
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6.4.15 Q 15. Are, or were, new roles and responsibilities defined adequately? Explain. 
All the interviewees said either the merger was not completed or they did not know. 
6.4.16 Q 16. Does, or could, the merged institution better meet the needs of students? 
Government? Society? Explain. 
Both UI and U2 gave no answer to this question because the merger was not completed. 
However, the other interviewees had quite a lot to say about the potential benefits of 
merging. 
For example, U3 thought that "The integration would exert two impacts on our society... - 
curtail redundant school departments and facilitate better management of the schools. 
Physical Education ... is potential exercise training 
for all citizens ... [and]... cutting-edge 
training .... 
for students ... who prefer TPEC 
because of its cosmopolitan situation". 
U4 commented that "a merger could make colleges re-evaluate and re-adjust.... To 
Government, a merger can also reduce unnecessary manpower consumption, and help 
enhance and increase schools' education quality, equipment, and their academic status". 
U5 considered that "it would benefit students and government ... students could have a 
wide-range of courses.... government could supervise the university more easily" 
U6 expressed the view that "merger can create a multifarious and well-rounded university 
learning environment, which, undoubtedly, would benefit students. Additionally, the 
efficient operation of the schools' education resources is also what City Government 
expects to see". 
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6.4.17 Q17 How much did staff trust the decision makers? How important is maintaining 
trust, in your view? 
UI thought that trust existed in TMUE because "It is most basic to maintain mutual trust 
among the school members. If employees do not trust their leaders, it will be extremely 
difficult to improve a program. In terms of our school [TMUE], mutual trust and members' 
credibility are quite good". However, U2 did not know. 
U4 said that "Instead of dogmatic intervention, the City Government held a liberal and 
democratic attitude to promote the program. So all staff still believed the Taipei City 
Govemment". 
U3 thought that he generated trust by example, saying "As a leader, I am ... the type of 
person who always executes the plan myself, setting a good example for [staffl. Therefore, 
they trust me, and I can easily lead and convince them". However, trusting others in the 
negotiation process was a different matter for U3 because he said "I only talked to the 
Commissioner or Vice- Commissioner of Education Department during the negotiation. I 
am ... a 
level-13 officer. The director of higher education in Taipei City Hall who 
supervised these two municipal colleges is a level-9 officer. [so] how can I trust or negotiate 
with him? " 
Thus, U3's comments indicated that there was some arrogance which may have obstructed 
the negotiation process, and this was supported by the comments of U5 and U6. For 
example, U5 pointed out that "TMUE didn't trust the lower level officers of the Taipei City 
Hall. They only negotiated with me and the Commissioner of Department of Education of 
Taipei city government". U6 supported this view when he observed that "the President of 
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TMUE talked to The Commissioner and The Vice Commissioner of Department of 
Education of Taipei city Government only. Even though I am supervising the higher 
education in Taipei. He thought I am not the same level". 
6.4.18 Q 18. Was the merger process evaluated? Should it have been? Explain. 
All interviewees said there was no evaluation of the merger process. 
6.4.19 Q19. Did the merger, or merger attempt, solve any problems, or create problems? 
Explain. 
It appears that the merger attempt had contrasting effects on the perceptions about the two 
colleges. 
UI thought "it created a new problem ... Last time, the Mayor of Taipei City agreed the 
merger then rejected it again... also TMUE had a [failed] merger attempt with other 
colleges". However, U3 considered that even though the merger process failed TPEC was 
able to earn respect which will be important in any future negotiations because "TPEC 
proved [its] competence in the market .. [and that 
it] could survive even if not merged with 
another college. Before the merger attempt, the Taipei City Hall and the Taipei Municipal 
Teacher College didn't care about us. Through the unsuccessful merger, they [learned] the 
importance of TPEC". 
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6.4.20 Q20. In your view, did the merger, or merger attempt, succeed or fail? Explain why. 
Most interviewees, but not all, thought the merger attempt failed, as explained below. 
Ul, U2, and U6 thought it failed because of withdrawn political support. For example, UI 
commented that "It failed ... [because] the Mayor turned the merger down. The Mayor hoped 
to use the budgets on primary schools or secondary education institutes, because of the 
election [he thought this would win more votes]". 
However, U3 thought it failed because "TMUE would not benefit us.... Why can't TMUE 
find another school to merge with? The answer is that no college wants to merge with 
them... their faculties cannot compete with ours. Our faculties have potential in the future". 
This was supported by the view of U5 that "TPEC ... feared the distribution of the two 
schools' faculties and departments would be unfair, after they integrated... [perhaps] their 
departments would be eliminated ... [however] TPEC is still discussing the final decision". 
However, U4 expressed the view that "The merger did not fail ... [it was] the Government 
being too passive to execute the project and the Ministry of Education, holding a different 
plan, the attempted merger of three Physical Education Colleges ... [so]... it has not failed it 
is just slower than expected ... the two schools will soon treat merger as their main goal". 
6.5 Conclusion 
The output from the interviews with the fifteen interviewees has generated a lot of relevant 
and interesting primary information concerning both the successful and the unsuccessful 
merger cases. The information is analysed further in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the information derived from the fifteen interviewees is further analysed, 
and considered in terms of the previous research. The first part of the chapter examines the 
information concerning the successful case. The second part of the chapter analyses the 
information concerning the unsuccessful case. The third part is some reflections on the 
research. 
7.2 Analysis of the Information Concerning the Successful Case 
The nine interviewees concerning the successful merger case (Section 5.6) are, or were, 
very senior people in education in Taiwan who were involved directly and intimately 
within one of the merged institutions, had merger involvement within the Taiwan Ministry 
of Education, or as Director of the Special Office set up to manage the merger. Furthermore, 
the responses of the interviewees confirmed that they were involved in the (successful) 
merger case in different ways and from different sides. 
As outlined in the Chapter 1, the driving force behind higher education mergers in Taiwan 
was to attain higher quality, status, and international standards in universities to attract 
more students and be more competitive, in an environment of limited government budgets, 
the increasing profitability-motivation within education, declining birth rate, and 
globalization of education. However, within this background, all the interviewees 
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concurred about the reason for this merger to create National Chiayi University - the initial 
inspiration for the creation of a university in Chiayi City was from a political election 
promise made by the Premier of the Executive Yuan, the governing cabinet of Taiwan. 
Thus, the idea had come from the 'top', and the Ministry of Education set out to implement 
the promise. 
The interviews revealed that National Chiayi Technology College and National Chiayi 
Teacher College were selected for merging by the Ministry because they were both public 
institutions, the Technology college was in Chiayi city, the Teacher college about 15 miles 
away in Chiayi county. The technology college was about twice as big as the teacher 
college in staff, students and campus area, and almost twice the age. Tuition fees and 
salaries were similar. 
The interviewees reported that there was a merger negotiation process involving 
representatives from both colleges and the Ministry and that those present all agreed that 
merging was the right way forward (this followed internal college meetings where there 
was agreement to the merger). However, the interviewee from the Teacher college (S4) 
suggested that any people who had expressed opposition to the merger initially were not 
subsequently included in the negotiation process. My own view is that only a few people 
opposed the merger plan initially and some of these were subsequently persuaded that it 
was a good idea, however a few who still objected decided to leave the college voluntarily. 
The interviews revealed that the merger process did not cost a lot and there was no extra 
budget requirement, because the Ministry promises of extra university budget after merger 
completion allowed plans for room alterations, new hardware and software to be made. 
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The appointment of a director of the special office (S 1) to be in control of the merger, who 
had no prior affiliation with either of the merging colleges and appeared to be trusted by 
both sides, appears to have been an important element for successful merger completion. 
For example, the interviews revealed that most staff in the Teacher college trusted the 
director of the special office and first president of the merged university because some staff 
had been his students and he respected the tradition of the Teacher College. This person 
decided the structure of the new university and became its first president. Furthermore, 
most of the interviewees who were able to comment thought that the merger had been well 
planned and implemented, although all of the potential administration efficiencies were 
thought yet to be achieved. However, the interviewee from the former Teachers college 
thought that the implementation for the education institute, which was formed mainly from 
the former Teacher college, was not yet good enough and some staff were angry about it. 
Those interviewees who expressed a view suggested that power differentials were not 
important in the merger mainly because it was a political promise, or they did not see 
power differentials operating, or they thought power resources were similar or did not 
create difficulties. However, the words of some of the interviewees reveal that the 
Technology college was superior in budget, students, staff, campus size and some staff felt 
merging was unnecessary for the Technology college as it was possibly large enough to 
upgrade to a university alone. Therefore the Technology College negotiated from a position 
of greater strength compared with the Teacher college, because it would make up about 2/3 
of the merged university. Furthermore, the Teacher college had previously tried merging 
with National Chung Cheng University, but this had failed. Therefore the feeling within the 
Teacher college may have been that merging with the Technology college was their only 
hope in the longer term because the Ministry wished it to happen and the Ministry 
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controlled the funding. The Technology college was only merging because of top-dowii 
Ministry pressure (its source of finance) but as a consequence it was able to extract many 
guarantees, including upgrade to a university, from the Ministry to avoid any internal 
resistance. However, as pointed out by MI, promise of upgrade to university has since 
proven to be an ineffective inducement for several higher status colleges to merge with 
teacher colleges in the case of other attempts to consolidate teacher colleges with other 
colleges. Therefore, the Technology college is so far unique in Taiwan in accepting this 
incentive. However, the interviews revealed that the promises made to the Teacher college 
prior to merging concerning more courses and an enlarged budget appear not to have been 
fulfilled by the distribution of finance within National Chiayi University. 
Thus, the objective interpretation must be that the answers of the interviewees actually 
suggest that power differentials were important during the merger process and did affected 
the outcomes within the merged institution but that this was not widely recognized, or it 
was not admitted by the interviewees with the exception of S4 who was aware of anger and 
resentment from the outcome. 
Furthermore, the top-down power dimension from the Ministry of Education was a critical 
factor concerning merger completion. If the colleges had not merged together they risked a 
future reduction of budget, rejection of proposals for starting new courses, and rejection of 
upgrade to university. Indeed the Ministry guarantees concerning workers' rights, salaries, 
no job losses and new building finance probably dissipated most logical arguments against 
merging. 
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Concerning organizational culture, it appears the Technology college had a democratic 
culture, with assessment by research achievements, while the Teachers college had a more 
hierarchical top-down culture, with assessment on teaching ability. In National Chiayi 
university the democratic style of the larger Technology college has become the 
predominant culture, although a culture gap may exist within the merged university which 
may take 5-10 years to close, according to one interviewee. The interviewees did not think 
organizational culture had impeded the merger, and even though long history and some 
conservative thinking existed, the Government policy and inducements had won over the 
staff of both colleges. 
Although the usual anxieties associated with merging were not present in the merger to 
form National Chiayi University because of government promises to protect salaries, 
employment and rights, there was apparently another important concern regarding the 
naming of the new university. Perhaps for this reason, a new name, different from both 
colleges was chosen. However, it is evident that unhappiness has been created among some 
staff from the Teacher college concerning the budget allocation for the Education institute, 
because it is less than they received before as an independent college, which is not what 
they expected. Thus, power differentials appear to have influenced the outcome as the 
weaker partner appeared to either lose out or not to gain as much as expected. 
None of the interviewees made any complaint about role definition in the merged university, 
even though some staff had been reassigned to new positions. According to most 
interviewees the merged university offered advantages to students, government and society 
with more courses, higher standards, the awarding of university degrees, more 
achievements, easier control by the Ministry, and a model for successful merging. Most 
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interviewees thought trust was maintained during the merger and this was very important to 
retain leadership credibility and get a successful outcome. However, some staff from the 
Education institute did not like the second president of National Chiayi University because 
of too fast changes. Evaluation of the merged university showed it received "very good 
comment" and "highly regarded". Also the merger had solved several problems for both 
colleges for example their arrested development, no new courses were allowed, no upgrade 
to university, and declining student recruitment, without the merger. 
All the interviewees thought it was a successful merger because the merged university still 
exists, higher education standards are easier to achieve, the evaluation has been favourable, 
and staff, students, and research publications have all increased. These comments are 
supported by the greater numbers of staff (Table 3.1), higher numbers of students (Table 
3.3) and better academic results (Table 3.7), and although there are more students per staff 
member (Table 5.4) the staff are more highly qualified (Figure 3.1). Regarding budgets, 
Table 3.9 illustrated that budgets rose for two years following the merger and then declined 
in 2003 and 2004 although they were still slightly greater than the total budget before 
merging even though there were about 24 per cent more day students, which suggests much 
greater efficiency. Perhaps, this partial decline of budget and sharing amongst more 
students also explains the reason that the Education Institute budget is reportedly lower 
within the University than it was before merging, and which is causing some anger among 
staff, however, maybe other departments have lower budgets too (but I have been unable to 
obtain the internal budget information to confirm or deny this). 
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It would seem unlikely that success or failure in merging would result from only one or two 
of the considered factors, rather it is more probable that a number of factors contribute 
simultaneously. 
In the terminology of the previous literature reviewed in Chapter 2, the National Chiayi 
University merger was a two-partner, cross-sectoral consolidation with dissimilar academic 
profiles, against a background of increasing competition, low quality and falling student 
demand. The merging was an external initiative with unitary control structure, but there 
was a merger negotiation process following agreement of parties, and the merger was well 
planned (Harman and Harman, 2003), there was no difference of tuition fees (Bates and 
Santerre (2000), it absorbed all members of the merging colleges to minimize objections 
and stress (Humphal, 1971), there was political and financial pressure (Meek, 1988), 
apparent transparency existed for the involved, but without consulting students (Harman, 
2000), care was taken in naming the new institution (Sharpe, 1999; 2003), there was job 
survival, no group dominance, no coalitions of resistance, no defensive strategies or 
federal/state rivalries (Martin, 1996), political intervention was not perceived as 
unwelcome (Rechter and Scott, 1988), and the merged institution could better meet the 
needs of students, government and society according to the interviewees (Hazelkorn, 2004). 
Therefore, this merger appeared to possess many of the prerequisites for a successful 
merger outcome (Section 2.4.1). 
The appointment of a capable person respected by both colleges to plan and control the 
merger was probably an important factor in overcoming potential resistance and reducing 
anxieties, and it led to good planning and good merger control. Furthermore, the size and 
status difference, although perceived as small, may have helped to reduce the chances of 
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determined opposition in conjunction with the promises of protected worker rights and no 
job losses from the Ministry of Education. However, the respect for the top-down authority 
in the culture was probably the crucial factor for success in this merger case. The top-down 
political decision for merging was consistent and ever-Present during merging and both 
colleges appeared to have no real choice but to continue to negotiate and complete the 
merger, even if there were some reservations. Top-down pressure does not work in all 
cultures, for example it was unsuccessful in achieving a giant merger of higher education 
colleges in South Australia (Martin, 1996), in merging the University of New England with 
the Armidale College of Advanced Technology (Lamb, 1988), in some schools in the USA 
(Hoff, 2004), and in the case of La Trobe University and Lincoln Institute of Health 
Sciences in Australia because, until LIHS was promised it could retain its autonomy, there 
was fierce resistance (Scott, 1988). But in the case of the National Chiayi University 
merger, the top-down authority was consistent with the well respected and widely 
prevailing traditional Chinese culture. Thus the prevailing societal culture in the case of 
National Chiayi University was probably crucial to acceptance of the inevitability of the 
authority decision. Furthermore, it is probable that the democratic style of the larger part 
would not represent a feared obstacle to the smaller part, and the hierarchical culture of the 
smaller part could have been beneficial because once the senior people within the Teacher 
college had given their approval for the merger, it would seem natural that the sub-ordinate 
staff would follow as that was their familiar organizational and societal culture. 
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7.3 Analysis of the Information Concerning the Unsuccessful Case 
The six interviewees (Section 5.6) concerning the unsuccessful case are, or were, all senior 
people in Taipei Municipal University of Education (TMUE), Taipei Physical Education 
College (TPEC), or Taipei City Government Department of Education who had been 
involved with the TMUE/TPEC merger negotiation process and could provide an insight 
into some of the different experiences and perspectives on the merger. 
From the responses given by the interviewees, it appears that the driver behind the merger 
was the Ministry of Education's policy to have fewer larger higher education 
establishments and to establish universities in every city, in order to raise quality to 
international standards and overcome the problem of too many teacher graduates for the 
available jobs. Initially the Taipei City mayor encouraged the merger because it would raise 
the status of the city, however the limited education budget was an obstacle. 
Although TMUE had I 10 years of existence compared with TPEC's 32 years, and about 
twice as many students, the perceived status of the colleges was said to be similar. The 
TPEC site was smaller but more valuable than that of TMUC, and TPEC had substantial 
additional funding income from private industries. 
The interviewees went on to reveal that TMUE was under pressure from the Ministry of 
Education to merge with another college as this was a condition for its recent upgrading to 
university status. TPEC were encouraged to merge with TMUE by the Commissioner of 
Taipei City Hall. However, TPEC did not want to merge with TMUC because, since 
TMUE had already upgraded to a university, this put TPEC in an inferior negotiating 
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position. Also, TPEC students were all employable, so TPEC felt that it was the partner 
which was helping TMUE, whose students had employability problems, rather than vice 
versa. In fact, TPEC preferred to merge with other physical education colleges not in Taipei, 
but the obstacle to this was the college was the property of Taipei City. 
Both the Taipei City government and the Ministry of Education had offered inducements - 
more funding after merging, a new stadium for TPEC, and permission for new courses. The 
merger negotiations involved talking between individuals of the same grade which could 
have obstructed wider exchange of information and the understanding of the views of staff 
at all levels. However, the Taipei City mayor withdrew his support during the negotiation 
period in order to promise extra budget for primary and elementary schools to win electoral 
votes. 
TMUE had a hierarchical organizational culture, while TPEC was more democratic and 
friendly. Only the TPEC interviewee thought that the difference in organizational culture 
had been a decisive influence on the merger attractiveness to TPEC. It is probable that it 
would have been difficult for democratic TPEC to withstand being subsumed into the 
hierarchical culture of the larger TMUE, which would clearly be a major discouragement 
for TPEC to merge with TMUE. However, this factor was not really appreciated by any of 
the TMUE, Taipei City or Ministry of Education interviewees, even though they thought 
culture was important. Uncertainties and fears about job losses and salary changes appeared 
to have been dissolved by guarantees from City Hall. Also, the planning of the merger 
appeared adequate and not a contributory factor to the merger failure. F 
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There seemed to be more potential benefits from merging for TMUE than for TPEC, 
however surprisingly the TMUE interviewees refused to answer this question. Taipei City 
Hall confirmed to me that if TMUE didn't agree to merge with TPEC, Taipei City Hall 
would cut their budget as a punishment, and the Ministry of Education may demote them to 
a college, but of course TMUE people will not admit the benefits. 
The question of trust revealed some particularly interesting truths about the higher 
education culture. The interviewees thought trust was important, and one interviewee 
generated trust by "leading by example", yet he would not discuss the merger with the 
Taipei City Hall people because they were at an inferior level and therefore he could not 
trust or negotiate with them. This arrogance could well have been an obstruction to a 
successful negotiation process, or was it merely a 'convenient' excuse for the TPEC 
director. 
However, since the merger failure, TMUE and TPEC have had contrasting experiences. 
TMUE approached other colleges about merging and was rebuffed, which has dented its 
self-regard. However, TPEC has survived well and grown financially much faster than 
TMUC since the merger failure. In fact TPEC now has experienced increase in budget such 
that its budget now exceeds that of TMUC (as illustrated in Chapter 3- Tables 3.9 and 
3.10), gaining more respect from both TMUE and City Hall. 
In terms of the previous literature, this merger attempt was a two-partner, cross-sectoral 
consolidation with dissimilar academic profiles, with a background of competition, low 
quality and falling student demand for one partner only, the merging was an external 
initiative, and there was only a narrow merger negotiation process, and no full agreement of 
both parties, and no shared vision (Harman and Harman, 2003), no difference of tuition 
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fees (Bates and Santerre (2000), members of the merging colleges would be absorbed to 
minimize objections and stress (Humphal, 1971), there was political pressure to merge but 
this was withdrawn (Meek, 1988), only partial transparency existed because negotiations 
were at the same level only, and there was no reported consultation with students (Harman, 
2000), no care was taken in deciding a name for the new institution (Sharpe, 1999; 2003), 
job survival, group dominance, coalitions of resistance, defensive strategies were uncertain 
factors (Martin, 1996), political pressure was unwelcome to one party (Rechter and Scott, 
1988), and it was uncertain whether the merged institution would fully meet the needs of 
students, government and society according to interviewees (Hazelkorn, 2004). Hence, it 
appears from the interviewees comments that the merger lacked many of the prerequisites 
for success. 
TMUE interviewees think the merger attempt failed because of withdrawn political support, 
however the view from the TPEC interviewee suggests that it really failed because TMUE 
had an unattractive hierarchical culture and TMUE had an unjustified superior self-regard 
making it unprepared to negotiate with TPEC as an equal partner. Thus, it appears that the 
key cause of merger failure was the withdrawal of the support for the merger from the 
Taipei City mayor. Without the top-down authority promoting the merger, TPEC could 
escape from merging with TMUE which had a conservative hierarchical culture 
unattractive to democratic and successful TPEC. 
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7.4 Comparison of findings from the two cases 
The findings from the successful case and the unsuccessful cases are compared in Table 7.1. 
In the Table, the first column is a list of factors identified in both mergers. The second 
column indicates Y (Yes) or N (No) whether this factor was present in the successful case. 
The Third column indicates Y (Yes) or N (No) whether this factor was present in the 
unsuccessful case, or not applicable as did not reach this stage (-). 
Table 7.1 Comparison of findings from the two cases 
Factor Successful case Unsuccessful case 
Agreement reached within each 
Y N 
institution for merging 
Merger negotiation process Y Y 
Coalitions of resistance and 
N Y 
defensive strategies existed 
Capable person respected by 
both colleges was appointed to Y 
plan and control the merger 
Merger was well planned Y 
The merger absorbed all 
members of the merging Y 
colleges 
Transparency existed in the Y N 
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merger negotiations 
Care was taken in naming the 
Y 
new institution 
There was consistent political 
Y N 
and financial pressure to merge 
Political intervention which was 
Y N 
not perceived as unwelcome 
The merged institution was 
perceived to better meet the 
Y 
needs of students, government 
and society 
There was respect for the top- 
down authority which was 
Y N 
consistent and ever-present 
during merging 
Both colleges appeared to have 
no real choice but to continue to 
Y N 
negotiate and complete the 
merger 
The hierarchical style of the 
larger part was probably 
N Y 
unattractive to the democratic 
smaller part 
Top-down support for merging N Y 
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was withdrawn during the 
merger negotiations 
From Table 7.1, it can be easily seen that many differences were identified between the two 
cases from analysis of the answers of the interviewees in the qualitative data collection. 
Since the questions reflected important factors in merging raised in previous research, it is 
considered that the differences were significant contributors to success or failure in the 
merger attempts. 
7.5 Reflection on the Research 
Gaining access is a well-known problem in social research (Hornsby-Smith, 1993). To 
gather primary qualitative data about successful and unsuccessful higher education mergers 
in Taiwan posed specific problems for this research because there appeared to be only one 
example of a successful merger, so gaining access was crucial for the carrying out of the 
research, and furthermore it seemed possible that people with experience of unsuccessful 
mergers may not have wished to discuss the reasons behind the failure. In Taiwanese 
culture, sensitivities can be significant, so for a doctoral student to gain significant access 
required a careful tactful approach. However, if the most senior people agreed, it was likely 
others would agree to participate because of the autocratic nature of the education hierarchy. 
As reported in Chapter 5,1 decided on target individuals and broached the idea carefully. 
The fact that I had prepared an interview guide based on questions raised in published 
research into higher education mergers proved to be crucial, because seeing the questions 
ahead of the interview was a condition of most of the interviews, and relevant questions 
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were essential for successful agreement for these busy senior people. The participation of 
the interviewees validated my approach procedure, which made this research possible. 
With all social research, the question arises, were the responses meaningful? The validity 
and reliability of data is often a concern (Fielding, 1993). During interviews, I considered 
sometimes whether people were always sufficiently considering the questions, and whether 
they were actually answering the question asked, because of some moving away from the 
point (intentionally or unintentionally); whether they were always passing on their own 
opinion or offering 'accepted wisdom'; and whether "No comment" or "I don't know" were 
convenient escapes or political sensitivities. However, I resisted interjecting at these times 
to avoid any guiding towards particular answers, in order not to discourage them from 
giving their answers in their way, and not to give them any excuse to prematurely terminate 
the interview. Instead, I continued recording the answers for later analysis, and sometimes I 
asked the question again slightly differently. Thus, with the exception of some interviewees 
giving "no comment" to a few questions probably indicating political sensitivity which they 
wished to avoid, the interviewees answered most of the interview guide questions in what 
appeared to be a frank manner, and the face-to-face context would suggest the occurrence 'r, 
of few misrepresentations (Section 2.1). My overall reflection on this is that, since 
apparently relevant and interesting subjective perspectives, sometimes different, were 
surfaced for research analysis, then it is likely that the responses were meaningful for the 
contexts. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
The analysis suggests that the National Chiayi University merger case was successful 
because many of the prerequisites for successful merging were present and the top-down 
political decision for merging was ever-present during merging. This top-down authority 
was consistent with the well respected widely prevailing traditional Chinese culture. 
Furthermore, the democratic style of the larger part did not represent a feared obstacle to 
the smaller part, and the hierarchical culture of the smaller part was probably beneficial to 
merging because once the senior people had given their approval for merging, it was 
natural for the sub-ordinate staff to follow this lead as that was their familiar organizational 
and societal culture. 
The analysis suggests that the unsuccessful merger case, between TMUE and TPEC, failed 
because of the withdrawal of senior Taipei City political support for the merger which 
meant that organizational cultural differences became crucial - the larger TMUE had a 
conservative hierarchical culture which was unattractive to the democratic and more easy- 
going culture of the smaller TPEC. Furthermore, TMUE had an unjustified superior self- 
regard and was not prepared to negotiate with TPEC as an equal partner. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
Six explicit research aims were stated at the start of this research: 
(1) To carry out a literature review about higher education mergers 
(2) To search for existing published data about higher education mergers in Taiwan 
(3) To generate new data about higher education mergers in Taiwan 
(4) To analyse the data to generate new understanding about higher education mergers, 
principally in Taiwan 
(5) To explain why one merger has been successful and another merger was unsuccessful. 
(6) To recommend guidelines for successful higher education sector merging in Taiwan 
8.2 Literature Review about Higher Education Mergers 
The literature review of higher education mergers established that merging of educational 
institutions has a long history, and is still occurring across the world in response to the 
changing needs and demands of the society which the education system aims to serve. 
Humphal noted in 1971 that an information gap existed in published literature on the 
organizational and behavioural aspects of mergers. However, this literature review carried 
out in 2005/6 was able to reveal a lot of relevant published literature on higher education 
mergers across the world including both Westem-style democracies and centrally- 
controlled countries like China. 
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It was deduced from the literature review that, although there is some disagreement among 
researchers concerning the effects of differing status and power and their influence on 
success and failure in merging, the chances of merger success appear to be enhanced if 
some factors are included, such as - maintenance of trust, and no job losses during merging 
(Humphal, 1971); large difference in size or status (Goedegebuure and Vos, 1988); strong 
strategic leadership (Sehoole, 2005); a merger negotiation process, good planning, 
agreement of all institutions (Harman and Harman, 2003); high transparency, and student 
consultation (Harman, 2000); better meeting the needs of students, government or society 
(Hazelkorn, 2004); care taken with naming of the merged institution, someone in control, 
sufficient finance, good role definition (Sharpe, 1999; 2003). Moreover, it can be deduced 
that for success other factors should be avoided, such as - personal stress, uncertainty, 
anxiety, role conflict, ambiguity, distrust, organizational stress (Humphal, 1971); highly 
competitive staff culture, political intervention perceived as unwelcome (Rechter and Scott, 
1988); threats to jobs, coalitions of resistance, defensive strategies (Martin, 1996); loss of 
status (Zhiping, 2000); and declining tuition fees (Bates and Santerre, 2000). 
The conclusion from the literature review was that there was an extensive body of prior 
research in the area of mergers in education in 2006 which seemed to indicate that mergers 
often have both supporters and opponents, involve cultural, social, political and 
international issues, and can involve some difficulties resulting in success or failure. None 
of the prior literature had reported in-depth qualitative interviews with stakeholders 
involved in mergers to elucidate differences between successful and unsuccessful cases. 
However, the literature did raise a number of important questions concerning mergers 
which formed the basis for the interview guide used in the collection of primary qualitative 
data for analysis. 
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8.3 Existing Published Data About Higher Education Mergers in Taiwan 
A database, library and Internet search was carried out at the start of this research in 2005, 
and this was repeated about nine months later in June 2006, however no published data 
about higher education mergers in Taiwan was discovered. This supports the gap in 
knowledge, which was identified in Chapter 1, and justifies this research as a first step 
towards generating much needed understanding about higher education mergers in Taiwan. 
8.4 New Data and Understanding about Higher Education Mergers in Taiwan 
In the course of this research, new Primary data was collected about the reality of higher 
education mergers in Taiwan by qualitative interviews with senior participants in two 
higher education mergers in Taiwan, referred to as successful and unsuccessful merger 
cases for the purpose of clarity in reporting the research. 
The case of the merging of the National Chiayi Technology college and the National Chiayi 
Teacher college to form the National Chiayi University in 2000 was termed the successful 
case because it continues to be in existence as a single merged institution at the time of this 
research in 2005/6. 
The case of the attempted merging of Taipei Municipal University of Education (TMUC) 
and Taipei Physical Education college (TPEC) in 2001/2 was termed the unsuccessful 
merger case because merger negotiations were aborted and they remain separate institutions 
at the time of this research in 2005/6. 
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Both the successful and unsuccessful merger cases involved two partner, cross-sectoral 
consolidations (or attempted consolidation) of public institutions with dissimilar academic 
profiles against a background of increasing competition in higher education in Taiwan, and 
merging was an external initiative. 
In the successful case, the merger appeared to have many of the prerequisites for a 
successful merger outcome, as deduced from previous published literature (Chapter 2 and 
Section 8.2): 
(1) Agreement was reached within each institution that the merger was the right way 
forward 
(2) There was a merger negotiation process 
(3) The merger was well planned 
(4) The merger absorbed all members of the merging colleges to allay fears 
(5) There was political and financial pressure to merge 
(6) Apparent transparency existed in the merger negotiations 
(7) Care was taken in naming the new institution 
(8) There were no coalitions of resistance or no defensive strategies 
(9) Political intervention which was not perceived as unwelcome 
(10) The merged institution was perceived to better meet the needs of students, 
government and society 
(11) A capable person respected by both colleges was appointed to plan and control the 
merger 
(12) The size and status difference, although perceived as small, may have helped to 
reduce the chances of opposition 
(13) There was respect for the top-down authority which was consistent and ever-present 
during merging, in the prevailing traditional Chinese culture 
187 
(14) Both colleges appeared to have no real choice but to continue to negotiate and 
complete the merger 
(15) The democratic style of the larger part represented no feared obstacle to the smaller 
part, and the hierarchical culture of the smaller part meant that once senior people 
approved of the merger, the sub-ordinate staff would follow. 
In the case of the unsuccessful case, the merger appeared to lack several of the prerequisites 
for a successful merger outcome, as deduced from previous published literature (Chapter 2 
and Section 8.2), creating fears because: 
(1) Agreement was not reached within each institution that the merger was the right way 
forward 
(2) There were coalitions of resistance and defensive strategies 
(3) Full transparency did not exist in the merger negotiations 
(4) Political intervention was perceived as unwelcome by one party 
(5) The smaller college thought it had other choices for merging 
(6) The hierarchical style of the larger part was probably unattractive to the democratic 
smaller part 
(7) Top-down support for merging was withdrawn during the merger negotiations 
These new data point to the conclusions presented in the next section. 
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8.5 Conclusions 
Concerning public higher education mergers in Taiwan, merging is more likely to be 
successful if- 
(1) Most of the prerequisites for success deduced from previous literature are present (e. g. 
no job losses; transparent merger negotiation process; good planning and 
implementation; care in naming; the merger better meeting the needs of students, 
government and society) 
(2) Consensus agreement is reached within each prospective merging institution that 
merging is the way forward for the institution, prior to the start of the merger process. 
(3) Policy support for merging from the most senior authorities is consistent and continues 
throughout the process of merging. 
(4) The appointment of a neutral and capable person trusted by all merging institutions to 
plan and control the merging process is important. 
(5) A democratic organizational culture exists in the larger part because it is less likely to 
be an obstacle to merging in cases where colleges have contrasting organizational 
cultures. 
8.6 Recommendations 
The main criteria for successful merging of public higher education institutions in Taiwan, 
although it is considered highly probable that the criteria are also applicable to private 
higher education institutions in Taiwan, are: 
Consistent and continuing political and senior authority support for the merger with a 
firm commitment to absorb all staff of merging institutions. 
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(2) Consensus agreement in each prospective institution that merging is the right way 
forward, after consideration of alternative scenarios, prior to the start of the merger 
process. 
(3) Establishment of merger negotiations involving representatives of the prospective 
merging institutions and Ministry of Education officials, to decide on the merger 
requirements, decide resources, new outline structure, funding allocation, the naming of 
the new institution, and how to better meet the needs of students, government and 
society. A report of the discussions and outcomes of each negotiation meeting should 
be issued in each prospective merging institution to ensure transparency and maintain 
trust. 
(4) Set up a merger office with a Director, who is a senior person in higher education and 
who is acceptable to all prospective parties to the merger, to plan and control the 
merger implementation and maintain trust. 
(5) If there are contrasting cultures in merging institutions, ensure that the organizational 
culture of the merged institution is democratic in nature in order to create a culture to 
hear all perspectives. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1- Interview Guide Draft 2 
1. What was the stated purpose of the merger? 
Q2. Were there prior problems of - major re-structuring; institutional fragmentation; lack of 
financial viability or academic viability; low efficiency; low quality; financial 
problems; falling student demand; competition; technology changes; globalization; 
new regulations? 
Q3 Was merging from an internal initiative or from external pressures? Explain. 
Q4. Did some key personalities inspire the merger? 
Q5 Were there differences in size or status between the establishments? Were these large or 
small differences? 
Q6. Was it a consolidation or a take-over? Was it a single sector and a cross-sectoral 
merger? Was it a two-partner and multi-partner merger? 
Q7. Were the previous academic profiles similar or different? 
Q8. Does, or would, the merged institution meet the needs of students? Government? 
Society? 
Q9. Was care taken in naming the new institution? Who decided the name? 
10. Who, or what, decided the new President? 
1. Did the institutions have choice of incorporating partner? 
2. Were there institutional history factors to take into account, and were they? 
Q13. Was there strong institutional leadership, strategic leadership, strong proactive 
government intervention? Did someone have a concept of the new whole? Was 
anyone in control of the merger, and who? 
4. Is the new control structure of a federal or unitary type? 
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15. Are new roles and responsibilities defined adequately? 
16. Did the new institution need a new management system? 
7. Is there a benefit incentive scheme? 
18. Were the finances sufficient to complete the merger? 
Q19. Were the human resources considerations sufficient? 
Q20. Was there effectiveness of scale, in terms of size and geographical closeness? 
Q2 1. Was there effectiveness of cross-disciplinary integration? 
Q22. Did the separate institutions have different cultures? 
Q23. Concerning your former institution: Was the academic role fairly loose or tightly 
prescribed?; Was your main professional loyalty to your discipline (subject) or to 
your institution?; Was teaching or research most valued?; Was the reward structure 
based on research output or teaching ability?; Was the governance styles mainly 
democratic or mainly hierarchical?; Did any of these create problems during merging? 
Q24. Concerning the new institution: Is the academic role fairly loose or tightly prescribed?; 
Is your main professional loyalty to your discipline (subject) or to your institution?; 
Is teaching or research most valued?; Is the reward structure based on research output 
or teaching ability?; Is the governance style mainly democratic or mainly 
hierarchical?; Does the new institution have a coherent culture? 
Q25. Have the previously separate institutions retained any autonomy in the merged 
institution? 
Q26. Was the merger well planned? 
Q27. Was there a merger negotiation process? Was consultation wide or narrow? Who was 
involved? Did involved people all agree that merging is the right direction? 
Q28. Concerning the role of key stakeholders: Was transparency high or low? Was 
important information communicated well or poorly? Were students involved? 
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Q29. Was there a merger strategy? Was it agreed by all institutions? 
Q30. Were any of the following factors issues for stakeholders: centralization, job survival, 
group dominance, coalitions of resistance, defensive strategies and federal/state 
rivalries? 
Q3 1. Did the merger cause personal stress - uncertainty, anxiety, role conflict, ambiguity, 
distrust? 
Q32. Did the merger cause organizational stress? 
Q33. Did the merged institutional absorb all members of the previous separate institutions? 
Q34. Were power differentials influential in shaping the merged entity? 
Q35 How much did staff trust the decision makers? How important is maintaining trust, in 
your view? 
Q36. Was there increase in tuition fee or salary prior to merging? 
Q37. How has the ownership of college plant and property been managed? 
Q38. Was the merger process evaluated? 
Q39 In your view, did the merger solve any problems, or create problems? Explain. 
Q40 In your view, did the merger succeed or fail? Explain. 
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Appendix 2- Interview Guide Draft 3 
In the interview, interviewees to make comments and answer questions from own 
experience or in own opinion. 
Interview Guide Questions 
1. What was your role in the merger, or merger attempt? Explain. 
Q2. Why did the institutions merge or try to merge? Explain. 
Q3. Were there differences in size, status, history, geographic position, tuition fee, salary, 
education profile or education sector prior to merging? 
Q4. Were prior power differentials influential in shaping the merged entity? Explain. 
Q5. Did the institutions have choice of incorporating partner, or look for other partners? 
Q6. Was there proactive government or Education Ministry intervention? 
Q7. Was anyone in control of the merger, and who was it? 
Q8. Was there a merger negotiation process? Who was involved? Did involved people all 
agree that merging was the right direction? Explain. 
Q9. Were the finances sufficient to complete the merger? Explain. 
10. Concerning your institution prior to merger: What was the organizational culture like? 
e. g. Was the academic role fairly loose or tightly prescribed?; Was your main 
professional loyalty to your discipline (subject) or to your institution?; Was teaching 
or research most valued?; Was the reward structure based on research output or 
teaching ability?; Was the governance styles mainly democratic or mainly 
hierarchical?; Did any of these create problems during merging? 
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Q11. Concerning the institution after merger, or attempted merger: What is the 
organizational culture like? 
e. g. Is the academic role fairly loose or tightly prescribed?; Is your main professional 
loyalty to your discipline (subject) or to your institution?; Is teaching or research 
most valued?; Is the reward structure based on research output or teaching ability?; Is 
the governance style mainly democratic or mainly hierarchical?; Does the new 
institution have a coherent culture? 
12. Was organizational culture influential in merger success or failure? 
13. Did the merger create uncertainty, anxiety, job losses, rivalries, defensive strategies, 
role conflict, ambiguity, distrust? Explain. 
14. Was the merger well planned, and well implemented? Explain. 
15. Are, or were, new roles and responsibilities defined adequately? Explain. 
16. Does, or could, the merged institution better meet the needs of students? Government? 
Society? Explain. 
Q17 How much did staff trust the decision makers? How important is maintaining trust, in 
your view? 
18. Was the merger process evaluated? Should it have been? Explain. 
19. Did the merger, or merger attempt, solve any problems, or create problems? Explain. 
Q20. In your view, did the merger, or merger attempt, succeed or fail? Explain why. 
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